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Abstract 
Few studies have examined depression in children from an Information Processing (IP) 
perspective. In this thesis a number of domains of IP (known to be associated with adult 
depression) are examined in children and adolescents, in particular, autobiographical memory 
specificity in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Foremost, overgeneral memory (OGM) 
was found for the first time, to be characteristic of dysphoric (Study 1) and clinically 
depressed children (Study 2). Similarity in the extent of the OGM bias in depressed and 
dysphoric children was observed. OGM was also comparable across child, adolescent and 
adult depressed groups (Study 2). Second, OGM predicted depressive symptoms in children 
during a stressful life event, in the first longitudinal diathesis-stress investigation of OGM to 
date (Study 3). OGM was also linked for the first time to an overgeneral thinking style and to 
a depressive attributional style (Study 3) thereby offering possible mechanistic insight in 
OGM. Third, in support of Williams' (1996) developmental origins hypothesis, OGM was 
also demonstrated in children in residential care who had suffered significant independently 
verified negative life events (Study 5). OGM in these youth was positively correlated with 
deficits in social problem solving and facial-affect identification, in part contextualizing OGM 
in children alongside depresso-typical biases. Performance on the AMT also varied as a 
function of severity of abuse with more abused children demonstrating less OGM -a recency 
memorial coping strategy is proposed to account for this effect. Fourth, a new measure of EF 
was introduced and highlights the importance of encoding preferences in explaining 0GM 
(Studies I& 5). Finally, considerable attention is paid to the pattern of valence results across 
studies. It is noted that effects most often lie with biases in the processing of positive 
information and that future studies may benefit from a concentration on this aspect of 
depressogenic bias utilizing a developmental perspective. Several key theoretical and practical 
implications are carefully discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Abstract 1 This General Introduction provides an outline of the thesis and its primary 
research objectives. In Part I, a general background on the topic of depression in childhood is 
presented. Therein, issues pertaining to childhood depression are considered and discussed in 
light of adult depression. In Part II, prominent theories of cognition and emotion and the 
information-processing approach are introduced as the central theories guiding this body of 
research. In Part III, the current IP research in childhood depression is reviewed. 
2 
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Thesis Aims and Theoretical Perspective 
The objective of the present thesis is to examine cognitive aspects of depression in children 
and adolescents, looking for the origins and possible development of cognitive biases strongly 
associated with adult depression. Many theories of depression assert that the origins of 
processing biases occur in childhood or adolescence where Schemas are being established 
(e. g. Beck, 1976). The experimental aim of this research project was to investigate 
depression-associated emotion-related cognitive biases in children, assessing the parameters 
of these biases where appropriate. This mainly takes the form of extending work on 
overgeneral autobiographical memory bias, to a child population. There is also some 
investigation of facial-affect recognition, cognitive style, social problem-solving and emotion- 
focusing tendencies. The major goal in studying such depressive information processing in 
children in this thesis is to learn more about the processes by which cognitive vulnerabilities 
to adult depression may be acquired in childhood. At its conclusion, it is hoped that the work 
will also allow for some assessment of the temporal relationship between bias and disorder. 
This is integral to elucidating causal theories of depression. 
This body of work is based on a information-processing approach to the investigation of 
major depression. A number of cognitive theories have been proposed to account for the 
growing literature on the cognitive aspects of depression. For example, one of the most 
influential of these theories is Beck's Schema Theory (1967; 1976). Beck's theory is founded 
on the idea that emotional disorders are characterized by schemata; a set of cognitive beliefs 
which influence a person's perceptions, interpretations and memories, which may result in 
biased cognition. The aetiological proportion of depression attributable to cognitive biases is 
not known. However evidence from the adult literature suggests that cognitive models play an 
3 
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important role. There are however considerable gaps in our knowledge about how 
mechanisms of dysfunctional information processing are acquired. It is the attempt of this 
thesis to investigate cognitive biases or operations which may exist and originate in 
childhood, and may contribute to the onset of later adult depression. 
This thesis principally attempts to look at the relationship between mood and cognition in 
children. A developmental approach to the acquisition of negative self-schemas was first 
suggested by Teasdale (1983) who hypothesized that depressive information processing is 
learned through the experience or repeated associations between mood and thoughts or 
memories (see also Bower, 1981). Work that has been conducted seems to suggest that 
schema based processing, with its capacity for bias and selective recall, is already well in 
place in children before adulthood and may play a role in future vulnerability to depression. 
For example, the loss of a parent through divorce, though not directly connected to 
depression, could be predicted to be indirectly connected to later depression through it's 
potential influence on the development of the child's cognitive set (Brown & Harris, 1978). 
This process can be referred to as a form of developmental psychopathology (Rutter, 1989) 
and is important in the sense that it is the study of the origins and course of individual patterns 
of maladaptation; integrating clinical, cognitive, social and developmental aspects of 
psychology. Though it is out with the remit of this thesis to tackle all possible component 
parts, the thesis does attempt to address the deficit in research of an information processing 
nature in children. This is important because early onset of depression increases the likelihood 
of more serious depression in the future (Birmaher, 1996). One explanation is that the first 
episode of depression sensitises the individual to future episodes (see Segal, Williams, 
Teasdale & Gemar, 1996). According to this view, the first episode of depression is 
4 
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accompanied by lasting changes in biological processes and alterations in responsivity to 
future stressors (Post et al, 1996). Depression may therefore be accompanied by changes in 
cognitive processing which result in future vulnerability to depression. The stance taken in 
this thesis is that demonstration of depression or depressive symptoms in childhood is a 
prequel to that evidenced in adult populations. A core disorder continuum hypothesis is 
endorsed 
5 
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PART II DEPRESSION & CHILDREN 
1.1. What is Depression? 
Depression is a common and debilitating psychiatric affective disorder. Depression typically 
involves multiple episodes and can be chronic. Although depression can be viewed as a 
constellation of symptoms, sad affect is central. The affective state of depression is often 
accompanied by feelings of inadequacy, an inability to concentrate, feelings of helplessness, 
hopelessness and negativity. Depression can follow diverse courses and has multiple 
aetiologies. Depression is a construct (Scott & Ingram, 1998). Depression represents a 
psychologically mediated disorder, is reactive to life events and reflects a state of both social 
and psychological dysfunction. It is debilitating in several domains of functioning and costly 
in terms of individual suffering as well as mental health resources. 
1.2. What is Childhood Depression? 
Childhood depression is now considered much the same as adult depression according to 
criteria in the fourth edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental health disorders 
(DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Diagnosis of childhood depression 
largely parallels that in adults with only minor amendments (see Appendix 1.1). Depression in 
children includes depressive feelings (sadness, despair, anhedonia), depressive behaviours 
(aggression, irritability, withdrawal, psychosomatic symptoms) and depressive cognitions 
(negative beliefs, devalued view of self). Yet until the late 1970's depression was not widely 
accepted as a valid affective disorder in children. For instance, it was believed that children 
lacked sufficient superego to experience `negative affect turned inwards' (Rochlin, 1959). 
6 
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However, research over the last 30 years has demonstrated that depression is prevalent in 
children and that, though some symptoms may vary as a function of age, the essence of 
depression, from a cognitive perspective, remains the same e. g. negative thoughts about self, 
world and future, hinged on themes of personal loss and failure. 
1.2.1. Symptomatology 
The fact that childhood depression is characterised by the same diagnostic criteria used for 
adults, has an advantage of developmental continuity. However there are some differences. 
For example, separation anxiety, phobias, somatic complaints, and behavioural problems are 
more commonly co-morbid in children. Anhedonia, psychomotor retardation, psychosis, 
suicide attempts and completions, and impairments in cognitive functioning increase with age 
(Hammen & Rudolph, 2003). Hypersomnia, weight loss and delusions are less common in 
children. Depressed children also often exhibit irritability unlike adults for example (Kovacs, 
1997). Clearly a child's depressive symptoms will vary with his/her developmental level for 
example, crying hourly, at 8 months of age has different implications than this same 
behaviour at age seven. The expression of depression in the elderly can also manifest 
differently to that of adult depression. Hence, developmentally relevant differences in 
symptom expression do not necessarily indicate different pathologies. 
1.2.2. Prevalence 
Prevalence rates are estimated between 2-8% for serious depression in prepubescence and 10- 
20% in adolescence (Reynolds & Johnston, 1994). Occurrence of depression in children and 
adolescents is increasing whilst age of onset is decreasing (Fombonne, 1999). This may be 
linked to greater awareness of the condition in youth. Otherwise, rapid social change, 
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overcrowding, loss of family support through family breakdown, shifts in occupational and 
employment patterns may be implicated (Kovacs, 1997). 
1.2.3. Onset 
Retrospective accounts from adults report first depressive episodes around 15-19 years 
(Burke, Burke, Regier, & Rae, 1990). However, prospective studies of children and 
adolescents find that the most common age of onset is earlier, between 11-15 years 
(Lewinsohn, Hops, et al., 1993). Depression in children under the age of seven is diffuse and 
less easily identifiable, but it still important to recognize depression-associated deficits in 
children since their less visible symptoms may develop into depressive disorders during late 
childhood or early adolescence (Cantwell, 1990). 
1.2.4. Recurrence 
Recurrence rates are high for childhood depression (Kovacs, 1996). Figures suggest 25% after 
1 year, 40% after 2 years and 70% recurrence after 5 years (Fombonne et al., 2001). In fact 
recurrence rates are similar to those found in adults (Birmaher, 2004). 
1.2.5. Co-morbidity 
Inter-correlation is an inherent characteristic of child and adolescent psychopathology. Co- 
morbidity, or the co-occurrence of two independent diagnoses in some studies, has been 
found to be high in depressed children and adolescents (Birmaher et al., 1996; Hammen & 
Compas, 1994). Anxiety, dysthymic and conduct/behavioural disorders, and substance abuse 
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are the most frequent co-morbid diagnoses. The mood states of depression and anxiety are 
highly correlated. This empirically tested co-occurrence has been shown across diverse 
groups (Compas & Oppedisano, 2000; Seligman & Ollendick. 1998). However, to some 
extent this co-occurrence reflects the way in which anxiety and depression are measured. 
Psychiatric conceptualisations of the two states share several symptom criteria e. g. problems 
with eating, sleeping and concentration. Hence, there are clearly going to be overlaps in 
diagnosis. However, even when non-overlapping criteria are used, there is still a strong 
correspondence- probably due to the fact that both states are characterised by negative affect 
(Clark & Watson, 1991). Despite the features they have in common, anxiety and depression 
are not interchangeable constructs. There are clear differences with respect to cognitive 
content and behaviour and biases even in childhood (e. g. Schneiring & Rapee, 2004). It is 
highly desirable that techniques and methodologies are developed to try to further aid 
differentiation of childhood disorders and look at ways of assessing disorder specific 
differences in cognitive functioning. Moreover, it is important to point out that rates of co- 
morbidity may be only slightly higher than in adults, 60-90% in adults and 80-95% in 
children, co-morbid with Axis I and II, clinical and personality disorders (Kovacs, 1996). 
1.3. Child and Adult Depression 
Though there are clear commonalities between childhood and adult manifestations of 
depression, there remains some controversy over whether child and adult depression form part 
of the same disorder or whether they are distinct entities. During the past 20 years the 
existence of MDD in children and adolescents has been consistently documented (Kovacs, 
1996). The continued reasons for ambiguity therefore principally concern high rates of co- 
morbidity, suggesting a possible `negative affect' disorder rather than distinct anxiety or 
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depression in childhood. Though recent work by Schniering and Rapee (2004) on content 
specific biases in children, for example, has cast doubts on this theory. Another complexity in 
viewing the continuity between child-adult depressions concerns possible differences in 
symptom manifestation. However, information about differences in symptom expression is 
sparse and difficult to synthesize. "Evidence regarding developmental changes in symptoms 
of depression is unsystematic and inconclusive" Kovacs (1996). Moreover, none of the 
symptoms that are believed to differ (e. g. irritability) are core depressive symptoms. 
Thus, there is consensus that children and adolescents both experience depressed mood. There 
is however controversy over children's capacity to experience depressive disorder as 
commensurate with adults (Double, 2005; Timimi, 2004). This has perhaps made researchers 
reluctant to investigate the `depressed child' as a precursor to the depressed adult. However, 
Kovacs (1996) concluded that `early onset MDD is a particularly serious form of affective 
disorder'. Moreover, the difficulty in recognizing the continuity between child-adult 
depression may also exist due to that fact that although a number of children develop 
cognitive vulnerability to depression through-out childhood, at this age, they perhaps do not 
experience significant enough (or relevant enough) stressors to trigger depression, i. e. 
consistent with a diathesis-stress model of mental health (Abela, 2001). However, in late 
adolescence there is perhaps more fertile ground for `stress' and therefore latent 
vulnerabilities may become exposed. Therefore, evidence of depressive vulnerability may not 
be recognized until this point, creating a false `gap'. In essence, even if child depression is not 
a useful developmental precursor to adult depression, efforts are still needed to assess effects 
of mood in children, from the point of view and rationale of looking for evidence of the onset 
and development of adult type biases. The recurrence rates however, and also the statements 
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endorsed (e. g. I hate myself) support the decision to make theoretical, as well as literal links 
between child and adult depression. 
1.4. The Importance of Early Onset-Depression 
Not only is depression evident in childhood but, the earlier the onset of depression, the poorer 
the prognosis for the individual (Birmaher et al., 1996; Garrison, Waller, Cuffe, & McKeown, 
1997). Numerous outcome studies have documented the negative effects of depression on 
children (e. g. Hammen & Compas, 1994; Kaslow, Deering & Racusin, 1994). For example, 
when undetected and therefore untreated, childhood depression increases a child's risk for 
substance abuse, suicidal behaviour, and poor psychological, social, and academic functioning 
(Birmaher et al., 1996; Kaslow, Brown & Mee, 1994). Depressive symptoms reported in 
children aged 8 also independently predicted an increased number of depressive symptoms 10 
years later in a prospective community-based study (Haavisto et al, 2004). 
Moreover there may be important differences between depression, which has its aetiological 
roots in childhood, versus depression, which has later onset and perhaps is more clearly linked 
to an immediate adverse life event. For example, when Ma and Teasdale (2004) examined the 
effectiveness of mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT) as a treatment for depression, 
they found that though the treatment was successful in reducing remission, there were group 
differences in treatment, based on the nature of the history of depression. The treatment 
proved particularly effective for depressed individuals with three or more previous episodes 
of depression and where depression was not preceded by life events but by more childhood 
adversity and earlier first depressive onset. Thus, it is important to distinguish between age 
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relevant origins of depression, as it may result in different underlying cognitive dysfunctions. 
This thesis is exploring the origins of depressive dysfunction from childhood. 
Steinberg, Alloy and Abramson (1998) found that a lower age of onset of first lifetime 
episode of depression predicted relapse and recurrence, even when cognitive risk status was 
controlled for: "When they appear in childhood or adolescence, persistent anhedonia and 
persistent feelings of worthlessness merit special attention". These two clinical features, in 
particular, were found to predict later risk of adult onset depression. The positive predictive 
value of anhedonia reported in adolescence was 58% and for persistent feelings of 
worthlessness was 61%. A total of 33% of adults with MDD reported early-life clinical 
features before age 19. Though adults are subject to errors in recall these results are 
suggestive of an insidious onset of MDD. Wilcox & Anthony (2004) examined cumulative 
occurrence of clinical features of depression from age 6-18 in a retrospective epidemiological 
study of 150 adults with MDD, aimed at identifying specific early markers or precursors to 
risk for depression occurring 13-15 years later. The earliest and most frequently occurring 
problem was persistent depressed mood. This had special prognostic value. The importance of 
studying the earliest clinical features in the screening and prevention of depression are 
therefore clear. 
1.5. The Continuity-Discontinuity Debate 
There is no uniformity in the literature as to whether depression as a mood (e. g. dysphoria) is 
qualitatively different to depression as a disorder. The distinction seems to be quantitative i. e. 
how much (how severe) and for how long (symptom duration). The continuity argument 
would be that depression exists as an entity on a dimension from unstable to stable. The 
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discontinuity argument would view depression more as a disease with a discrete aetiology. As 
already mentioned, there is also some uncertainty over whether childhood and adult 
depression reflect a continuum of the same disorder, or whether they describe separate 
conditions (e. g. Fombonne et al, 2001; Harrington, 1993; Harrington, Rutter & Fombonne, 
1996). 
1.6. Relationship between Clinical and Sub-clinical levels of depression in Children 
The continuity hypothesis would assert that the only differences between clinical and sub- 
clinical depression are ones of degree not quality. That is, that clinical depression is classified 
by greater length and intensity of depressive symptoms, which have greater delirious effects 
on other functioning. On the other hand, sub-clinical depression would be characterized by 
the same symptoms (depressed mood, negative self cognitions, hopelessness) but these 
symptoms would be fewer in number, would have occurred for less time, or would not be 
significant enough to have affected daily functioning (DSM-IV, 1994). Clinical depression is 
often preceded by a history of sub-clinical episodes of depression in children (Gotlib & 
Hammen, 1992). 
1.7. The Reasons for Using Sub-clinical Child Populations 
Research is needed to examine whether cognitive biases can be found in individuals before 
they manifest clinical levels of depression. Such work is ultimately aimed at a preventive 
course i. e. locating the existence of biases before they become deeply rooted or established. It 
is also important to test individuals before clinical sequelae as it is unclear whether existant 
biases are a product or cause of the depressed state. One goal of this thesis is to look for 
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possible biases in childhood, which could act as cognitive vulnerability markers for 
depression. Hence, clinical groups were used in order to investigate the severity or extent of 
bias in children and adolescents in Study 2. Equally, a clinical but non-depressed population 
were used to meet the requirements of the specific hypotheses being tested in Study 5. In all 
other empirical chapters, normative populations with sub-clinical levels of depression were 
tested. Both clinical and sub-clinical testing have theoretical value. 
1.8. Incidence in Current Samples 
There are relatively few children in community populations who score in the extreme 
category for depressed symptoms (Kovacs, 1992). However, there is evidence that even 
moderate levels of depression can have a negative impact on children and adolescents. For 
example, chronic, moderate depression is associated with significant impairment in school 
and peer functioning in children (Nolen-1"ioeksema et al., 1992). Gotlib, Lewinsohn and 
Seeley (1995) also found adolescents who scored high on self report measures but did not 
meet diagnostic criteria for depression showed just as much psychosocial dysfunction as 
clinically depressed adolescents. So although depressed symptoms may not meet criteria for 
psychiatric disorder they remain a clinical concern. 
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PART 11 1 THEORIES AND MODELS 
There are many available theories proposed to account for depression. There are also multiple 
approaches to the study of depression (biological, neurological, psychodynamic, genetic, 
social). This thesis favours a cognitive information-processing approach, due to its 
applicability across a wide range of ages and groups and also due to the nature of its 
therapeutic potential, offering a real sense of self-efficacy to patients. Cognitive theories of 
depression emphasize negative cognitions and negative information processing biases. This 
section of the General Introduction introduces the information-processing approach to 
depression. In addition, the key theories of cognition and emotion and depression are 
introduced, as the most important in a discussion of the results of this thesis. 
1.9. The Information Processing (IP) Approach 
Figure 1.1. The Information Processing Approach 
LIFE EVENTS X, II DEPRESSION 
Y, L IP 
THERE IS NOTHING IN ITSELF GOOD OR BAD BUT OUR THINKING WHICH 
MAKES IT SO (Shakespeare's Hamlet 1623 p216) 
The IP paradigm focuses on the fact that information processing mediates the relationship 
between the occurrences of events, be they external or internal, and individuals' subsequent 
behavioural and emotional responses (Figure 1.1). Hence, IP styles are central to depression. 
Person A and Person B, experiencing the same levels of stress, may both experience the same 
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additional negative life stress, but it depresses only one of them. This is because it is not the 
event in of itself, but rather the personal interpretation and processing of that event which 
determines how they will respond. In a very real way, information processing affects how we 
feel. The way we feel then determines how we process information. 
Figure 1.2. The Basic IP Model 
it 
Attention & Orientation I Memory 
Perception 
Interpretation 
. 
Schema (Appraisal) = Action 
." 
This interaction can give us valuable insight into forms of psychopathology such as 
depression. However, saying that the way we `think' affects how we `feel' presents rather 
vague terminology and offers little leverage for either empirical research or subsequent 
psychotherapeutic change. IP offers a way of breaking down these holistic terms into the 
likely constituent parts. Typically therefore IP is conceived of encompassing three domains of 
processing; Attention and Orientation; Perception and Interpretation; and Memory (Figure 
1.2). This is not to suggest that these processes are in any way discrete or sequential. Instead it 
offers a useful way of framing our understanding of the cognitive processes involved in 
complete information-processing. 
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Figure 1.3. The Basic IP Model incorporating Emotion 
IP 
Attention & Orientation 
Associative 
Propositional "'ý 
Schematic 
Perception 
00 Intcrprctation 
(Appraisal) 
.. . 
Memory 
Action 
inotion 
Emotion can affect/ bias any one of the three domains of IP (Figure 1.3). Indeed this is a 
central tenet of IP research (e. g. Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1997). In part, emotion can be conceived as `system 
level information' indicating goals or more specifically; the state of the organism in relation 
to its current (long term and short term, automatic vs. higher order, specific vs. less specific) 
goals (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). On one level we can have the implicit goal to `remain 
physically safe'. Fear or anxiety ollen signals that the system is processing information, 
which it interprets as suggesting this goal attainment or maintenance is in jeopardy. For 
instance, it has been suggested that the emotion of `depression' signals a cognitive `time-out' 
informing the system that something has gone wrong and that certain schemata need to be 
revised. Prolonged experience of depression is furthermore posited to reflect failure or 
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resistance to modify these schemata (Welling, 2003). Equally, we may have the peculiar goal 
of `be successful' the intermediary goal of which might be `obtain a good job'. It is suggested 
that IP is motivated (biased) by such goals. Hence if a goal such as `be liked' was 
relinquished, preferential attention to positive facial feedback may be abandoned. Again, 
emotional states may reflect a person's perception of how close or far away they feel they are 
from their goals (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Of course, how a person comes to arrive at 
personal goals is another matter. The probable value of `emotion' is that it signals the 
perceived need for change or contrastingly confirms a given approach therefore no need for 
change. This of course is a system with continual, multiple, complex and basic, changing and 
unchanging and sometimes contradictory goals in multiple domains at any given time. 
Figure 1.4. IP Model indicating the central role of goals 
IP 
Attention & Orientation 
Perception 
Associative . "'''"'ýýý""ý"'''" Nlý Interpretation 
' (Appraisal) 
Propositional 
Schematic ; 
'' 
Memory 
Action 
. 1notioll 
............................. 
k1 
Appraisal in line with goals 
.................................. I 
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Schemata are pivotal in explicating cognition from an IP approach. Schemata are formed 
through our interpretation of commonalities in experience. They are not just passive 
representations of experience, but can actively effect processing (Figure 1.5. ). Schemata affect 
processing by aiding the processing of information consistent with the schema content. 
Schema incongruent material may then be overlooked by the system. Although, it is unclear at 
what level (or multiple levels) of processing this may occur. Schema congruent processing is 
fast and powerful. To process information which is schema incongruent therefore may require 
cffortful, voluntary elaboration of such material to prevent this information being `filtered 
out' (Philippot et al., 2004). 
Figure 1.5. IP Model indicating the central role of Schema 
Congruent 
Incongruent ---- 
Attention & Orientation 
Associative 
Propositional ""' 
Schematic 
-. dir 
Perception Memory 
. 
Interpretation "" 
(Appraisal) 
0. 
Action 
_ 
Emotion 
The final key aspect of IP to be recognized concerns that of action. Perceiving and 
interpreting the consequences of actions that have been derived from these cognitive 
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processes is a vital way in which the system can learn. For example, `When I get angry and 
shout at Sam I feel worse afterwards and Sam dislikes me even more'. Such information 
`when I shout it makes things worse' feeds into memory and schema, and hence provides new 
information to inform the next cognitive-emotional cycle. Of course, as with the initial 
information cycle, this information too is subject to biased processing in that it will be 
accepted or rejected or interpreted in line with current goals and schema. For example, if it is 
a personal goal to `not deal with anger issues', then the above person may interpret the 
situation with Sam as `her fault', or `just an anomaly' and not learn from it. Moreover, 
individuals who have had dysfunctional experiences, such as `If I tell mum I'm hungry she 
will smack me' will develop dysfunctional schema, which will direct action, though not 
always consciously (Figure 1.6) 
Figure. 1.6. IP Model highlighting Action Feedback 
IP 
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Much of cognitive psychology and the study of the affective disorders is concerned with 
understanding how these processes interact with one another and how biases in one system 
may affect the others. Locating the domain(s) in which there are disorder relevant biases is a 
primary aim of research efforts. As can be seen, our interpretation of any given event is 
fuelled and governed by attention, memory and schema. Sometimes understanding the nature 
of these component biases (many of which may not be accessible to conscious introspection) 
is important in understanding the source of the more `visible', conscious and idiosyncratic end 
biases, which otherwise may seem unfounded from an objective world view. For example, `I 
hate myself, I hate life, nothing is ever going to work out for me'. Once we understand that 
such views are fuelled by a biased information processing system it becomes easier to 
understand the nature of the problem, and perhaps, how to deal with it. 
1.10. Prominent Theories of Cognition and Emotion 
Within an information-processing framework `Cognition and Emotion and the Affective 
Disorders' has become a recognized and fruitful domain of psychology. In particular four 
theories, designed to account for or discuss the inter-relationship between cognition and 
emotion have contributed substantially to the underpinning of practical research findings in 
the area and are reviewed in the next section. They are the principal theories discussed in the 
relevant literature. These same four theories have most impacted the work in the present 
thesis. They are: Williams et al's. priming vs. elaboration account of affective disorder, ICS 
macro-theory of cognition, SPAARS multi-level model of cognition and emotion and of 
course Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression. Further theories, which are specifically 
relevant to an interpretation of the results of this thesis, but are either newer (Philippot & 
Schaefer's Dual Memory Model of Emotion) or more specialized (the theory of Depressive 
Realism), are also considered. 
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Beck's Schema Theory, (1967; 1976; 1979) 
Beck is sometimes referred to as the father of cognitive theory of depression. According to 
Beck (1967; 1976; 1979) depression relates to the activity of dysfunctional schema. In terms 
of Beck's model, schemata are stable representations of knowledge, which have been 
acquired by an individual during development. According to this view individuals who 
become depressed have had early experiences that result in the formation of dysfunctional 
schema. Schema are described as cognitive constructs for encoding, screening and retrieving 
information. The knowledge stored in schemata represent a person's beliefs, attitudes and 
assumptions, which are used to perceive, interpret and think about experiences (Fig. 1.7). 
Figure 1.7. Beck's Schema Theory 
Attention & Orientation 
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Beck's cognitive theory centres around the idea of schema influencing 
information-processing preferences, congruent with schema content, hence biasing 
processing. 
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Furthermore, Beck makes a statement to the effect that the development of dysfunctional 
schema in the case of depression could be a result of early life experience of loss. These 
dysfunctional schema lead to negative biases in the way the individual processes information. 
Beck suggests that the experience of matching stressors can activate these schemata, which is 
the source of a series of subsequent cognitive biases, including recall, in the processing of 
information. 
Beck, Rush Shaw & Emery (1979) assert that "generalised negative expectancies" are at the 
core of depression, which are "based on attitudes or assumptions (schemas), developed from 
previous experiences. " An assumption is that these assumptions are misconceptions of reality. 
However it may be that in childhood, depression is not associated with misconceptions as 
such. Rather, depression may be associated with accurate perceptions, which because they are 
more `negative' relative to the norm, may lead the individual to depression. 
Furthermore, the Cognitive Model of Depression postulates three specific concepts to explain 
the psychological substrate of depression: (1) The Cognitive Triad (2) Negative Schemas and 
(3) Cognitive Errors (faulty information processing). 
1) The cognitive triad concerns negative patterns of thinking about self, world and future. A 
depressed person will view himself as defective, inadequate, diseased or deprived. He tends to 
attribute negative experiences to a defect in himself. He believes he lacks the attributes he 
considers essential to attain happiness and contentment. He sees the world as cruel and 
demanding and presenting obstacles to him reaching his goals. The depressed person will also 
have a negative view of the future and will anticipate problems and suffering indefinitely. 
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2) The concept of 'schema' arises from the observation that any given situation is composed 
of a host of stimuli and every individual needs to selectively attend to specific stimuli in that 
environment and conceptualise the situation. Schemata are a way of conceptualising how we 
do this. A schema is a filter; a basis for screening and coding information that confronts us. A 
depressed person categorises and evaluates his experiences through a matrix of negative 
schcmas. 
A schema may be inactive, active or dysfunctional. "As schemas become more active, they 
are evoked by a wider range of stimuli, which are less logically related to them. " (Beck et al., 
1979) The depressed patient loses much of his voluntary control over his thinking processes 
and is unable to invoke other more appropriate schemas as the negative schemas become 
increasingly dominant. In fact in severe depression, idiosyncratic schemas become 
autonomous. hie depressive cognitive organisation may become so independent of external 
stimulation that the individual is unresponsive to changes in his immediate environment. 
3) Faulty information processing `errors' in depression include; arbitrary inference, selective 
abstraction, over-generalisation, magnification and minimisation, personalisation, absolute, 
dichotomous thinking (black and white thinking). Beck suggests the thinking of a depressed 
person is synonymous with a child's thinking in that it is primitive, over-simplistic, and non- 
adaptive to situations or experience; rigid. These are the traits of depressive thinking; it is one 
dimensional e. g. `I am fearful' - as opposed to the multidimensional - `I am fearful, I am 
strong, I am kind'. 'thinking is absolutistic and moralistic e. g. `I am a coward' - as opposed to 
relativistic - `I tun not more fearful than other people'. It is invariant e. g. `I always have been 
and I always will be fearful'. It is also irreversible e. g. `There is nothing I can do about it, 
there is nothing I can do or learn to allow me to change'. 
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Beck et al., (1979) manage only a brief reference to predispositions to adult depression, in 
which is stated, "early experiences provide the basis for forming negative concepts about 
one's self, the future and the external world. " During this developmental period, each 
individual learns rules or formulas by which he attempts to `make sense' of the world. These 
formulae determine how the individual organizes perceptions into behaviour, and how he 
understands or comes to terms with the events in his life. In essence, these basic assumptions 
form a personal matrix of meaning and value. These rules are active in situations that impinge 
on areas relevant to the person's specific vulnerabilities. Such as acceptance-rejection, 
success-failure, health-sickness, or gain-loss. These assumptions are learned and at one time 
may have been articulated. Furthermore they may be culturally reinforced. However, one 
limitation of the Beckian model is that it predicts a consistent pattern of bias in attention and 
memory for both depressed and anxious persons. In contrast other models such as Williams et 
al. (1997) posit that different types of biases characterize different disorders. 
In summary, Beck suggested the importance of biased cognitive styles in explaining the 
existence of depression in response to adversity, such as black and white thinking, 
overgeneralization, and selective abstraction. All of which are deduced from the person's 
written or oral verbalisations. `Schemas' are now consistently used as a tool in explaining 
dysfunctional thinking and are incorporated in all of the prominent theories of cognition and 
emotion interactions (e. g. SPAARS and ICS, see below). However, despite the widespread 
acceptance of the importance of underlying schema, little is known about the processes that 
contribute to the existence and content of such schema. One further limitation is that Beck's 
(1976) formulation concerning information processing would predict a consistent pattern of 
bias in attention and memory for both depressed and anxious persons i. e. it is a global 
cognitive theory. This does not fit with our current knowledge of biases in depression and 
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anxiety. For instance instead, Williams and his colleagues, (1997) have posited disorder 
specific characteristic biases, such that whereas anxiety in associated with negative bias in 
attention, depression is associated with biases in memory. 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews (1997) 
This is an empirically driven theory. Negative information processing is known to form a 
substantial part of the cognitive classification of depression in adulthood. "Seeing things 
negatively" or "taking a negative view of things" is classically linked to a depressive profile. 
However, Williams et al proposed that there are two stages of cognitive processing involved 
in the maintenance and/or onset of anxiety and depression. In line with Graf & Mandler 
(1984), Williams et al propose a "pre-attentive" integration (priming) stage and a subsequent 
elaboration phase of IP. Priming is described as an automatic process that occurs rapidly 
without cognitive effort and involves the activation of multiple elements associated with the 
representation of information. In contrast, elaboration refers to a strategic process that 
involves the association of new information with related material. Unlike Beck, Williams et al 
suggest that depression is largely characterized by biased processing at an elaborative stage of 
processing whilst anxiety is associated with pre-attentive biases (Figure 1.8). 
In keeping with the theory of Williams et al, most conclusive work on initial perceptual biases 
and the emotional disorders has been with anxious patients. Anxiety is linked to a bias in 
preconscious processes such as selective attention for threatening material, whilst such pre- 
conscious biases do not appear to play a role in characterizing depression (see Mogg, Bradley 
& Williams, 1995 for a review). Instead, it is generally agreed that adult depressive biases 
emerge at an elaborative stage of processing, during the interpretation, sustained attention, 
recognition or recall of information. In a broad sense, depression prone individuals would 
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look for evidence of being `doomed to failure' whereas anxious persons would avoid 
attending to such information and moreover, normal individuals would look for counter- 
evidence. Williams et al., (1997) argue that the shift of attention in anxiety versus the 
sustaining of attention to negative information in depression may be the dimension which best 
differentiates the disorders. These differences can be thought of in terms of the allocation of 
limited resources (Williams et al., 1997). 
More recent empirical evidence regarding attention and depression by Gotlib, Kransnoperova, 
Joorman and Yue (2004) has indicated that depression is associated with initial attention 
towards depression relevant (negative) stimuli. However, this attention is not always 
maintained, as was demonstrated using a dot probe paradigm with manipulated exposure 
times to stimuli. Some patients showed sustained attention to negative stimuli whilst others 
failed to. It would therefore appear that the depressed population may not be homogenous in 
terms of attentional bias and added levels of complexity may be needed to fully account for 
biased processing in depression. What is interesting is that to attend to `negative' information 
preferentially, an individual must first encode or perceive it as such. That is, perception and 
attention would appear intrinsically linked in these studies. 
Therefore there may be evidence to suspect attentional biases do play some role in depression. 
Nevertheless, on the whole, research to date has supported the usefulness of distinguishing 
between priming and elaboration stages of processing to account for observed differences in 
anxious and depressed biases. Anxiety is associated with an initial bias towards threat, and 
subsequent strategic bias away from threat. Depression is associated with strategic bias 
towards depression congruent information and there is inconsistent evidence regarding initial 
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biases in depression. Whether a bias is automatic or elaborative has direct implications for 
therapeutic intervention. 
Figure 1.8. Williams et al. (1997) 
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Williams et al suggest that specific emotional disorders may arise not only 
because of biases in content of appraisal but also because of biases in specific IP 
domains. For example, predominantly pre-conscious attentional bias in anxiety 
and strategic memory biases in depression. 
One limitation of this work is that it is really advocating a single level model of cognition and 
emotion and does not capture the full complexity of multi-level models of information 
processing of which SPAARS and ICS are two best-known examples. In addition, little 
comment has been made regarding the extent to which this theory applies to children. For 
example, is it that the same biases exist outright in childhood or should there be some form of 
development of these biases across age? 
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ICS, Teasdale & Barnard, 1993 
ICS is macro-level theory of cognition-emotion relations. It differs from Williams et al's 
priming vs. elaboration theory in that it is an attempt to offer a framework for all cognitive- 
affective relationships. ICS is not designed to account for any specific order or disorder. 
Teasdale & Barnard propose that human cognitive architecture is divided into nine sub- 
systems each specialized for handling a specific type of information processing. Cognitive 
processing depends on the interactions between these subsystems. Each subsystem processes 
its own unique `code' and has its own recording (memory) system. Each subsystem has an 
image record a copy process and a transformation e. g. sound to words. Five subsystems are 
periphery. Three of these subsystems (visual, acoustic and body state) concern sensory and 
proprioceptive representations. Two further periphery subsystems (articulatory and limb) 
relate to output systems. Of the four central subsystems, two (morphonolexical and object) 
represent intermediate structural descriptions. The two final central systems, and those most 
central to a discussion of emotion (propositional and implicational) represent higher order 
meaning. 
According to ICS emotion is primarily generated within the implicational subsystem. The 
implicational subsystem directly receives and integrates information about an occurring event 
from other subsystems. It is a synthesizing subsystem. Emotion is triggered when the 
implicational subsystem produces a code, which corresponds to a previous `affective-theme' 
or schemata from a past emotion-eliciting situation. The implicational code generates 
emotional reactions by activating expressive patterns in the effector subsystems. In other 
words, the implicational system is the final mode through which all emotions are mediated. 
29 
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This system `adds' emotional connotations to otherwise `cold' cognitions. In terms of this 
model, emotion results only following processing in the implicational subsystem. For 
example, the literal meaning of the statement, "I passed my exam" can be represented in the 
propositional subsystem and this representation will not be accompanied by an emotional 
reaction. This would be termed `cold cognition'. While the same thought or statement 
represented in the implicational subsystem i. e. in terms of a schematic model such as "I am a 
success" will result in emotional reactions. This is termed `hot cognition' and it is hot 
cognition, which results in affective arousal. ICS can therefore account for the important 
distinction between intellectual and emotional beliefs. For example, `I know I'm not ugly but 
I don't believe it in my heart'. In ICS the thinking comes from the propositional code and the 
feeling comes from the implicational code and importantly, the two can be discrepant. 
In ICS the type of emotion elicited is highly dependent upon matching incoming or inferred 
information to stored information about past emotional experiences. Hence, the system must 
be heavily influenced by the development of schema, from childhood. It is also possible that 
some original implicational code is more difficult to recode than newer information. 
Moreover, ICS offers a way of conceptualising psychological disorders such as anxiety and 
depression as dysfunctional patterns of interaction with the subsystems. Depression is 
theorized to be a result of interlocking between implicational and propositional level 
subsystems such that an individual focuses on negative propositions, which are supported by 
implicational code, and thus result in iterative cycles. For instance, it may be that that schema 
models in depressed individuals are particularly negative or dominant, or that they are more 
closely related in depression (e. g. Teasdale, Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst & Paykel, 1991) and 
hence this perpetuates iteration. Alternatively, iterative thinking may be characteristic of 
depression. Teasdale and Barnard's model therefore offers insight into the possible 
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mechanism of depressive cognition. That is, according to ICS, depression is a consequence of 
generation of depressogenic, schematic models in the implicational subsystem, which are 
maintained via a feedback loop with the propositional subsystem (Figure 1.9). In effect, the 
implicative schematic model generates propositions such as "I am a failure", which feed back 
to the implicational subsystem reinforcing the active schematic model. The account given by 
Teasdale and Barnard mirrors that of Williams et al, in the sense that (a) depression relevant 
material is more highly elaborated in depressed individuals and (b) ongoing processing of 
depressive schematic models will increase the likelihood that these representations will be 
accessed and affect processing. 
Figure 1.9. ICS 
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ICS is concerned with a macro-theory of cognition. ICS 
highlights `hot' vs. `cold' processing, which takes place 
within the implicational and propositional subsystems. In 
depression these subsystems are said to be interlocked. 
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ICS assumes a piagetian type development of the subsystems. However, the model is not 
discussed with any developmental considerations in mind, besides perhaps the inherent 
implication regarding the development of schema content. 
SPAARS, Power and Dalgleish (1997) 
The preferred model of emotion in this thesis is the Schematic Propositional Associative 
Analogical Representational System (SPAARS). There are strong and weak versions of 
cognitive theory. The SPAARS model endorses a strong version in which cognition can result 
in emotion. The issue of appraisal is central to this model. Here, the process of appraisal is 
deemed the central engine of emotion. Emotion is defined as a process; an interpretation and 
subsequent appraisal of an event (be it internal or external) and an appraisal of a physiological 
change or action potential deriving from this event appraisal. Interpretation is defined as the 
comprehension of the event elements and appraisal is defined as an evaluation of these 
elements. 
In essence, SPAARS is a model of emotion-elicitation attempting to offer an account of both 
ordered and disordered emotion. SPAARS is a multilevel model with 4 levels of 
representation, namely those indicated in the acronym; schematic, propositional, analogical 
and associative. These levels can help account for different levels of cognition and emotion. 
The analogical mode of representation comprises images of the different sensory modalities, 
including visual, olfactory, auditory, gustory, proprioceptive and tactile. Analogical 
representations inform the other levels of representation. Propositional representations are 
representations of beliefs, thoughts, ideas, objects and concepts as well as the relations 
between them. Propositional representations take a non-language specific form but are 
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amenable to description in language form. Propositional representations according to 
SPAARS are explicit, abstract and discrete. According to this model, the analogical and 
propositional modes of representation have no direct role in eliciting emotion. Emotion 
elicitation occurs only through the schematic and associative modes of representation. 
The schematic model level of representation contains higher order information about the 
world and the self, abstracted from information at the other levels of representation. 
Schematic level representations cannot be easily or fully expressed verbally, and are basically 
equivalent to Teasdale and Barnard's `implicational subsystem'. Finally, the associative level 
of representation contains associations between situations and the meaning ascribed to the 
situations. As mentioned, the associative level accounts for direct single step access to 
information stored in memory, established through repetition of event emotion combinations 
and is best understood as being the equivalent of automatic processing. In contrast, the 
schematic model level includes the representation of self and goals that are relevant for 
appraisal processes. 
Thus, SPAARS assumes that there are two main ways in which emotion can be generated. 
First, emotion can result via cognitive processing involving the schematic system. In this 
instance, information about the self, world and future is combined with information about 
current goals in order to generate an internal representation of the immediate situation. For 
example, `I am an academic +I have an impending paper deadline + GOAL -I want to 
submit this paper'. If this analysis reveals discrepancy between reality and an individuals' 
current goals, then an emotional response ensues, e. g. `I want to submit this paper +I have no 
time and too much administrative work to do = RESPONSE - frustration'. The second route 
to the production of emotion involves an associative pathway. This route is automatic and has 
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been described by Dalgleish et al., (1998); `if the same event is repeatedly processed in the 
same way at the schematic level, then an associative representation will be formed such that, 
on future encounters of the same event, the relevant emotion will be automatically elicited'. 
That is, the associative route short-circuits concurrent appraisal but is based on previous 
appraisal, such that when the academic sees a paper submission deadline in a journal he 
immediately feels frustration. Further, it is possible that some associative pathways are 
prepared or hardwired (e. g. Seligman, 1971). As with any automatic process, forms of 
associative emotion are difficult to control or modify. 
Emotion elicitation in the SPAARS framework can therefore occur via an appraisal process 
(schematic level) or via an automatised memory retrieval route, bypassing any appraisal 
process (associative level). Conscious awareness at some or all stages is needed in order to 
`experience' emotion and as with ICS, the propositional level is cold and only contributes 
information for the schematic model level. According to SPAARS, this propositional 
information only becomes emotional when it is assessed with respect to one's goals by the 
schematic model representations. One area in which Power & Dalgleish develop theory 
further than ICS is that they explicitly discuss the different types of emotion that can be 
generated by appraisal processes and how appraisal of physiological arousal in line with goals 
can account for various emotional labels and disorders. 
In this regard, SPAARS posits a functional goal directed mind in which emotions are 
distinguished on the basis of appraisal. Appraisals occur in levels or cycles with each cycle 
leading the event to be appraised in more sophisticated way. There are 5 basic emotions and 
thereafter SPAARS posits combinations or `blends' of emotions. Examples of such complex 
emotions include guilt, shame, envy, love, and grief, so called because they all require higher 
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levels of appraisal. Emotions can also be conflicting due to multiple appraisal processes 
producing different end outcomes or associatively generated emotions conflicting with 
schematically generated emotions, for example. Goals are believed to operate in hierarchies 
and appraisal of these goals can be inhibitory and facilitatory, necessary or sufficient in terms 
of emotion elicitation. Moreover, in this model, initial emotions can be reappraised and then 
act as the impetus for further emotional experiences. This is presented as a potential key 
factor in underlying disordered emotion. 
In terms of disordered emotion, SPAARS assumes a goal-based system whereby fear reflects 
a threat appraisal, sadness reflects an appraisal of failure/loss, anger reflects appraisal of a 
blocked goal, happiness reflects appraisal of achievement of a goal, and disgust is an appraisal 
and rejection of something repulsive to self or goals. Therefore, depression according to 
SPAARS is linked to the basic emotion of sadness and can be coupled with disgust or anger 
e. g. "self as worthless, failed or bad". The coupling of sadness and disgust in depression has 
received little theoretical or research attention to date. However, it may well capture a unique 
quality of depression and would also explain the pervasive link with anxiety disorder i. e. 
anxiety would be linked to fear, also often coupled with disgust, such as in OCD. 
Thus, SPAARS endorses the interlock (coupling) theory of Teasdale and Barnard in which the 
system may become `captured' by emotion due to the coupling of thoughts and feelings 
(propositional and schematic representations) making it difficult to deactivate the emotion in 
question. In addition, SPAARS further purports the coupling of emotions, whereby two basic 
emotion states reciprocally activate each other or one emotion activates itself. In this state the 
experience of the emotion becomes the object emotion (e. g. fear or fear) again locking the 
person into an emotion mode, from which it is difficult to disengage (Figure 1.10). SPAARS 
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posits that in depression it may be particularly difficult to disengage from a negative 
emotional mode, because of poor integration between positive and negative schema. Hence, 
once in a negative emotional state it may be difficult for these individuals to access 
counteractive positive information. 
Finally, SPAARS underscores the belief that depressed individuals overinvest in and 
overvalue certain goals, distinguishing these individuals from the normal population - an idea 
with its roots in Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression. Highly valued goals or fixed goals in 
SPAARS would suggest the existence of greater biases and greater emotional reactions in 
response to appraisals concerning these goals, particularly concerning loss of these goals and 
hence - vulnerability. 
Figure 1.10. SPAARS 
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SPAARS is primarily concerned with appraisal processes and the 
generation of emotion. 
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With respect to developmental issues, SPAARS briefly alludes to the development of 
schematic models and goals, asserting many of which are established in early childhood. 
SPAARS also states that emotion provides a guiding principal around which development 
occurs, and is organised. SPAARS further posits that, given the right stressors, old models can 
become reactivated and dominate processing in a schema congruent fashion, similar to Beck's 
idea of latent schemas. SPAARS makes some reference to the possibility than children may 
`deal with' emotional situations differently to adults, for instance, greater dissociation in 
childhood in response to traumatic events. This may be linked to the different appraisal 
abilities of children relative to adults. However, no more detailed discussion of developmental 
issues is pursued, perhaps because within a SPAARS framework, cognition and emotion 
interactions are couched in terms, which are equally applicable across development. This is 
not so obvious in Williams et al's discussion of strategic biases or in ICS multiple subsystem 
model which appear more adult-centric. For example, if pattern matching accounts for 
emotion in ICS can a child only feel something if they have felt something like it before? And 
the strategic biases of Williams et al. suggest a cognitive style, which presumably needs to be 
developed. SPAARS is more `timeless' (i. e. appraisals are generated on a moment to moment 
basis) unlike models requiring developmental clarification. 
Interim Summary 
The above are summaries of the main theories of cognition and emotion. Each model 
emphasizes different aspects of cognition and emotion processing. Models broadly converge 
in terms of the perceptual and conceptual processes involved in emotion elicitation. The 
models differ in the detail with which they describe each underlying mechanism and in the 
relative roles they attribute to the processing modes. Beck's is a global model of cognition 
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viewing emotion and biases as a consequence of thinking styles and schema. Williams is a 
theory of characteristic biases emphasizing stages of processing. ICS introduces the idea of 
hot and cold cognition, and interlock, however the exact workings of emotion-cognition 
relationships are given little substance. SPAARS gives an account of emotion as a 
hierarchical goal based appraisal phenomenon and discusses depression in terms of coupling 
and overvalued goals. All the models are designed in full or in part to deal with depression. In 
so doing, no model explicitly addresses developmental considerations. It is striking how few 
of the cognition-emotion theories account for the development of the dysfunctional processes 
they espouse. Beck's Cognitive Theory of Depression is the temporal predecessor to the 
above theories, however it continues to exert a pervading and enduring quality in guiding and 
interpreting (specifically) results of depression research. Next to be introduced is the newer 
theory of Philippot & Schaefer, and an adjunct theory to a cognitive bias theory of depression; 
the theory of Depressive Realism. This is followed by a brief comment on conducting IP 
research within a developmental framework. 
The Dual Memory Model of Emotion (Philippot & Schaefer, 2001; Philippot, et al, 2004) 
Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez & Francart (2004) discuss the cognitive regulation of emotion. 
As indicated in the above sections, most cognition-emotion models assert that emotional 
responses are determined by the activation of schema. Schema activation relies on fast 
processes requiring few cognitive resources but has great impact in terms of attentional focus, 
concept priming and physiological arousal. Moreover, schemata are not accessible to 
conscious inspection instead multilevel models assume schema activation occurs 
automatically. In contrast, voluntary processes that might moderate the effects of schema are 
slower, require more cognitive resources and require inhibition of the more automatic 
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processes. Specifying information is generally believed to involve effortful, strategic 
processing. In the Dual Memory Model of Emotion, it is argued that strategic, high-level 
voluntary processes should inhibit emotional arousal, by reducing automatic schematic level 
processing (see Appendix 1.2). Of course, phenomena like flashbulb memories in trauma (e. g. 
Brewin, 2001) are both highly emotional and specific. However these are instances of direct 
retrieval (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and emotion is activated via the associative route 
(SPAARS, 1997). This does not involve high level cognitive processing. Instead the dual 
memory model of emotion is concerned with the inhibition of emotion generated through 
schematic processing and the wilful elaboration of information. Thus, Philippot et al., (2004) 
propose a theory of emotion elicitation and regulation based on the automatic activation of 
schema eliciting emotion, and the wilful elaboration of specific (propositional) information 
inhibiting emotion (Figure 1.11) 
Figure 1.11. The Dual Memory Model of Emotion 
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Depressive Realism (DR; Alloy & Abramson, 1979) 
The final theory to be established in this General Introduction is that of Depression Realism 
(DR). Most cognitive and IP theories of depression discuss depressive cognition in terms of 
negative biases. DR is instead simply a theory, which postulates that this emphasis concerning 
depresso-typical processing is wrong. Instead of depressed individuals being viewed as 
negatively biased this theory suggests that depressed individuals can actually be more 
`balanced' in their appraisals of information in some circumstances and that the `bias' instead 
lies with non-depressed normal individuals, who processes information in a positively biased 
fashion (Albright & Henderson, 1995; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Johnson & Lorenzo, 1998; 
Pacini, Muir & Epstein, 1998; Kapci & Cramer, 1998). This is the classic `rose-tinted' glasses 
phenomenon. 
Unfortunately few empirical studies have tested participants with material that has clear truth 
validity (see Ackermann & deRubeis, 1991 for a commentary) and some studies which have 
failed to find a DR effect or have contested the validity of the effect (e. g. Msefti, Murphy, 
Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005) can equally be criticised on the grounds of inadequate test 
material or `problem' validity i. e. if test material is not salient or where a particular judgement 
is obvious, convincing biases will not be demonstrated in either direction. DR may also 
depend on the extent of depression with typically mild depressed groups demonstrating the 
effect (see Albright & Henderson, 1995; Haaga & Beck 1995). One further consideration 
concerning the DR effect is that the typically fixed conditions of DR contingency tasks 
perhaps better suit the typical thinking styles of depressives (e. g. unchangeable, immutable 
events allied to poor self-efficacy) rather than non-depressed typical thinking. In this case, DR 
results would be reflecting something called `stereotypic' accuracy (Cronbach, 1955) rather 
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than a flexible ability to view information accurately. Therefore patent interpretation (or 
rejection) of depressive realism is not possible. However, counter to the typical flow of 
thought on depression, there remains some reason to consider that under some circumstances 
depressed individuals may be getting it right. Depressed individuals may sometimes be more 
realistic in their judgements than normal individuals, although the precise conditions under 
which this may occur are yet unknown. 
In this thesis DR is approached from the possibility that DR may hold true more in children 
than in adults. That is, is it possible that existence of DR (seeing negative as negative) could 
be more prevalent in childhood but that it may result in negative bias over time, such that in 
adulthood what was originally a realistic appraisal is now negative skewed? This transition 
would of course be dependent on experience. Seeing bad as bad over time, when there is lots 
of bad to be seen, could effect mood and subsequently future IP as described in the above IP 
sections. This theory is drawn out more fully in a discussion of the results of Studies 1 and 4. 
Suffice to say that all the theories discussed above will be referenced in the appropriate 
empirical chapters and all of these theories are the ones most cited in terms of explicating 
cognitive biases in the depressed adult literature. 
1.11. A Developmental Perspective 
Unlike the mainstream cognition and emotion literature, Developmental Psychopathology 
focuses on such cognition and emotion interactions in youth. A developmental 
psychopathology approach to depression maintains that early structures are often incorporated 
into later structures therefore an early deviation or disturbance in cognitive functioning may 
cause much larger disturbances to emerge later on. Rutter (1986) has stressed the importance 
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of studying how earlier experiences modify later ones, how maladjustment in childhood may 
set the stage for depression in later years. An early depressive episode is also hypothesized to 
leave long-term developmental and functional impairments. This is the theory that an episode 
of depression sensitises an individual to future episodes, such that the first episode of 
depression may be linked to a particular stressor, and is accompanied by lasting changes in 
biological processes and alterations in responsivity to future stressors (Post, 1996). In 
addition, the initial externally produced changes in the brain can be conditioned so that 
following the first depressive episode, even more events that resemble loss or stress 
experiences, may result in depression. This is the phenomenon referred to as kindling 
(Kovacs, 1997; Post, 1992). 
Moreover, within this developmental-psychopathology framework qualitative reorganisations 
which are believed to take place during development can be conceived as proceeding in 
accordance with the Orthogenetic Principle (Werner, 1948) which states that the developing 
organism moves from a relatively diffuse and globally undifferentiated state, by means of 
differentiation and hierarchical integration, to a state of greater articulation and organised 
complexity. This idea may apply as much to cognitive processes as any other processes, and 
hence, highlights the importance of investigating biases early in development, in order to gain 
an understanding of initial biases, before layers of complexity make adult depressive biases 
increasingly more difficult to unravel. 
A transactional model of depression also states that pathology such as depression does not 
occur in isolation, caused by one process alone, but rather is the result of various factors 
operating together. This is a `broad' model of depression, which seeks to take into account 
multiple processes. A transactional model specifies that the interrelationships between the 
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organization of developmental domains (biological, socio-emotional, cognitive) and the 
environment in which the individual resides (family, school, community) exert a bi- 
directional influence on the individual. Cicchetti & Toth (1995) provide an exhaustive review 
of affective disorders and clinical depression from a transactional approach. For example, a 
child who is the product of depressed parents may possess a unique set of risk and protective 
factors, while another child who has undergone chemotherapy may face a completely 
different set of factors; each child may warrant a diagnosis of clinical depression but the 
aetiologies leading to each child's depression differ drastically. In effect, although it is 
difficult to empirically research depression from a transactional approach, it is worth holding 
in mind the complex of interactive effects of the child and their environment, when 
considering the implications our more controlled experimental findings. Understanding 
multiple risk and protective factors will ultimately increase the efficacy of our approach to 
depression, whether in childhood, adolescence or adulthood. 
1.12. A Cognitive-Developmental Approach 
Therefore, while adhering to the philosophies of developmental psychopathology and a 
transactional approach, and motivated by adult theories of cognition and emotion, this thesis 
attempts to focus more specifically on a cognitive-developmental model of depression within 
this larger framework. Thus, for example, social and environmental concerns are controlled 
for, rather than studied in this thesis, in order to focus specifically on cognitive factors and 
depression in childhood. Basically the premise of the cognitive-developmental model of 
depression is that cognitive vulnerability to adult depression is acquired in childhood. This 
approach, in the long-term, promises to contribute to important aetiological answers regarding 
the origins of depressive biases. 
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1.13. Extending Adult Research 
It is clear that we have reached a reasonable research plateau regarding what cognitive biases 
manifest in adult depression. Prolific and robust research is available covering various aspects 
of cognition (perception, attention, memory) in adults. However, we do not know the precise 
origins of these biases. Most cognitive-emotional theories of depression would assume that 
depressive biases are stable, i. e. they have developed steadily over time and are not simply 
transient or incidental. It therefore seems sensible to address the issue of from whence these 
biases arise. 
However, to a greater extent, adult work in depression has not been extended to child 
populations. Possible reasons are that the cognitive abilities of children in the past have been 
underestimated. Also only 30 years ago, it was not believed that children experienced 
clinically significant depression so presumably researchers doubted the validity of extending 
cognitive research into child samples. Equally, it is difficult to design tasks, which are 
suitable across all ages. Thereafter previous work may not have readily addressed depression 
from a developmental perspective, due to disagreement regarding whether or to what extent, 
depression in child and adult-hood reflect a continuation of the same disorder. 
1.14. Why extend adult research? 
Extending adult research in depression into child population is useful on several fronts. It can 
inform preventative measures and interventions from a research perspective. Professionals 
need a set of theories from which forms of treatment or diagnoses have been scientifically 
derived. This will eventually reduce costs to the mental health system Understanding better 
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the manifestation of depressive symptoms and biases in children will also, importantly, reduce 
the suffering of young people and improve people's awareness of the existence of affective 
disorders in youth. Thirdly, managing depressive biases before they become more critically 
established in adulthood will reduce the onset of clinical depression in adults. Finally, to 
understand a thing fully, one must understand its origins. Thus, research efforts into studying 
depressive processes in children will help underpin broader questions concerning the 
existence of cognition-emotion interactions. 
1.15. Problems Carrying Out Research 
Childhood depression as a recognised clinical condition is relatively new and consequently 
our understanding of the disorder in comparison to its namesake in the adult population is 
limited. Unfortunately many of the adult methodologies and theories of depression have been 
transferred wholesale into the study of childhood depression without due consideration of 
developmental issues (see Vasey, Dalgleish & Silverman, 2003 for a commentary). Although 
information processing has been widely studied in depressed adults, less effort has been 
directed toward studying the information processing styles of depressed children and 
adolescents. Information processing paradigms can be used to investigate aspects of child's 
functioning, which are not accessible to direct introspection. Basically, information 
processing research can be used to map various cognitive biases. This may prove useful 
intervention strategy for children who may otherwise be on a developmental pathway leading 
to depression. 
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PART III I CURRENT IP RESEARCH IN CHILDHOOD DEPRESSION 
The IP approach was a research avenue developed to look at biases in adults and has not yet 
been fully or systematically replicated in children or adolescents. Nevertheless there is some 
evidence of processing in depressed youth analogous to that found in depressed adults. 
1.16. Memorial Biases 
A number of studies have documented depression-typical memory biases and preferential 
processing of negative information in clinically depressed children. For example, negative 
self-descriptions are recalled more frequently than positive in childhood depression (Gencoz 
et al 2001; Hammen & Zupan, 1984; Zupan & Jaenicke, 1987). Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, 
Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, (1998) observed that depressed children recalled more negative 
words than non-depressed children. Similarly, Timbremont and Braet (2004) reported that 
after a negative mood induction, never-depressed control children demonstrated biased for 
recall for positive words. This positive bias was not evident in the depressed groups. Instead, 
currently (but not formerly) depressed children showed a bias for recall of negative words. 
Bishop, Dalgleish, and Yule (2004), also presented positive and negative emotional stories to 
children who scored low and high on a measure of depressive symptoms and found that 
children with high levels of depressive symptoms (aged 5-11 years) showed enhanced recall 
for sad emotional stories, relative to positive stories, compared to the low depressed group. 
This effect did not vary with age. Authors conclude that, when child-oriented materials are 
used, depression-related biases towards negative information are observable even in a non- 
clinical sample of children. 
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Moreover, Gencoz, Voelz, Gencoz, Petit and Joiner, (2001) investigated the specificity of 
biased IP styles to depression and anxiety, in 58 youth inpatients aged 9-17. Lower rates of 
positive adjective endorsement and lower rates of positive adjective recall were found to be 
associated with depression, but not anxiety. Furthermore, in the Gencoz study, even when 
positive adjectives were rated as self-referent, depressed children were still less likely to recall 
them relative to negative. Hence, it appears positive information was unlikely to be elaborated 
in depressed youth, consistent with Williams et al's priming and elaboration theory of 
depression (1997). Moreover, such results do not implicate a general memory dysfunction in 
depressed children, since only poor positive recall was associated with depression in children 
in this study (see Gencoz et al., 2001). 
1.17. Attentional Biases 
A common underlying feature of paediatric depressive disorder (as with adults) may be 
alterations associated with the strategic processing of and allocation of resources towards 
valenced emotional information. Evidence in support of preferential attention to negative 
information in depressed youth was provided by Ladouceur, Dahl, Williamson, Birhaher, 
Ryan & Casey (2005). Ladouceur et al. found that depressed (and co-morbid anxious- 
depressed) children (aged 8-16, mean age 12) took longer to react to a neutral stimulus on a 
negative emotional background (compared to a neutral background) on an emotion-distracting 
task. In contrast, non-depressed children showed longer reaction times for target stimuli on 
positive backgrounds. This shows an interesting dissociation effect, whereby depressed 
children appeared biased towards negative emotional stimuli whereas controls appeared 
biased towards positive emotional stimuli, in keeping with adult depressed literature. 
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Similarly, Joiner, Katz and Lew (1997) found depressed children expressed more interest in 
negative feedback than non-depressed counterparts. 
Furthermore, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Taghavi, Yule, and Dalgleish, (2000) found no evidence 
of an attentional bias towards depression-related or threat-related emotional information in 
clinically depressed children and adolescents on the dot probe task. In the same vein, results 
from Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule and Dalgleish, (1999) demonstrated selective 
attention toward threat stimuli in clinically anxious children, relative to controls, However, no 
attentional bias in mixed anxious-depressed children. Thus, as with adults (see Williams, et al 
1997), depression in children does not appear to be associated with priming level attention 
towards negative information but rather, with biases at a strategic level. 
1.18. Schema Biases 
With respect to the applicability of Beck et al's (1979) schema model of depression to 
children, recently, Schniering & Rapee (2004) found evidence of the content-specificity of 
negative schema in 200 community youths and 160 clinical youths aged between 7-16 years. 
Depression was associated with themes of personal failure and loss; anxiety was associated 
with social threat, consistent with the idea that specific depressogenic vulnerabilities exist in 
childhood. In the same way, links have been found between negative beliefs and depressive 
symptoms in community (e. g. Krantz & Hammen, 1979; Dobson & Shaw, 1987) and clinical 
child samples (see Segal & Ingram, 1994). Since the origin of the development of schemas 
about the self, world and future occur during childhood, a more concentrated focus on this 
time span in normal and depressed children would be useful. 
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Joiner, Metalsky, Lew and Klocek (1999) also reported that dysfunctional attitudes interacted 
with a negative outcome on a mid-term examination increased depressive symptoms in 
students. Anxious cognitions did not mediate the relationship between exam stress and 
depression. Abela and D'Alessandro (2002) examined 136 high-school students and found 
that increased depressed mood was associated with dysfunctional attitudes following a 
negative stress, but not following positive event, supporting a diathesis-stress model of 
depression in youth. Cole and Jackson, (1993) further found evidence that negative cognitive 
errors mediated the relationship between peer rated competence (across academic, social, and 
personal domains) and depression in children. Hammen, Adrain & Hiroto (1988) also tested 
children aged 8-16 years at high risk of depression due to parental affective disorder or illness 
and a normal comparison group and found that negative cognitions about the self predicted 
onset or change in depression over a6 month follow up period. Indeed negative self- 
evaluation appears to be a common symptom of depression in childhood (Stark, 1990). 
1.19. Attributional Biases 
Evidence of biases in the way children attribute causes to positive and negative events has 
also been demonstrated in line with adult depressive literature. Attribution theory is a theory 
of how people link actions and emotions to particular causes, both internal and external and 
biases in attributional style are considered `a risk' factor for depression (Abramson, Seligman 
& Teasdale, 1978; Abramson, 1989). Numerous studies have demonstrated the predicted 
association between a negative explanatory style and depressive symptoms in youth (e. g. 
Gladstone & Kaslow, 1995; Blumberg & Izard, 1985; Hops, Lewinsohn, Andrews & Roberts, 
1990). 
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Muris, Scmidt, Lambrichs & Meesters (2001) found that a negative attributional style featured 
as the primary source of depression in a sample of 373 normal adolescents aged between 13- 
19 years. There is abundant evidence that high levels of depression in childhood and 
adolescence is associated with internal-global-stable attributions to negative events and that 
the reverse is true (external-specific-unstable attributions) for positive events (e. g. Joiner & 
Wagner, 1995; Gladstone & Kaslow, 1995). For example, between the ages of 8-12, 
attributional style begins to interact with negative life events to affect depressed mood in 
children (Abela, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema et al, 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994). 
In addition, Joiner (2000) showed that a negative attributional style interacted with occurrence 
of negative life events to significantly predict depressive symptomology in youth psychiatric 
inpatients. There are also several studies of children of depressed mothers, which show 
similar results (e. g. Taylor & Ingram, 1999; Jaenicke et al, 1987; Garber & Robinson, 1997) 
i. e. more negative self-concepts, less positive self-schemata and more negative attributional 
styles in high risk children than in children of medically ill or normal mothers. Thus, there is 
evidence that negative IP and negative self-schema may be characteristic of depressed 
children and adolescents, as well as children who are at high risk of developing depression. 
1.20. Current Cross-modal Studies 
In one of the very few but important studies of IP across a significant age range and across 
different disorders in childhood, Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury & 
Yule (2003) compared children with diagnoses major depressed disorder (MDD), general 
anxiety disorder (GAD), and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with healthy controls 
between the ages of 7-18 on tests of attention, memory and prospective judgement. No biases 
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on any task were found in the depressed group. The lack of support for an attentional bias 
towards depression-congruent words in depression is consistent with the bulk of adult 
literature (Williams et al., 1997). The lack of memory bias in depressed children in this study 
is slightly more surprising given that previous work in depressed adults (and depressed 
children; see above) often demonstrates an elaborative mood-congruent memorial bias 
(Williams et al., 1997). Work in depressed child, adolescent and adult groups have produced 
evidence of a memorial bias for self-referent negative information. The cue words used in the 
Dalgleish et al., study were not examined for self-reference and were not explicitly processed 
in a self-referent mode. This could therefore explain the absence of a memorial bias for cue 
words in this study. 
Finally, the failure to make `other' or 'self' referent biases in judgements for negative events 
is consistent with previously published evidence from these authors, indicating evidence of 
depressive realism in depressed youth (Dalgleish et al., 1997; 1998; Neshat-Doost et al, 
2000). This study highlights the importance of appropriate stimuli material in IP paradigms. It 
also highlights possible additional levels of complexity in childhood depressive processing 
beyond that predicted, for example, by Beck et al., (1979). For instance, depressive realism, 
as evidenced in depressed children's prospective judgements, is not predicted by a `negative 
bias' account of depression. Thirdly, this study looked at a representative sample of IP tasks 
used in the adult literature, it did not look at autobiographical memory biases, which are 
common in adult depressive literature. This thesis hopes to extend our knowledge concerning 
memorial and other emotion-related processing biases in children, which may be associated 
with depression. In particular, the aim was to examine autobiographical memory (AM) bias in 
childhood. 
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Chapter 21 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY AND DEPRESSION 
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Abstract 21 One of the strongest findings in the adult depressive literature is that depressed 
individuals demonstrate an overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) bias in response to 
valenced cue words. This is a robust finding and has implications in terms of self-schema, 
information processing, downstream processing and encoding. This bias has not been 
examined in children. The present chapter reviews the relevant literature and introduces the 
main contending theories posited to account for this bias. 
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2.1. What is Autobiographical Memory? 
Autobiographical Memory (AM) is memory for information pertaining to the self (Brewer, 
1986). There are arguably two components to AM. The first component is semantic and 
encompasses autobiographical facts (e. g., names, addresses and trait information). 
Autobiographical facts are a type of autobiographical knowledge that is not indexed by event 
related information (Conway, 1987). The second component is episodic and contains 
personally experienced events. Within this episodic component there are subtypes of AM. 
These are specific, categoric and extended memory. Specific AM is memory for a single 
event that lasted less than I day and occurred at a specific place and time whilst categoric 
(generic) memory is of a collection or class of events (Williams & Dritschel, 1992). Extended 
memory involves memory for an event that occurred at a specific time and place, yet lasted 
more than I day e. g. a holiday. Overgeneral memory (OGM) then refers to inappropriate 
retrieval of categoric and extended episodic memories and is linked to depression. This thesis 
is concerned with episodic retrieval, in particular, influences on autobiographical memory 
specificity (AMS). 
2.2. Why is AM important? 
What and how autobiographical memories are retrieved is important. If there are biases in 
what we remember in terms of autobiographical (personally relevant) events this will affect 
how we feel about ourselves, the world and the future. For instance remembering only 
negative personal events will have implications for anticipation of negative events in the 
future. In addition biases in how we remember (i. e. in terms of specificity) will also effect 
subsequent processing. For example, both specific and categoric memories are required for 
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successful everyday functioning. Access to general scripts is needed to provide context and 
orientation in a situation while specific episodic recall is needed to differentiate one event 
from another. People should be able to move through an AM hierarchy to select the 
appropriate level of specificity in a given context. It is important to note that there are 
dysfunctional consequences to lacking either specific or general memories. (T. Dalgleish, 
personal communication, 2005). 
2.3. Overgeneral Memory and Depression 
Depression is characterized by OGM (Van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). This bias was first 
reported in parasuicidal individuals by Williams & Broadbent (1986). When asked to report 
specific AMs in response to cue words, parasuicidal patients instead responded with 
categoric, script-like memories. Hence, this phenomenon is observed when an interviewer 
tries to elicit specific information from a patient but the patient fails to produce a particular 
recollection even when prompted. Eventually, the patient may access a specific memory but 
this is both difficult and delayed. A number of studies have replicated this OGM in depressed 
individuals, relative to controls (e. g. Brewin, Reynolds & Tata, 1999; Goddard, Dritschel, & 
Burton, 2001; Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach, 
2001; Williams & Scott, 1988). OGM is not considered to reflect a function of 
psychopathology generally, for instance with the exception of post-traumatic stress disorder, 
OGM is not associated with anxiety disorders (e. g. Richards & Whittaker, 1990; Burke & 
Matthews, 1992). OGM is also linked to impaired social problem solving (Goddard, 
Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; 1997; Evans et al., 1992; Pollock & Williams, 2001), suicidality 
(Williams et at. 1996; Williams & Dritschel, 1988; Evans, Williams, O'Loughlin & Howell, 
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1992) and has also been shown to predict depressive symptoms in prospective designs (e. g. 
Brittlebank, Scott, Williams and Ferrier, 1993). 
Evidence suggests that OGM exists as part of a stable, dysfunctional cognitive style and is 
somewhat independent of current mood. For example, the OGM bias is present in patients 
remitted from depression (Mackinger et al 2000). However OGM also appears subject to 
modification as demonstrated in formerly depressed adults following Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy for example, where the development of a more specific retrieval mode for 
AM was associated with a lower risk for relapse into depression (Williams, Teasdale, Segal & 
Soulsby, 2000). It seems to be that OGM can predict depression and is not just a cognitive 
curiosity, but is indicating something fundamental about depressive bias. Mounting evidence 
supports the hypothesis that OGM reflects a modifiable but stable cognitive bias, which has 
led a number of theorists to assert that the roots of this bias may lie in childhood. 
2.4. OGM and Trauma 
Although the weight of OGM evidence is for depressed groups, research has also 
demonstrated a relationship between reduced AMS and trauma groups. This includes adults 
(Kuyken & Brewin, 1995) and adolescents (Johnson, Greenhoot, Glisky and McCloskey, 
2005) reporting a history of childhood abuse, adults reporting past physical abuse (Hermans, 
Van den Broeck, Belis, Raes, Piters & Eelen, 2004) or emotional abuse (Raes, Hermans, 
Williams & Eelen, 2005), adolescents with a history of serious burns in childhood (Stokes et 
al 2004), inpatient adolescents (de Decker, Hermans, Raes & Eelen, 2003) outpatient 
adolescents (Meesters, Muris & Wessel, 2000), war traumatized adults (McNally, Lasko, 
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Macklin & Pitman, 1995) and eating disorder patients with a history of parental abuse 
(Dalgleish et al 2003). 
Some studies have failed to find a significant relationship between AMS and trauma (Arntz, 
Meeren & Wessel, 2002; Wessel et al 2001; Peeters, et al 2002; Orbach, Lamb, Sternberg, 
Williams & Dawud-Noursi, 2001). These incongruent findings could be linked to the severity, 
type, timing or impact of trauma experienced, as well as individual coping responses. As this 
OGM and trauma literature is in its infancy these factors have not yet been systematically 
examined. Also, the AMT was not used in the Orbach et al study, where overgenerality was 
instead assessed, by coding child responses to direct questions about family disagreements, 
which is a very different task to the AMT. There is also no consistent valence pattern across 
the existant trauma studies. Trauma related 0GM effects have been demonstrated to both 
negative cues (e. g. Dalgleish et al 2003) and to positive cues (e. g. de Decker et a! 2003). The 
testing of such diverse groups, among other things, may account for this inconsistency. 
Nevertheless, the weight of evidence suggests a link between trauma and OGM, which is 
crucial to understanding some theories of OGM (e. g. Williams et al, 1996). 
2.5. Mnemonic Interlock 
Work on OGM came out of a mood congruent memory tradition, i. e. do people remember 
events consistent with their mood such that depressed persons remember more negative than 
positive information. It was found that irrespective of the valence of material, depressed 
individuals demonstrated an overgeneral memory style in reporting past experiences. 
Mnemonic Interlock (MI; Williams, 1996) was designed to give an account of this OGM in 
depression. Assuming a hierarchical autobiographical memory system, MI states that the 
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overgeneral memory retrieval phenomena observed in depressed adults may be a result of a 
truncated memory search caused by memory becoming locked at a schematic level of 
processing. This would occur, primarily in depression, due to depressed individuals 
preferentially processing at this schematic level of analysis. The reason for preferential 
processing at this level of analysis is further hypothesized to be linked to a passive form of 
affect avoidance or affect regulation (AR). In avoiding the more specific event memories and 
sticking to an overgeneral mode of retrieval, individuals are proposed to be able to regulate 
the impact of painful affect generated by specific recollections. Hence, it is most likely that 
individuals who have experienced `pain' in early childhood may in part develop this 
overgeneral autobiographical memory style. The argument concludes that it is these same 
individuals who suffer from depression. 
However, MI is a theory specifically designed to account OGM and in isolation it does not 
have any broader explanatory appeal. Therefore, a second model, that of Conway & Pleydell- 
Pearce (2000), is now frequently adopted to give more substance to the theory of MI. The 
Self-Memory System of Conway & Pleydell-Pearce offers a more complete hypothesis 
concerning the possible self, memory and goal interactions in human cognition. Although it 
has less to say concerning emotion, or indeed depression, it remains a useful overview of 
memory structures and the self, placing them on a clear stage from whence to communicate 
the importance and appeal of studying autobiographical memory phenomena. 
2.6. The Self-Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Peace, 2000) 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce's (2000) Self Memory System (SMS) is a hierarchical search 
model of personal event, autobiographical memory (AM). In this model there are three levels 
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of AM knowledge. These are lifetime periods (e. g. at school) general event representations 
(GER; e. g. sitting exams) and event specific knowledge (ESK; e. g. winning the class honours 
trophy). GERS are assumed to be the preferred mode of memory entry for all individuals. 
ESK is the lowest level in the memory hierarchy and is normally more concrete and visual 
than the more abstract and verbal summaries of past events. 
In this model ESK can be generated via generative or direct retrieval. Generative retrieval is 
elaborating on mnemonic cues and searching for matches supervised by executive processes, 
guided by goal structures. Generative search is hierarchical. This constructive process starts 
with a general memory that is progressively specified. Importantly to the study of depression, 
this slow and effortful process may be disrupted by activation of emotion and therefore may 
be aborted. Generative search also involves conceptual representations (see next paragraph). 
Direct retrieval in contrast is the immediate activation of a memory. Hence, as with Williams' 
(1996) truncated search, in SMS, a dysfacilitation of the retrieval process, is assumed to 
underlie the retrieval of overgeneral memories. 
Furthermore, according to Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) remembering is a goal-directed 
activity. In other words there is a strong relationship between self, goals and memory in this 
model. The conceptual self contains abstract self-knowledge such as attitudes, beliefs and 
self-guides which are constrained by and associated with the general event memories, lifetime 
period memories and self-schema representations of the autobiographical knowledge. The 
episodic memory system, lower in the hierarchy, contains sensory perceptual event specific 
knowledge (ESK), which if relevant to ongoing goal processing, becomes linked to stored 
representations in the autobiographical knowledge base. Basically then, AM constrains the 
self. 
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Moreover, memory according to this model becomes distorted under two guiding principles; 
coherence and correspondence. Coherence results in changing the accessibility of memories 
to make it consistent with the 'self' could inter-change `self' for `schema' here). It is argued 
that this occurs due to driving needs to maintain a confirmatory past and to heavily resist goal 
change. Correspondence means memory has to correspond to a fact however it can still be 
distorted, for example, in the case of overgeneral memory, selective memory, or rehearsal. 
Something else, which is important in terms of the SMS is the difference between recent and 
remote memories. It is remote (long-term) memories, which define the self. Recent memories 
unless rehearsed and incorporated into long-term memory, are transient. This has implications 
for the AM literature As well as determining which aspects of ESK become integrated with 
the AM base (being retained for later retrieval), the working self influences which episodic 
memories are retrievable at any given point in time, retrieval being dependent to a large 
degree on the extent to which episodic memories are consistent with and relevant to the 
current goals of the working self. 
2.7. 'Origin' Theories 
Williams (1996) is one of the only theorists to have put forward a developmental mechanism 
through which OGM may evolve. Williams (1996) first posited the theory of Mnemonic 
Interlock (MI) to account for the excess of categoric memories recalled by depressed 
individuals. In this theory, memory retrieval becomes deadlocked following the categoric 
stage of memory because of the tendency for an initial self-referent categoric description to 
elicit other highly self-referent descriptions in depressed memory. For example, the cue 
`unhappy' in a depressed person will likely elicit the memory `I always fail things', which 
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may trigger further categoric descriptions such as `I always let people down'. Several such 
iterations (which can be about self, world or future) will result in reinforcement of these 
negative categoric descriptions, lead to a closer relationship of these schemas in memory and 
therefore a greater likelihood of one categoric description triggering another in the future. Of 
most relevance to the current thesis, is that Williams (1996) theorizes that this overgeneral 
cognitive style develops from childhood perhaps in response to negative events. He suggests 
that children who are either subjected to numerous negative events or who have difficulty 
coping with negative affect, may develop an OGM style to minimize their experience of 
negative affect at recall. There is the Affect Regulation (AR) hypothesis. An assumed adverse 
consequence of adopting an OGM style is that individuals will also recall overgenerally for 
positive events. 
2.8. The Theory of Affect Regulation (Williams, 1996) 
The theory of Affect Regulation (AR) is conceived of as a passive cognitive avoidance' 
strategy, within a developmental framework. Consistent with this theory, Kuyken & Brewin 
(1995) found that depressed women with a history of abuse as children demonstrated more 
overgeneral retrieval than those who had not. Individuals who have experienced trauma 
during childhood have greater difficulty in specific retrieval even for events unrelated to the 
trauma (Meesters, Merckelbach, Muris & Wessel, 2000). Thus, evidence from trauma 
research supports the affect control hypothesis to the extent that experience of negative life 
events in childhood is associated with overgeneral retrieval in adulthood (Daigleish et al. 
2003; de Decker et al. 2003; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory & 
Williams, 2002; Hermans, et al, 2004). 
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However, evidence that categoric recall reduces the experience of negative affect, consistent 
with AR is not uncontested. For example, Hanawalt & Gebhart (1965) found that when 
children gave ratings of event pleasantness and unpleasantness, individual events were rated 
as more unpleasant than events that had been summarized consistent with an AR 
interpretation. However no mood or physiological measures were taken to confirm that rating 
of unpleasantness actually effected mood. Second, Raes, Hermans, de Decker, Eelen & 
Williams (2003) found evidence in support of AR in an experimental study of undergraduate 
students where students demonstrating very high OGM reported less distress on a subsequent 
frustration task compared to students reporting very low OGM. However, findings 
contradictory to an ARH have been reported by Philippot and colleagues who found specific 
processing was consistently related to reduced emotional arousal in a series of studies. For 
example, Philippot, Schaefer & Herbette, (2003) found that re-evocation of negative 
memories (primed for specific or general retrieval) resulted in reduced ratings of emotional 
intensity for the specific primed condition while ratings of emotional arousal in the general 
primed condition remained the same. Results are interpreted as evidence that actively 
specifying emotional memories actually reduces emotion elicitation, contradictory to the AR 
hypothesis. This result was also replicated in a second study with induced anxious students, 
whereby specifying anxiety related information actually resulted in less emotional arousal 
than general level processing (Philippot, Burgos, Verhasselt & Baeyens, 2002). 
Work on AR and AM is clearly in its infancy. Results have not yet been tested in depressed 
populations and there is discrepancy in current findings. There are several possible reasons to 
account for such differences. One such reason may be a fundamental difference between the 
effects of induced high-low specificity vs. a trait high-low OGM style (Raes et al., exclusively 
examined the latter). Equally, another difference concerns reporting of emotion. Raes et al., 
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asked participants to rate mood on a 0-100 (not at all- extremely) visual analogue scale in 
response to various mood adjectives whereas participants in Philippot et al., study reported 
emotion intensity on a scale of 0-10 (no emotion - strongest emotion ever experienced). This 
too could account for differences. Ultimately, that the process of overgeneral retrieval may be 
an affect reducing mechanism is popular but as yet unproven. 
2.9. Other OGM theories 
OGM bias may otherwise be explained with reference to (a) schema and (b) prototypicality; 
(c) problems of inhibitory control or (d) affect-regulation failure. For example, (a) Rather than 
a passive memory search strategy, OGM may reflect `capture errors' due to AMT cues 
mapping onto core concerns and dysfunctional schema in depressed or traumatized 
individuals, resulting in temporary memory system disruption (Dalgleish et al., 2003). OGM 
to positive cues in depression would then be explained in terms of depressed individuals 
failing to encode or store positive memories because of strong negative schema making 
positive memories incongruent with self. (b) Similarly, I would suggest, negative OGMs may 
result from decisions regarding prototypicality. Under normal circumstances people use 
generic memory because of the efficiency if affords in summarizing large numbers of 
individual episodes and events. General memories can give quick access to information. 
However, general memories are formed not merely as a frequency effect, i. e. the more 
frequent an event the more likely it is to become generic. Instead, one off events may be 
generalized if they are viewed as `typical' by the individual. Importantly then, individual 
events can become generic in a person's memory if they are seen as paradigmatic or 
representative and what an individual considers `typical' is effected by their current schemas 
and scripts. Hence depressed individuals may retrieve overgeneral negative memories as 
prototypical (i. e. multiple specific events summarized or single negative events viewed as 
63 
CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION 
paradigmatic) whereas overgeneral positive memories may be a result of failure to encode 
specific positive events (as schema incongruent). OGM theories so far have failed to give an 
adequate explanation for the existence of reduced specificity to both positive and negative 
cues. 
(c) Regarding the inhibitory control hypothesis, Hasher & Zacks (1979) proposed that 
depressed individuals have difficulty inhibiting interfering cognitive material when seeking to 
perform cognitive tasks. This would lead to OGM because specific retrieval requires 
appropriate inhibition of mnemonic material from other stages of the memory hierarchy. 
Deficits in the ability to inhibit interfering information may contribute to OGM errors. This 
inhibition theory was very recently proposed and tested by Dalgleish et al., (in press). It may 
be that AM retrieval is particularly vulnerable to executive failures of inhibitory control. 
Dalgleish et al. have argued that, if a central problem in specific memory retrieval is a failure 
to inhibit interfering information, the numbers of OGMs on the AMT should be associated 
with errors of performance on executive tasks that require inhibition of irrelevant information. 
In a series of studies in dysphoric individuals, Dalgleish et al. demonstrated that this was the 
case. Levels of OGM were correlated highly with levels of inhibitory task errors on a range of 
executive paradigms with little or no relationship to autobiography, memory or emotion. 
Thus, OGM may be associated with a failure to inhibit task irrelevant information. This 
particular line of OGM research is in its infancy but highlights the possibility that there may 
be more than one plausible account for OGM retrieval and more than one mechanism may be 
in operation. 
Finally, (d) Philippot et al., (2004) argue that instead of OGM reflecting a truncated memory 
search motivated by affect regulation, 0GM may instead be a result of failure to emotion 
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regulate. That is, it may be that when an AM is activated in a depressed person, the associated 
emotion is so poorly regulated that any attempt to further specify the emotional memory is 
disrupted by the emotional arousal. This theory is similar to the schema disruption theory, in 
which schema activation disrupts the memory search process. This AR-failure (or Affect- 
Arousal) theory asserts that the elicitation of emotion disrupts the memory search process. 
Furthermore, the ARH suggests a specific memory mode results in increased emotional 
arousal. In contrast, the present account suggests specifying information from memory should 
reduce emotional arousal. This would be due the reduction of automatic, schematic (emotion 
associated) processing. Though not yet tested in depressed groups, this has held true in several 
student studies (Philippot, Burgos, Verhasselt & Baeyens, 2002; Philippot, Schaefer & 
Herbette, 2003; Philippot, Burgos, Douilliez & Francart, 2004). In addition, both schema and 
affect-arousal explanations of OGM also have the advantage of being able to account for both 
positive and negative OGM, while a cognitive avoidance explanation (AR) can only 
comfortably account for negative memory effects. 
In summary, evidence of OGM in depression is robust and at present, MI and AR remain the 
most prominent and well-established mechanistic or causal theories. Moreover these theories 
are not mutually exclusive. However, clear empirical evidence validating theories of OGM is 
still pending. As a prime example, though the links between the development of an OGM 
style from childhood and depression have been made in theory, to date there are no studies 
examining OGM bias in children. The principle aim of this thesis is to address this gap in the 
literature. 
2.10. Valence 
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In terms of trying to account for valence effects in the context of current OGM theories, AR 
would assume the OGM effect starts with negative recall and may later spread to include 
positive recall due the system wide bias. Schema interpretations of OGM would not predict 
directional valence effects, since overgenerality in this view is linked to cues mapping onto 
underlying schema as opposed to being a product of the valence of the word cues themselves. 
However, it is unclear whether OGM to positive cues would reflect underlying negative 
schema or the absence of positive schema. A mood congruent theory of OGM would probably 
predict increased specificity to negative cues and reduced specificity to positive cues, which 
cannot fully account for the negative OGM effects in depression. An affect-arousal account, 
like the schema account, would also allow for an incorporation of positive or negative OGM, 
dependent on whether disruptive affect was generated by the cue word e. g. The cue word 
`Happy' generating distress by triggering thoughts of `I am never happy' which would 
interfere with specific processing. One of the central aims of this thesis is to look more 
closely at valence effects in the child AM responses. 
2.11. In Conclusion 
In this chapter I have reviewed the rhetorical and empirical literature on autobiographical 
memory and depression. Within this broad domain I have concentrated on the OGM effect, as 
this is the central focus of the research in this thesis. I have outlined the key adult studies in 
this area and highlighted the fact that, to date, there are no published studies in children. The 
rationale for the present thesis was therefore to examine the fundamental components of 
OGM, for the first time in children and to then extend our knowledge of OGM in children by 
studying OGM in the context of other biases associated with depression. 
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To this end, Chapter 3 describes a study examining whether or not OGM effects exist in 
younger populations, along with an investigation of the relationship between OGM and 
individual differences in emotion focusing. In Chapter 4, this research is extended to a clinical 
population of children, and OGM in the sample is compared with OGM in both adolescent 
and adult samples. In Chapter 5, the adult finding that OGM predicts later levels of depressed 
affect (e. g. Brittlebank, et al., 1993; Dalgleish et al., 2001) is examined using a prospective 
longitudinal design in a school sample. This study also examines the relationship between 
OGM and cognitive style. Chapter 6 describes a study that validated an additional 
information-processing paradigm for use in children and to support AMT results, this new 
paradigm involved labeling of facial affect. Finally, Chapter 7 reports a study of looking at 
the relationship between OGM, emotion focusing, facial affect recognition and social problem 
solving in a sample of traumatized residential children. 
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Chapter 31 Study 1 Autobiographical Memory Specificity in Children: Effects 
of Age, Dysphoria and Emotion-Focusing 
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Abstract 3 Overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) is strongly associated with 
depression in adults and appears to reflect a stable cognitive bias (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 
2004). Theories of OGM have postulated that this bias may originate in childhood (Williams, 
1996). However, it is not known whether this bias exists in children or what factors contribute to 
its development. The roles of age, dysphoria and a new variable, Emotion-Focusing (EF) on the 
production of specific autobiographical memories was examined in children aged 7-11 years 
using the standard Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Results 
show that older children retrieved more specific memories than younger children irrespective of 
cue valence. Dysphoric children retrieved fewer specific positive memories irrespective of age 
and a three-way interaction was discovered between age, valence and dysphoria, such that older 
dysphoric children also demonstrated OGM to negative cue words. In addition, EF was 
associated with specific retrieval, providing new evidence for the possible importance of 
encoding preferences in OGM. Results are discussed in terms of the development of 
depressogenic biases. 
69 
CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we saw that overgeneral memory (OGM) has been extensively studied in 
adults and appears to be a key feature of adult depression (van Vreeskwijk & de Wilde, 2004). In 
considering the origins of this bias Williams (1996) put forward a developmental hypothesis in 
which he theorized that OGM may develop from childhood in response to negative events. 
However, to date no studies have looked at OGM in children. Moreover there is no empirical 
evidence regarding how mood or other individual difference factors, such as emotion focusing 
might influence the production of overgeneral memory in children using standard AMT cuing 
paradigms. Importantly, if OGM does reflect a stable bias, it could be a useful marker of 
cognitive vulnerability to depression in children. The principal aim of the present study was 
therefore to investigate whether children could generate AMs to cue words, and whether this 
effect would be affected by age, levels of dysphoric mood, level of emotion-focusing or cue 
valence. 
3.1.1. Adolescent AM 
We have some insight into the development of 0GM from investigations involving adolescents, 
using the same AMT cuing paradigm that is used in the adult literature (de Decker, Hermans, 
Raes & Eelen, 2003; Park, Goodyer & Teasdale, 2002; Swales, Williams & Wood, 2001). In 
these studies, as expected from the adult literature, clinically depressed adolescents are more 
overgeneral in their responses to cue words than non-depressed controls (Park et al., 2002). 
However, in the Swales et al. study there was also a positive correlation within the clinical 
70 
CHAPTFR 3 DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
population, with the more depressed and hopeless adolescents demonstrating greater specificity 
to negative cues. This is in the opposite direction to that which would be expected from previous 
findings with depressed adults (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). Post-hoc analyses attributed 
this finding to a repeated memory phenomenon, whereby a sub-set of parasuicidal adolescents 
recalled the same negative traumatic event to more than one cue word. The researcher was the 
therapist in this study, which may also be pertinent to the result. Repeated specific recall can be 
addressed with clear participant instruction to prevent or judge repetition. Adolescents exposed 
to family violence during childhood, and reporting co-morbid depression, also exhibited an 
OGM bias as evidenced in interview data concerning family conflict (Orbach, Lamb, Sternberg, 
Williams & Dawud-Noursi, 2001). 
3.1.2. Developmental-Child AM 
Instead of examining OGM effects, existing studies examining AM retrieval in children have 
tended to concentrate on the onset of AM recall in pre-school to early school age children and 
have used different methodologies from those used in the adult literature. Currently there is no 
literature available on OGM bias in children. However, it is possible to look at literature on the 
influences on the development of AM to look for factors, which may contribute to the 
development of an OGM style. This subsection reviews this literature on development of AM 
retrieval in children. 
Conscious memory begins to develop at 8 months which is when granule neurons in the 
hippocampal denate region have all finally formed, when myelination of many important limbic 
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pathways gets underway, and when activity in the frontal lobes (which plays a part in both short 
and long term conscious memory) surges (McCall & Carriger, 1993). Thereafter, toddlers can 
demonstrate accurate and durable recall of personally experienced events. However, these 
reports are often fragmentary and heavily dependent on questioning and prompting. Moreover 
there are doubts as to whether event memory of this sort is truly autobiographical, in the sense of 
personally relevant (Howe & Courage, 1997). 
With respect to specificity, children as young as 3 can recall one-off or routine events but details 
are often lost and they tend to rely on script like information e. g. `having dinner', `taking a bath', 
`going to bed'. Such generic event memory provides a schema derived from experience that 
sketches the general outline of a familiar event without details of specific time or place and is 
believed to represent a functional stage in memory development in early childhood (Nelson, 
1993). In contrast, older preschool children and school age children are able to provide 
narratives, which contain more referential detail, orienting information, evaluative comment, 
temporal markers and require less prompting (Howe & Courage, 1997). This developmental 
literature reveals that specific questions can yield specific AM responses even in very young 
children (e. g. Barr, Dowden & Hayne 1996; Carver & Bauer, 1999). However, overall, young 
children's preferred mode of memory reporting is general (Nelson, 1993). 
Greater detail, structure and reference to temporal markers are then observed in AMs as a 
function of increasing age (Howe & Courage, 1997). Both narrative and AM continue to develop 
in structure, length, organization, content and elaborativeness over early school years (Fivush & 
Hammond, 1990; Hudson, Fivush & Kuebli, 1992; Peterson & McCabe, 1991). These findings 
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are discussed in terms of language acquisition (Nelson, 1993) and self-concept formation (Howe 
& Courage, 1997) rather than in terms of specificity or generality per se. However, improvement 
in knowledge base, strategy use, language skill, self-concept and storage capacity, with age (for a 
full review see Howe & Courage, 1997), are likely to facilitate AM response specificity. By age 
7 therefore children's AM recall is considered comparable with adult functioning; "memory 
function appears adult like in organization and strategies and shows only a gradual quantitative 
improvement through to early adolescence" (Gathercole, 1998). 
However, developmental literature can suffer from lack of experimental control. For example, 
child narratives are typically heavily prompted and structured/scaffolded by interviewers, 
making results difficult to validate. The present study therefore sought to test an early to middle- 
school age child population on the standard AMT cuing task in order to bridge the gap in the AM 
and depression literature, and to look for evidence of the development of or onset of an 
overgeneral retrieval style prior to its establishment in adolescence. The use of the AMT cuing 
methodology then makes direct comparison between child and adult retrieval styles possible, 
providing a clear baseline from which to examine any effects of mood. 
3.1.3 Factors known to influence AM Development 
The question then remains, what contributes to the development of AM style and content in 
childhood? Howe & Courage (1993) state the emergence of AM arises from basic developments 
in the establishment of the self-concept. By definition, AM is memory for information and events 
pertaining to the self, it is therefore only following knowledge of one's self as an independent 
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entity that experiences can be organized in memory as personal or autobiographical. In effect, the 
development of self-concept theory claims "the development of the self-concept (or self 
schema), like that of other schemata, has a dramatic impact on the way in which memories are 
organized (encoded, stored and retrieved)". At 3 years of age for example, a transition occurs in 
children's qualitative ability to describe themselves and this marks the development of an 
organized psychological self around which memories can be organized. Self-concept may also 
instruct the organization of AMs. Stored AMs add features to the 'self, which in turn influences 
subsequent encoding (Conway, 1996). For example, adults with highly committed self-identities 
recall more AMs and recalled them faster than individuals with low commitment self-identities 
(Neimeyer & Rareshide, 1991) and in adolescence, memories best recalled as contributing to life 
stories were organized around clear themes and personality traits, with high levels of congruency 
and consistency (Habermas & Bluck, 2000). Therefore it seems likely that organization of self- 
concept effects AM. Howe & Courage (1993) state that with the emergence of the self we 
witness the emergence of AM. They argue that AM does not depend on language for its 
existence but does require a cognitive sense of self. So is it possible that self-concept is less 
sophisticated in depression and that this can add to an account of OGM? Beck et al, (1979) 
would certainly assert that the self-concept in depression is child-like in that it is over-simplistic, 
one-dimensional and fixed e. g. `I am fearful' - as opposed to the multidimensional `I am 
sometimes fearful, but I am also often strong and kind'. If the theory of self-schema and memory 
association is true this would presumably affect AM. 
Nelson and colleagues on the other hand assert language, not self-concept, is the key factor 
which influences AM development. Around the same time as the development of self-concept 
74 
CHAPTER 3- DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
children also begin to generate personal narratives around their memories. This language-based 
development of AM explanation (Nelson 1992; 1993) suggests that it is the development of 
language that marks the development of AM. Nelson proposes that children learn the social- 
cultural forms of narrativising memory in conversation with others and it is this that aids 
developing mental representations about knowledge in the form of AM. The impetus for personal 
memories according to this theory occurs when children begin to appreciate the contribution of 
AM and personal memories to social bonding. In this way social bonding is viewed as the 
impetus underlying the development of AM. According to this view social interaction, therefore 
distinguishes AM from other types of memory (Nelson, 1993). In this regard, parental 
conversational style has been shown to affect retrieval style (Fivush & Fromhoff, 1988), as has 
culture (Wang, Leichtman & Davies 2000), each having a strong social aspect. Thus, from a 
developmental perspective both self-concept formation and social interaction have been shown 
to influence the content and style of AM. 
3.1.4. Age and Depression 
Age and dysphoria might also interact to affect AM production. In a 5-year longitudinal study of 
8-13 year olds, Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus & Seligman (1992) found that as children age, 
cognitive style as measured by the Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire (Kaslow, 1978), 
became a significant predictor of depression. In contrast, only negative life events predicted 
depression in the younger group. Authors suggest the reason for this apparent increasing role of 
cognitive style in depression with age may be due to cognitive capacities increasing with age, or 
because cognitive styles become more stable across later childhood. Similar data exist, showing 
an increasing relationship between depression and mood congruent memory bias with age 
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(Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule & Dalgleish, 1998). If age, mood and cognition do 
interact in this way, the association between dysphoria and overgeneral retrieval may manifest 
itself differently in younger as opposed to older children. 
3.1.5. Importance of Cue Valence 
A further factor that might interact with age and dysphoria to influence AM retrieval is cue 
valence. In the adult literature overgeneral recall occurs more in response to positive as opposed 
to negative cue words (e. g. Williams & Broadbent, 1986), However it can show the reverse 
effect (e. g. Mackinger, 2000) with more overgenerality to negative cues. Inconsistent valence 
effects in depressed groups may be attributable to variance in the relative causal contribution of 
AR (Williams, 1996), temporary memory system disruption caused by schema activation 
(Dalgleish et al, 2003) or mood congruency (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Matthews, 1997). 
For example, AR would predict greater OGM to negative cues relative to positive, schema 
activation theory would suggest OGM is dependent on relevant schema activation not cue- 
valence and so directional valence effects would not necessarily be predicted. Mood congruency 
would then anticipate mood congruent processing and therefore poor positive AMS in depressed 
or dysphoric groups. It is also possible that age may further influence this valence effect though, 
to my knowledge this has not been demonstrated in any AM literature. 
3.1.6. Emotion-Focusing and AMS 
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Finally, this study is the first to introduce the idea of `Emotion Focusing' (EF) as a possible 
additional variable influencing the OGM effect. The original motivation for studying this 
variable comes from Williams (1996) who argued that OGM may, in part, be attributable to 
preferential encoding of situations according to their emotional content in individuals who are 
predisposed to focus on emotion due to negative life experiences. Williams (1996) suggested that 
encoding emotion may lead to global memories because it encourages a schematic level of 
thinking (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). From this, it can be assumed that people who have a 
greater tendency to encode the emotional content of situations may be more likely to demonstrate 
overgeneral recall than those who do not. Williams, Teasdale, Segal & Soulsby (2000) re-stated 
that trauma in early childhood may result in a cognitive style in which individuals habitually 
focus on, or are hypersensitive to, the affective features of events. The extent to which 
individuals focus on (encode) the emotional features of their environment is an important factor 
that has hitherto been neglected in both child and adult investigations of AM retrieval. 
It may be for example, that rather than simply reflecting a defensive memory search strategy, 
OGM may also be governed by encoding preferences. OGM is characteristically exclusively 
discussed as a retrieval phenomenon, however it is also useful to consider OGM as a possible 
encoding phenomenon. Individuals do not necessarily encode all information in a given context 
and then later suppress specific aspects at retrieval. Indeed people tend to selectively encode 
information that is salient to them (Howe & Courage, 1997). Some individuals may therefore 
preferentially encode or avoid specific features (or emotional features) of events such that it 
effects specific representations in memory. This would mean that both encoding and storage (not 
just retrieval) are important in understanding OGM. 
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Williams (1996) suggested that people who encode emotion would be more likely to demonstrate 
overgeneral recall than those who do not.. An alternative hypothesis for the effect of EF on AM 
retrieval is that an individual's predisposition to focus on the emotional features of their 
environment may result in improved specific recall of emotional events. Various theoretical 
accounts of cognition-emotion relations would concur with this prediction. For example, 
cognitive theories of depressed mood and/or AM (Beck et al., 1979; Bower, 1981; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) would suggest that, 
to the extent that a specific autobiographical event is encoded in emotional terms, the presence of 
a congruent emotional cue word (such as in the AMT) would be more likely to elicit retrieval of 
that event from memory. The rationale here is that retrieval of AMs is facilitated by the presence 
of any information that maps onto the underlying representational content of that memory. 
Consequently, because high EF individuals would habitually lay down AM representations with 
a greater proportion of emotional content, the presentation of emotional cues should be more 
likely to activate those representations leading to facilitated generation of specific memories. An 
alternative hypothesis for the effect of EF on AM retrieval is therefore that individuals' 
predisposition to focus on the emotional features of their environment may result in more 
specific AM recall to emotional cue words. People who are depressed may then have strong, 
activated connections between affective "negativity" nodes and multiple semantic concepts 
(Ingram, 1984). 
EF is used in this study to denote an individuals' predisposition to focus on the emotional 
features of their environment. Though EF could be state induced, it is conceptualised primarily 
as a trait-like characteristic of an individual. For example, given a typical scenario of a university 
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library during an exam period, one individual may encode the fact that several students at their 
desks look terrified and tearful, while another individual, viewing the same scene, may notice 
instead that there is a pile of precariously stacked books against a chair leg. The first individual 
will be effectively cued to remember the library event by the word `fear' while the second 
individual would be better cued by the phrase `safety-hazard' and would probably not remember 
the event based on an emotional descriptor. 
Thus, it is possible that sensitised emotion encoding may either result in OGM as a form of affect 
regulation or, it may result in improved recall (i. e. increased specificity) due to enhanced 
memory for emotion. Either way, EF may provide clues to the precipitation of certain AM 
retrieval styles. People who are depressed may preferentially encode negative affective aspects 
of events, such that depressed high emotion-focusers would be highly specific to negative cues. 
It is currently not known whether EF is associated with overgeneral or specific valenced recall. 
The final aim of the present study was therefore to investigate the influence of EF, and the 
putative interactions of EF, age, valence and dysphoria, on AM retrieval in children. 
3.2. Study Rational 
The overall rationale for this study was simply to extend the adult AM literature to a child 
population. To my knowledge, no one study has looked at the interaction of age, dysphoria and 
valence as factors known to influence AM. Nor has any study looked at child AM using the 
standard cuing task, or considered EF as a contributing factor. The present study was therefore 
designed to investigate these issues. The specific hypotheses were as follows: 
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3.3. Hypotheses 
1. Age, valence and dysphoria will interact to influence AMS in children. 
- Younger children will be less specific than older children. 
- Dysphoria in children will be associated with reduced AMS 
- The effects of dysphoria may be valence specific and may vary with age. 
These effects will remain after controlling for any effects of general scholastic ability. 
2. EF will explain a significant proportion of the variance in AMS. EF will be associated with 
either increased or reduced AMS and will interact with age, valence or dysphoria, factors 
already known to influence AMS. The effects of EF will occur independent of scholastic 
ability or age. 
3.4. METHOD 
3.4.1. Participants 
Seventy children (35 girls) took part in this study. Thirty-five of the participants were aged 7-8 
years (M = 7.86, SD = . 
40). The remaining thirty-five participants were aged 10-11 years (M = 
10.6, SD = . 72). 
The gender ratio across age groups was similar with 17 females in the younger 
group and 18 females in the older group. Two different age groups of children were recruited. 
Children aged 7-8 years were chosen as the youngest age group. This is because AM retrieval is 
believed to be commensurate with adult functioning by this age (Gathercole, 1998). Children 
aged 10-11 were then chosen to provide a discrete age comparison group and to form a good 
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bridge with previous adolescence literature on OGM (e. g. Park et al., 2002). These two age 
groups ensured the best chance of detecting any deviance in normal child AM development, if 
any exists. There were 14 dysphoric participants (8 from the younger group and 6 from the older 
group). The remaining participants (27 and 29 respectively) were categorized as non-dysphoric. 
`Dysphoric' in this study was defined as a score of 7 or above on the short form of the Child 
Depression Inventory; Kovacs, 1992, see Materials and Measures section. 
All participants were volunteers recruited from a London, UK Junior School. The school was 
initially contacted to sanction the research proposal. Research approval was then obtained from 
the relevant ethical bodies. Permission to conduct research was sought from individual classroom 
teachers, followed by a letter of consent to parents and finally written consent from the children 
themselves. The sample was ethnically mixed. No individual with Special Educational Needs 
was included in this study. No child with any known history of trauma or emotional disturbance, 
as established from school records and teacher reports, was included. We elected to use this 
criterion since a history of trauma is known to influence AM recall (e. g. de Decker et al., 2003) 
and there would have been insufficient children with a history of trauma to examine any such 
influences systematically. 
3.4.2. Materials and Measures 
AM. The standard Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was 
used. The AMT is based on a cue word method as adapted by Lloyd & Lishman (1975) and is 
widely used to assess personal event recall. The task comprised 10 emotional words, 5 positively 
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valenced (happy, surprised, safe, successful, interested) and 5 negatively valenced (sad, lonely, 
hurt, careless, angry). Words were presented orally and visually to participants on 120 mm x 100 
mm laminated index cards and participants were asked to retrieve a specific memory for each 
cue word. All participants completed three practice trials involving neutral words, with feedback, 
to ensure that all participants understood and were able to complete the requirements of the task. 
Every child retrieved at least one specific memory during the practice trial. Participants were 
informed that that they would be prompted to provide a specific memory if an overgeneral 
response was given (i. e. a memory that was not of a particular event on a given day). In addition, 
clear instruction was given requesting the child not to give the same memory to more than one 
cue word, to avoid the phenomenon of `repeated memories' discussed earlier. The presentation 
of cue words was mixed across valence. Participants were given 60 seconds to retrieve a 
memory. Failure to respond was coded as an omission; failure to retrieve a memory was coded as 
a `no memory'. Failure to retrieve a specific memory resulted in the allocation of an overgeneral 
response categorisation for that cue word. All participant responses were recorded on audiotape 
and later coded for specificity. 
Two independent raters coded the AM responses as either specific, categoric or extended (where 
a specific memory is an memory for an event on a particular day, an extended memory is of a 
single event lasting more than one day and a categoric memory is a generic collection or class of 
events) or as `no memory'. The mean numbers of specific first-response memories for each 
child, were used as the data for analysis. An example of scoring of a categoric response to the 
cue word `Lonely' was, "When I was in Year Two I used to sit on the lonely bench every play 
time". A specific memory response to the same cue was, "On Friday- When I was at home. I had 
82 
CHAPTER 3, DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
no-one to play with `cause my brothers were out at a friends and I wasn't allowed to go". This 
memory was coded as a specific response because the memory is of a particular place and time 
(of less than one day). Over 85% inter-rater reliability was achieved on coding of these 
responses. This reliability estimate is comparable to reliability rates found in the adult literature 
(e. g. Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
As noted, there are numerous indices of OGM style that can be derived from standard AMT data. 
This means that some care has to be taken as to how best to approach data analysis for this task. 
One possibility is to present analyses for all of the AMT indices for all of the studies. However, 
this would require the reader to digest many pages of, invariably repetitive, analyses. Another 
possibility, and the one adopted here, is to select a representative AMT measure for analysis. The 
main contenders for this more selective approach are the measure of number of specific 
memories, the measure of overgeneral memories (i. e. categoric plus extended) or the measure of 
categoric memories. Each of these has pros and cons. Overgeneral and categoric measures have 
sometimes been preferred as more sensitive indices of memory style (see Williams & Dritschel, 
1992). However, in practice, the core effects in the literature that have been reported for 
'generality' have almost always also emerged when using measures of specific memories. Hence 
the terms `reduced AMS' or `OGM' are typically used interchangeably throughout the literature. 
A disadvantage of analysing generality measures is that the numbers of such memories can often 
be quite low for any given study as, essentially, these responses represent 'errors' on the AMT. 
These low numbers presents difficulties for carrying out parametric data analysis and means that 
factorial examination of the data (which is really ideal for most of the studies) is often not 
possible. There is also the concern about floor effects for categoric data, especially in control 
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participants. Measures of numbers of specific memories (essentially 'correct' responses on the 
AMT), on the other hand, are usually compatible with parametric examination and avoid 
problems with floor (or ceiling) effects. For these various reasons, the following approach to 
AMT data analysis has been adopted in the thesis: 1) to report data on numbers of specific 
memories and on numbers of overgeneral memories (categoric plus extended) where necessary; 
2) to present full data analyses on numbers of specific memories; 3) where experimental 
hypotheses involving the AMT are not'supported using such specific memory analyses and 
where pre-existing findings in the adult literature have shown effects using generality measures, 
then to analyse the overgeneral memory scores to see if the key effects are present using this 
index. In practice, this last step was only necessary and relevant in the longitudinal study (Study 
3- See Chapter 5). For all other studies analyses with specific memories produced results in 
keeping with the a priori hypotheses. 
Another issue that merited consideration was whether raw numbers of specific memories should 
be the focus of analysis or whether specific memories calculated as a proportion of all 
meaningful responses (i. e. after non-responses or omissions have been subtracted) should be 
used. Usually these two measures produce the same results. Notwithstanding this, because recent 
work using the AMT indicates that AMT performance may represent, at least in part, a general 
problem with executive functioning (e. g. Dalgleish et al, 2005), it seems more sensible to use 
raw data. This is because omissions, according to such an executive functioning view, could 
potentially index executive failures as much as overgeneral memories do; therefore, controlling 
selectively for omissions would be theoretically suspect. For this reason, and because omissions 
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were very rare in the studies reported in the thesis, raw data on numbers of specific memories 
were analysed throughout. 
Validity of the AMT for use in children was also established in several ways. No child failed to 
retrieve a specific AM to at least one practice cue word and some of the experimental cue words. 
Some children in the youngest age group were unsure of the meaning of the words `successful' 
or `careless' (N = 4). In these instances, the experimenter explained the meaning of the word by 
invariably saying `good at something' or `clumsy'. This was sufficient for all children to 
acknowledge their understanding of the word and quickly retrieve a valid memory (specific or 
overgeneral). There were only 7 `no memory' responses in total, which were distributed across 
age (3 from older children) and cues. There were no omissions or memory repetitions. Content 
validity was also examined by having two raters judge whether the content of the reported 
memory was appropriate to the cue word used to elicit the memory. All children recalled 
appropriate content memories. High content validity was confirmed by over 95% inter-rater 
agreement on memory content appropriateness on a random 50% of the sample. For examples of 
specific and overgeneral coded child responses see Appendix 3.1. 
Emotion Focusing. A measure of EF was constructed using combined results from two tasks: 
Card Sorting and Image Description. The Card Sorting Task consisted of a set of 12 cards (90 
mm x 60 mm) each portraying an adult face displaying one of three different emotional facial 
expressions (happy, neutral or sad). The faces were arranged in a 6x2 formation and consisted of 
an equal gender mix, mixed age and appearance e. g. hair length, colour. The faces were not of 
mixed race due to limited availability. All photographs were drawn from a sample set of faces, 
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which had previously been used and received over 75% inter-rater agreement concerning the 
emotion being portrayed (Le Gal & Bruce, 1999; see Appendix 3.2 for examples). Firstly, the 
experimenter verified that each child understood the nature of grouping and physically 
demonstrated that the cards could be sorted into two groups, using gender as the most obvious 
sorting-category. Once established, the cards were then replaced and the children were required 
to sort the cards according to their own sorting category, verbalising the decision as soon as one 
was made. A score of 1 was given when the child sorted the faces according to affect (emotion). 
A score of zero was given for any other (non-emotional) sorting category. The sorting categories 
suggested by children were emotion (happy and sad faces), hair colour, hair length, age, face- 
shape and subjective attractiveness. 
The second EF task was the Image Description Task. This involved a picture-cuing 
methodology. A series of 11 photographic images of socio-emotional behavioural settings e. g. 
family laughing around a dinner table, child being admonished by parent figure, were drawn 
from a developmental psychology stimulus pool. The 11 images were presented to the 
participants as 200 mm x 150 mm laminates, and depicted for example, `Parents standing over a 
baby, smiling'. All but one of the cards involved a child protagonist. Protagonists were of mixed 
age and race. Participants were simply asked to `Tell me what you see' in response to being 
shown each pictorial card (see Appendix 3.3 for examples). The participant responses were 
recorded and later coded for emotional description. Subjects were given a score of 1 if an 
emotional adjective or adverb was used in the description of the card, for example `happy, 
excited, loving'. A score of zero was given for each card where no emotional description was 
given, for example `a baby, a mum and a dad. ' Two raters examined participant responses in 
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terms of these categories. When emotion was implied but an emotional adjective was not directly 
used e. g. `running hard' or `dad is making up with son for missing him play football', it was 
decided that a strict criterion would be used and only an emotional descriptive would result in an 
emotional classification. That is, inference of emotion was not sufficient to classify as an 
emotional description. Using this criterion, 100% inter-rater category agreement was achieved. 
From these two tasks a combined measure of EF was constructed whereby the sample was 
divided into high, medium or low emotion-focusers according to the following criteria. The 
criteria for low EF was that the participant neither sorted the cards by emotion nor used emotion 
descriptions in over 75% of the images in the image description task. The criteria for medium EF 
was that the participant either sorted the cards by emotion or described over 75% of the images 
in terms of emotion. The criteria for high EF required the participant to both sort the cards by 
emotion and describe over 75% of the images in terms of emotion. This classification was 
considered statistically reasonable in the absence of any other theoretical or empirical 
constraints. 
Child Depression Inventory. The shortened version of the Child Depression Inventory (CDI-S, 
Kovacs, 1992) was completed. The reasons for using the CDI-S are described in Appendix 3.4. 
This measure consists of 10 mood-related items with three possible responses per item. 
Participants are directed to indicate which of each of the 3 statements best applies to them over 
the last 2 weeks. The statements are read out loud to the participants and participants are required 
to tick the most appropriate statement to them (see Appendix 3.5). According to CDI guidelines 
(Kovacs, 1992) participants with a CDI score of 7 or above are classed as dysphoric and those 
87 
CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL. MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
with scores below 7 are classed as non-dysphoric. The word `dysphoric' is used in this study 
rather than `depressed' simply to stress that the current authors felt the measure best reflects a 
depressive mood or emotional state characterised by depression, which can be transient, rather 
than a depression disorder, which should be formally diagnosed. 
General Ability. A measure of scholastic ability was constructed for each child using a 
combination of teacher report and age appropriate National Curriculum Attainment levels. This 
is a method of ability grouping commonly used in British Primary School education. From these 
two sources, children were divided into high, medium and low ability groups. Where discrepancy 
existed between groupings based on optional SAT levels, e. g. high attainment in Maths but 
medium attainment in English, the teacher's summative assessment on overall ability was used 
as the final criterion. Though standard IQ measures are more commonplace and therefore easier 
to interpret across studies, this measure of scholastic ability was favoured in order to respect 
testing time constraints, to avoid unnecessary stress caused to individuals by IQ testing in a 
young and partly dysphoric sample, and to utilize teacher reports of child potential for an 
arguably stronger index of actual ability. 
A note on statistical analyses: For all analyses presented below, data were initially explored to 
ascertain homogeneity of variance, normality of distributions and, where relevant, sphericity, 
across conditions, using Levene's Test, Kurtosis and Skew indices, and Mauchley's W test. 
Where data violated the assumptions for parametric statistics both parametric and either non- 
parametric analyses or analyses with adjusted degrees of freedom were conducted. If these 
produced comparable results then parametric output is reported. Otherwise, non-parametric 
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output is presented. In practice, in almost every case, data were suitable for parametric analysis 
or parametric and non-parametric output did not differ. All analyses were two-tailed. Unless 
otherwise stated, alpha was set at . 05. In the case of analyses examining post hoc comparisons or 
unhypothesised contrasts, statistical correction was employed and this is noted where relevant. 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 11(SPSS for Windows, Released 11.01.2001. 
Chicago: SPSS Inc. ). 
3.4.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and face to face, in a quiet testing environment within the 
school. Participants were first asked to complete the AMT, followed by the two EF tasks and the 
CDI. Task order was fixed to avoid possible contamination effects of the CDI or EF on the 
AMT. Once the participants had completed all 4 measures they were thanked for their 
participation and fully debriefed. After the testing session an indicator of general scholastic 
ability was obtained from school records and in consultation with the appropriate class teacher. 
3.5. RESULTS 
Data on AMS is reported in this study. The numbers of specific AMs split by age, dysphoria and 
cue valence are shown in Table 3.1. In keeping with the hypotheses, the data indicated that 
young non-dysphoric children were less specific to negative cues than to positive cues. 
Furthermore young dysphoric children appeared to recall more specific negative memories and 
fewer specific positive memories compared to their non-dysphoric age equivalents. The data also 
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indicate that dysphoric children in the older group were less specific than older non-dysphoric 
children to both positive and negative cues, suggesting evidence of the OGM bias. 
Table 3.1. Mean Positive and Negative Specific AMs (and standard deviations) recalled by 
Dysphoric and Non-dysphoric Children, grouped by Age 
7-8 yrs (n=35) 10-11 yrs (n=35) Total (n=70) 
Cue 
Valence Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total 
Non- 
dysphoric 2.97 0.93 3.90 4.48 4.22 8.70 3.70 2.51 6.21 
(n=56) (1.27) (1.25) (2.08) (0.85) (1.15) (1.30) (1.32) (2.04) (2.98) 
Dysphoric 1.67 2.00 3.67 2.88 3.00 5.88 2.36 2.57 4.93 
(n=14) (1.21) (2.37) (3.14) (0.64) (1.51) (1.55) (1.10) (1.91) (2.53) 
Total 2.74 1.11 3.86 4.11 3.94 8.06 3.43 2.53 5.96 
(n=70) (1.34) (1.51) (2.24) (1.05) (1.33) (1.80) (1.38) (2.00) (2.92) 
Hypothesis 1. Age, Valence and Dysphoria will interact to influence AMS in children 
A three way ANOVA with Age (7-8 yrs and 10-11 yrs), Dysphoria (high and low) and Valence 
(positive and negative) was conducted to examine this hypothesis. General Ability (high, 
medium and low) was initially included as a covariate but was not significant, F(1,65) = 1.56, p 
=. 22. Reported analyses are therefore without this covariate. The ANOVA revealed a significant 
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main effect of Age F(1,66) = 38.80, p< . 001, such that older children were more specific than 
younger children. Results also revealed a main effect of Dysphoria, F(1,66) = 7.38, p = . 01, such 
that overall dysphoric children were less specific than non-dysphoric children. There was also a 
Valence trend, F(l, 66) = 3.77, p=0.056, in that all children tended to recall fewer specific 
negative memories than positive. However, these main effects were qualified by a 3-way 
interaction between Age x Valence x Dysphoria on AM recall, F(1,66) = 4.4, p= . 04. 
In order to deconstruct this 3-way interaction, two 2-way ANOVAs were conducted. The first 
examined the relationship between Age and Dysphoria on recall to positive cues, the second 
looked at the relationship between Age and Dysphoria on recall to negative cues. In the first 2x 
2 ANOVA (Age x Dysphoria) on specific positive recall there remained a main effect of Age, 
F(1,65) = 8.25, p< . 001, such that younger children recalled 
fewer specific positive memories 
than older children and a main effect of Dysphoria, F(1,65) = 20.75, p< . 001, such that 
dysphoric children recalled fewer specific memories to positive cues than non-dysphoric 
children. There was no significant interaction between Age and Dysphoria on positive recall 
(F(1,65) = . 26, p = . 63). 
In the second 2x2 ANOVA (Age x Dysphoria) on specific negative recall there remained a 
main effect of Age, F(1,65) = 27.3 1, p< . 001, such that younger children recalled fewer specific 
negative memories than older children. There was no main effect of Dysphoria, F(1,65) = . 04, p 
= . 85, 
however, there was a significant interaction between Age and Dysphoria, F(1,65) = 7.79, 
p= . 007, such that non-dysphoric children's recall of negative memories significantly 
improved 
across age (t(54) = 10.21, p< . 001). In contrast, dysphoric children's negative specific recall, 
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though higher than non-dysphorics in the younger group, stayed static across age (t(12) = . 97, p 
= . 35). 
Moreover, by age 10-11 dysphoric children recalled significantly fewer specific 
memories to negative cues than their non-dysphoric age equivalents (t(33) = 2.4, p= . 02), 
in 
keeping with an OGM bias. 
In summary, the main findings were that age affected specificity such that older children were 
more specific than younger children, especially to negative cues (see Figure 3.1). Dysphoria 
exerted a main effect on positive recall such that dysphoric children retrieved fewer specific 
positive memories than non-dysphoric children (Figure 3.2) and the 3-way interaction above was 
attributable to age and dysphoria interacting to influence the recall of negative memories. Young 
non-dysphoric children showed low specificity to negative cues. Older non-dysphoric children 
showed relatively high negative specificity. In contrast, young dysphoric children showed higher 
specificity to negative cues than their same age counterparts and yet specificity to negative cues 
in the older dysphoric group was comparatively low (see Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.1. Age, Valence and AMS: Older children were more specific compared to 
younger children, especially to negative cues. 
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Figure 3.2. Dysphoria, Valence and AMS: Dysphoria in children was related to reduced 
positive specific recall 
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Figure 3.3 Age, Dysphoria and Valence: older dysphoric children were less specific to 
negative cues than same age non-dysphoric counterparts. 
O Non-dysphoric 
13 Dysphoric 
5 
4 
m 
3 z 
U 
Z; 2 
0 
C. 
N1 
c 
d 
20 
7-8yrs 10-11yrs 
Age 
93 
CHAPTER 3- DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY SPECIFICITY 
Hypothesis 2. EF will explain significant independent variance in AMS and may interact 
with Age, Valence or Dysphoria to affect AMS. 
With respect to the second hypothesis this is the first study to examine EF. It was therefore 
important to first establish that EF was not simply a correlate of another variable such as age or 
scholastic ability, which would reduce the usefulness of EF as a measure. There was however no 
correlation between EF and Age (rs'= . 13, n= 70, p= . 27); General Scholastic Ability (rs = . 08, n 
= 70, p= . 51) or Dysphoria (rs = . 12, n= 70, p= . 3) 
in this sample. Subsequently, to investigate 
whether EF accounted for unique variance in AMS, over and above any effects of age and 
dysphoria an enter-stepwise regression model was conducted on total specific AMs such that 
Age and Dysphoria were entered in a first step and EF was added in a second step. Age and 
Dysphoria accounted for significant variance in AMS (F(2,69) = 45.69, p< . 001, Adjusted R2 = 
. 56). 
The inclusion of EF resulted in a significant additional 12% of variance in AMS being 
explained (R2 change = . 12, F= 25.05, p> . 001). The final model included Age as the best 
independent predictor of specificity (r = . 72, n= 70, ß . 66, p< . 001), followed by EF (r = . 47, n 
= 70, ß . 35, p< . 
001) and then Dysphoria (r = . 07, n= 70, ß -. 27, p< . 001). All three variables 
contributed to a significant final model accounting for 68% of the variance in specificity (F(3, 
69) = 49.75, p <. 001, Adjusted R2 = . 68). There was no collinearity between variables (VIF < 2). 
Given that EF was shown to be an important predictor of AMS, the analyses used to test 
Hypothesis 1 were repeated, including EF as an additional factor. Two 3x2x2 ANOVAs with 
EF (high, medium and low), Age (7-8 yrs and 10-11 yrs) and Dysphoria (dysphoric and non- 
dysphoric) were therefore conducted, first for positive and then for negative valence. This was 
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done to test the hypothesis that EF would interact with other factors known to influence AM 
specificity. The relevant mean data comparisons for the effects of EF on AMS are indicated with 
superscript numbers in Table 3.2 These superscript numbers correspond with those 
accompanying the relevant statistical analyses in the following text. 
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Table 3.2 Mean AMS scores (and standard deviations) recalled by children within 
Emotion-Focusing and Age groups (the same superscript numbers indicate relevant cell 
comparisons, as discussed in the text). 
EF 
Low Medium High 
(n=19) (n=30) (n=21) 
Age/yrs 7-8 10-11 Total 7-8 10-11 Total 7-8 10-11 Total 
n=12 n=7 n=19 n=16 n=14 n=30 n=7 n=14 n=21 
Negative 0.56 2.426 1.215 0.756 4.006 2.275 3.006 4.646 4.105 
(1.00) (1.27) (1.44) (0.86) (1.18) (1.93) (2.00) (0.84) (1.51) 
Positive 2.252 4.142 2.951 2.873 4.363 3.571 3.294 3.864 3.671 
(1.42) (1.06) (1.58) (1.15) (0.74) (1.22) (1.50) (1.29) (1.35) 
Once again results of ANOVA on positive recall confirmed the main effects of Age, F(1,58) = 
18.68, p<. 001 and Dysphoria, F(1,58) = 28.95, p<. 001 on AMS. Thereafter, as can be seen in 
Table 3.2, there was no main effect of EF on positive recall, F(2,58) = 1.79, p =. 18(l). However, 
a significant interaction was found between EF and age on positive recall, F(2,58) = 4.29, p= 
. 018, such that older children were more specific than younger children 
in the low (t (17) =3.04, 
p= . 007)(2) and medium 
EF categories (t (28) = 4.13, p<. 001)(3). However, in the high EF group 
there was no significant difference between younger and older children's specific positive recall 
(t (19) = -. 91, p= . 38)(4). Young children were just as likely to produce a specific positive 
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memory as older children in this group. There was no significant 3-way interaction between EF, 
Age and Dysphoria (F(2,58) = 0.25, p =. 78) and no interaction between EF and Dysphoria (F(2, 
58) = 1.02, p= . 
37). See Appendix 3.6 for the AMS means within EF, Age and Dysphoric 
subgroups. 
Figure 3.4. Effect of Emotion-Focusing on Child AMS 
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When EF was included in ANOVA on specific negative recall, there remained a main effect of 
Age (F(l, 58) = 35.18, p<. 001) with no main effect of Dysphoria (F(l, 58) = 1.41, p= . 24). 
However EF exerted a main effect on negative recall, F(2,58) = 17.02, p<. 001, as can be seen in 
Figure 3.4 high emotion focusers were more specific to negative cues compared to low (1(38) = 
6.12, p<. 001) or medium (t(48) =3.70, p<. 001) emotion focusers(5). EF did not interact with age 
to affect negative recall (F(2,58) = 1.74, p= . 18)(6) nor was there any 3-way interaction between 
EF, Dysphoria and Age (F(2,58) = 1.22, p= . 30). Of 
interest to us was whether EF and 
Dysphoria would interact significantly to influence negative specificity however, no such 
interaction was found (F(2,58) = 1.68, p= . 20). 
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3.6. DISCUSSION 
The results of this study show that, as predicted, age, dysphoria and cue valence interact to 
influence AMS in children. Older children were more specific than younger children especially 
to negative cues. Dysphoric children were overgeneral to positive cues and there was an 
interaction between age, dysphoria and cue valence such that older dysphoric children also 
showed reduced AMS to negative cues. Regarding EF, high emotion-focusing was positively 
associated with AMS and EF significantly predicted unique variance in AMS. Each of the main 
findings is discussed in turn and possible mechanistic implications are considered. 
3.6.1. Age and AMS 
First, as predicted, older children were able to produce a specific memory more readily than 
younger children. This suggests that between 7 and 11 years of age, a child's autobiographical 
recall develops from a general to a more specific memory style consistent with developmental 
literature (Howe & Courage, 1997; Nelson, 1993). Moreover, this effect of age on specificity 
was further influenced by cue valence. Younger children produced fewer specific memories in 
response to negative cues than to positive. This difference was not apparent with the older 
children, who presented approximately equal numbers of positive and negative specific 
memories. This age by valence effect has not been previously demonstrated and it suggests that it 
is particularly children's specific negative recall, which improves with age. It is clear that the 
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development of cognitive processing of valenced stimuli in children is an interesting and 
previously neglected area of research, which could hold clues to the origins of information 
processing biases associated with depression. In addition, if AM in a normal population develops 
from a general to a specific retrieval style with age, the question remains whether in a depressed 
population memory fails to develop into a specific style or whether depressed individuals regress 
back to an overgeneral style. 
3.6.2. Dysphoria and AMS 
Results are the first to provide direct evidence that dysphoria is linked to OGM in children. 
Dysphoric children retrieved significantly fewer specific positive AMs than non-dysphoric 
children, irrespective of age. This is consistent with the well-documented adult AM literature, 
and with adolescent findings in general. Indeed results are consistent with an intriguing finding 
from Joorman & Siemer (2004) whereby dysphoria in adults was associated with a reduced 
ability to use mood incongruent happy memories to repair sad mood compared to controls. If 
specific positive recall is used to repair negative mood (Joorman & Siemer, 2004), then there are 
major mood regulatory implications for 0GM to positive cues in dysphoric children. 
Moreover age and dysphoria interacted to affect specific negative retrieval, such that there was 
an effect of dysphoria on negative recall in the older group. Dysphoric children in the older 
group retrieved significantly fewer specific negative memories compared to their non-dysphoric 
age equivalents. What is more, when the pattern of negative AM retrieval across groups was 
more closely examined, the younger dysphoric children were shown to have retrieved more 
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specific negative memories than their non-dysphoric age-group counterparts. However, while 
non-dysphoric negative recall significantly improved across age group, the same was not true for 
dysphoric children. By age 10-11, therefore, dysphoric children were retrieving significantly 
fewer specific negative memories than non-dysphoric older children. Thus, though dysphoric 
children demonstrate reduced specificity for both negative and positive cues, the effects of 
dysphoria on negative recall was only really apparent in the older group. 
3.6.3. Mechanisms 
It may be that dysphoria affects positive and negative recall through different underlying 
mechanisms or processes. For instance, dysphoria may be affecting positive recall via mood 
congruency, which is a relatively autonomous mechanism based on spreading activation and 
therefore less dependent on age or cognitive ability than other possible mechanisms. In contrast, 
the impact of dysphoria on negative recall may be more schema dependent and therefore its 
effect on recall is not observed until later in childhood when schemas are more firmly in place. 
For a review of mechanistic theories of 0GM see Chapter 2. In keeping with this schema 
explanation, repeated experience of dysphoric mood may allow negative biases to become more 
engrained and better established in older dysphoric children. In younger dysphoric children 
however, negative schemas may be less well defined and therefore exert less influence on 
information processing. This interpretation though speculative, is supported by results from 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1992), which showed that effects of cognition on depression increased 
with increasing age. This interpretation is also consistent with results from Neshat-Doost et al. 
(1998) who found evidence suggestive of an age-related increase in the elaboration of negative 
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self-referent schematic representations in depressed youth. Predictions from kindling and 
sensitization theory would also lend credence to this type of interpretation such that one episode 
of depression may sensitise an individual to further depression by increasing the likelihood of 
depressive cognition (see for example Segal, Williams, Teasdäle & Gemar, 1996). 
Alternatively, it may be that a young child's negative AM response style is already so highly 
overgeneral that dysphoria can exert little additional effect. It would therefore not be until later in 
childhood, when children have typically developed a more specific retrieval style, that the 
overgeneral effect of dysphoria on negative recall would become apparent. Interestingly, this 
relative difficulty in retrieving specific negative memories in older dysphoric children is not in 
keeping with the finding that depressed adolescents demonstrate highly specific recall to 
negative cues (e. g. Park et al., 2002). Further research is needed to track the evolution of the 
OGM bias and to clarify the differences in valence specific AM styles in children, adults and 
adolescents. 
With respect to the broader OGM theories present results speak to the developmental and 
schema-based hypotheses of OGM and depression, in that there is evidence of OGM in 
dysphoric children as predicted. Future work is needed to directly assess emotion arousal in 
order to examine other aspects of OGM theories. 
3.6.4. EF 
Another important way in which this study adds to our understanding of OGM is through the 
results of EF. EF significantly contributed to predicting variance in AM specificity in children, 
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even above the predictive value of age and dysphoria. Results indicate that high emotion- 
focusers demonstrate specific memory recall to emotional cue words. Thus, an emotion-focuser 
who preferentially focuses on emotion in the environment may form memory representations 
with relatively high emotional content. When these individuals are then asked to recall events in 
response to emotional cue words, specific retrieval is then relatively easy for these individuals. 
Thus, EF could have implications, for example, in therapy when attempts are made to assist 
patients in recalling specific AM information, something that is a core component of some 
cognitive based clinical treatments. Heightened emotion encoding does not appear to correspond 
with overgeneral recall (as expected by Williams, 1996). However, it is proposed that with the 
addition of an environmental stressor, EF may emerge as a vulnerability factor for OGM in 
depression, more in keeping with the trauma-induced EF hypothesis proposed by Williams. 
It is important to note that EF was not correlated with any measured independent variable in this 
study. Though there was an interaction between age and EF on positive recall, there was no co- 
linearity with this variable. EF was not a product of age nor was there any correlation between 
scholastic ability or dysphoria, and EF. Therefore the variability accounted for by EF in this 
study is clearly not attributable in any straightforward way to the effects of dysphoria, age or 
ability. Further longitudinal studies are required to look more closely at the relationship between 
negative life events, EF and AM retrieval over time. It may be, for example, that EF interacts 
with ruminative style to affect AM and depressive mood. It is clear that EF is an interesting new 
variable to consider in children and adults. 
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3.6.5. Caveats and Limitations 
EF is a new measure so no data are available to validate its use. The division used here to 
differentiate high, medium and low EF was selected only as a prudent statistical division. 
Ultimately, if EF is to be developed in the future as a standard measure, more sophisticated 
coding and classification categories could be explored, with greater numbers of participants, 
whereby different levels of description are recognised. It might then be helpful under some 
circumstances to accept inference of emotion if it is found, for example, to be a typical 
descriptive style of some groups. It would also be interesting to eventually introduce a greater 
range of stimuli to the image description element and systematically look at intensity of emotion 
or valence effects. High EF was positively associated with AMS. It would also be of interest to 
test individuals on non-emotional cue words (in addition to emotional cue words), to test whether 
high EF individuals still demonstrate specific recall outwith their area of focal interest. 
Regarding other caveats or limitations of the present study, it was important in investigating the 
possible mechanisms through which overgeneral recall may develop and act as a vulnerability 
marker for the etiology or maintenance of depression, that we test a sample vulnerable to clinical 
depression but not suffering from it. However, it is not clear in the literature what the precise 
relationship is between dysphoria and depression. With the addition of clinical data and larger 
sample sizes, different patterns may be observed. Although the present results are nonetheless 
interesting, replication with greater sample sizes would add to the strength of the findings; for 
example, some subgroups in the ANOVA design were small, thus leading to reduced power in 
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our investigation of the higher order EF interactions. For this reason a four-way ANOVA was 
not initially conducted to examine the possible interactive effects between EF, dysphoria, age 
and valence on AMS. Finally, as noted, this is the first study to use the standard AMT in this age 
range. Although all children retrieved appropriate content memories to all cue words and were 
able to produce specific memories to at least some cue words, the lack of established validity and 
reliability data for this measure in children should be acknowledged as a limitation of the study. 
3.7. In Conclusion 
This study highlights the importance of testing OGM in children. Present results also 
demonstrate the usefulness of testing children with valenced emotional stimuli. As already 
highlighted, a key finding was that younger children tended to retrieve relatively fewer specific 
memories, particularly in response to negative cue words, while dysphoric children demonstrated 
reduced specific positive recall. It may be of interest in future studies to track this valence effect 
through development to see what role it may play in the later onset of depression. An 
understanding of the nature and development of normal valenced biases in childhood clearly 
have important implications for understanding the development of depressogenic biases. This 
study has attempted to examine the development of valenced AMS as one such bias. Looking at 
AMS from this developmental perspective should help us better understand the existence of 
OGM in adults and in psychopathology. The results of the current study also suggest that 
dysphoria affects AM in children, not by increasing availability of negative memories but by 
decreasing the availability of specific positive memories. It is unclear what underlying processes 
are responsible for such effects in the AM literature. It is likely though that more than one 
mechanism, bias or effect is in operation at any given time. Further work is needed to unravel the 
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contributions and roles of associated variables. Moreover, examining differential bias across age 
is essential. It may be for example that such depressive biases originate with deficits in 
processing of positive information but spread to include negative information processing biases 
with age, or failing intervention. 
In the next study (Chapter 4) a clinical population of depressed children, adolescents and adults 
are examined in order to test the hypothesis that OGM bias exists in a clinically depressed child 
group and that the bias may be comparable across a wide age range. Dysphoric data from this 
chapter (Study 1) are also utilized to make comparisons of dysphoric versus clinically depressed 
children's performance on the AMT. 
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Chapter 41 Study 21A Clinical Study: Autobiographical Memory Specificity in 
Clinically depressed Children, Adolescents and Adults and a comparison of 
Dysphoric and Depressed recall in childhood. 
106 
CHAPTER 4. A CLINICAL STUDY 
Abstract 41A plethora of studies have provided strong evidence regarding adult 
autobiographical specificity (AMS) over the past 20 years, such that we can confidently assert 
that reduced AMS is associated with depression, relative to non-depressed controls. There is 
currently no equivalent data available concerning the same autobiographical memory (AM) 
effects in depressed children. In addition, we do not know how AMS compares across age 
within depressed samples. The previous chapter reported the effects of dysphoria on AMS in 
childhood. This present study developed this work further by testing 100 participants (30 
children, 30 adolescents and 40 adults), half with clinical depression and half matched- 
controls, on the standard autobiographical memory test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
Results indicated that the reduced AMS bias exists in children with depression. The extent of 
this overgeneral memory (OGM) effect was equivalent across child, adolescent and adult 
groups. In addition, comparisons with dysphoric, depressed and non-depressed/or dysphoric 
child AMS were of interest in terms of valence effects. The valence effects observed across 
samples may offer some insight into the mechanisms of the development of the OGM bias. 
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4.1. Introduction 
In the previous study (Study 1) OGM was evidenced for the first time in normal children 
exhibiting high depressive symptoms. This study (Study 2) seeks to demonstrate the OGM 
effect in a clinical child population. This is the first study to examine OGM in depressed 
children. It is also the first study to examine OGM in depressed child, adolescent and adult 
age groups. 
4.1.1. OGM and Clinical groups 
The overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) effect is well established in depressed 
adult populations. Since Williams & Broadbent's (1986) seminal work, OGM bias has been 
consistently and reliably associated with adult clinical depression (Brewin, Reynolds & Tata, 
1999; Goddard, Dritschel & Burton 1996; 2001; Kremers, Spinovem & Van der Does, 2004; 
Kuyken & Dalgleish, 1995; Nandrino, Pezard, Poste, Reveillere & Beaune, 2002; Puffet, 
Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier & Timsit, 1991, Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz & 
Mercekelbach, 2001, Williams & Scott, 1988). Studies examining depression in adult 
populations find that depression is associated with OGM in response to valenced cue words. 
In addition, OGM has also now been demonstrated in adults with sub-clinical depression (i. e. 
dysphoria), (Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 1997; Moffit, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson & Vyse, 
1994; Ramponi, Barnard & Nimmo-Smith. 2004). Thus, the OGM bias is not limited to 
clinical populations. In the same vein, the OGM effect has now been replicated in a group of 
dysphoric children (Study 1, Chapter 3). Thus, it would seem that although the OGM effect 
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has principally been demonstrated in adult clinical groups, the bias appears significant and 
pervasive enough to also be detected in sub-clinical and younger age groups. 
In fact to my knowledge only one study has failed to demonstrate a relationship between 
depression and OGM. Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend, & Kuyken, (2001) studied a group of 
seasonal affective disorder (SAD) patients and failed to find the OGM effect. Authors suggest 
this finding could possibly reflect underlying differences in major depressive disorder (MDD) 
and SAD aetiology. For example, SAD is not typically associated with experience of 
childhood adversity and dysfunctional negative schema akin to MDD (for a discussion see 
Dalgleish, Golden, du Toit & Spinks, 2004). Instead SAD may be linked to more biological 
causes (see Dalgleish, Rosen & Marks, 1996, for a review). Thus, AM is perhaps less likely to 
be affected in SAD in the way that it is proposed to be affected in MDD, according to an 
affect regulation (AR) hypothesis. An AR hypothesis of OGM asserts that early adversity 
impacts a person's developing AM style so as to minimize the negative affect generated by 
the recall of these specific negative experiences. If SAD is less associated with adversity and 
therefore memory style is less implicated in the aetiology of this particular depressive 
disorder, then the absence of OGM in SAD results from Dalgleish et al (2001) bolster the AR 
hypothesis that it may be early life experience which affects memory in depression and 
contributes to an overgeneral style. 
Also of importance is that, with the exception of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), OGM 
has so far not been shown to be associated with any other anxiety disorders. For example, 
several studies have looked at anxiety in the form of general anxiety disorder (GAD) or 
phobias (Burke & Matthews, 1992; Wenzel, Jackson & Holt, 2002, Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, 
Arntz & Merckelbach, 2001; Kremers, Spinoven & van der Does, 2004) and found no 
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relationship between AMS and anxiety. The results may be interpreted as evidence that OGM 
is specifically associated with (symptoms of or vulnerability to) depression, rather than 
reflecting a general characteristic of psychopathology. In due course, further research will 
either support or refute this claim, but for now there is no evidence to suggest that OGM is 
linked to any affective condition other than depression or trauma (as noted in Chapter 2). This 
of course will prove crucial if research intentions are to pursue OGM as a vulnerability factor 
for depression. 
4.1.2. Extending Work to Clinically Depressed Children 
Though a body of research exists examining the OGM effect in depressed adults, no study has 
tackled this issue in children. The study reported in the previous chapter examined the effects 
of dysphoria on AM functioning in children aged 7-11. The results showed that age had an 
effect on AMS, such that younger children typically demonstrated an OGM style. However, 
in addition, the presence of dysphoria in childhood was associated with OGM recall, in 
particular, to positive cues. With increased chronological age, the effect of dysphoria was 
found to also extend to negative OGM. The present study seeks to extend this work to a group 
of clinically depressed children. The first aim of repeating work in a clinically depressed child 
sample was to ascertain whether depressed children demonstrate the OGM bias. This group 
has not previously been studied with the standard AMT cuing paradigm, despite theoretical 
implications that the OGM bias may originate in childhood (e. g. Williams, 1996). As 
discussed in full in the previous chapter, a few studies (de Decker et al., 2003; Park et al; 
2002; Swales et al; 2001) have investigated OGM in clinical adolescent populations but no 
study has extended this work to children. It is possible that the OGM effect is restricted to 
post-adolescent clinical groups. However, if evidence of this bias is found in younger 
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depressed groups this would lend support to the developmental aspects of the theory of AR, 
and would have direct implications for early therapeutic intervention to tackle OGM. 
4.1.3. Depression and AMS across Age 
The second motivation for this study is to compare the AM style of depressed patients across 
different age groups. It is of interest to examine whether there are differences (or indeed 
similarities) in the nature and extent of depressive biases in children, relative to adolescents, 
relative to adults. Since, in the clinical literature it is generally unclear whether cognitive 
deficits exist in childhood, analogous to those found in older clinical groups. In addition, 
Study 1 revealed that OGM varies as a function of age. Advantageously, the AMT can be 
used across a wide age range. Therefore the OGM bias can be examined across age groups. 
No one study has compared depressed AMS across age-groups, and comparing age groups 
across different studies is slightly problematic e. g. different experimenters, different AMT 
instructions, different additional test materials, and so on. Therefore, an objective of this study 
was to examine child, adolescent and adult depressed groups within the same study and using 
the same methodology, to first establish that depression is associated with OGM across age 
and thereafter, to compare the OGM effect across age-group. For example, one possibility is 
that depressed adults may be more overgeneral than depressed children, consistent with a 
degeneration assumption. That is, will the bias have increasingly deleterious effects with 
increasing age? Again, such results would have direct implications for intervention efforts. 
4.1.4. Developmental Considerations 
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In considering cognitive bias across age, several issues must be carefully considered. 
Assessing the magnitude of depression in each group is important in order to ensure any 
effects are not attributable to the extent of current mood, but instead, may reflect an effect 
related to age or developmental level. It is therefore important to ensure levels of depression 
are comparable across groups. Another consideration when testing clinical populations across 
age is that symptom expression may be different across groups. Some clinicians would assert 
that depression is not necessarily the same disorder across age groups (see General 
Introduction: Chapter 1). However, this assertion is controversial, and where symptoms are 
argued to differ (e. g. irritability in childhood but not in adulthood) these symptoms do not 
reflect core depressive features. Instead, they reflect manifestations of the features. It is 
perhaps most appropriate to say that the phenomenology of childhood and adult depression is 
similar, despite peripheral differences in symptom expression (Kovacs, 1997). Nevertheless it 
is important to acknowledge that studying the effects of depression across age, by necessity 
involves added developmental complexities. This was highlighted for example, in the 
previous chapter, whereby AMS varied as a function of age, not only depression. 
In considering depression across age it is important to acknowledge these developmentally 
relevant issues. One further issue concerns co-morbidity. Unlike adult and adolescent 
samples, children who present with depression often have especially high co-morbidity (often 
with anxiety or conduct disorder) and often also present with developmental disorders, such 
as ADHD or autism (Hammen & Compas, 1994). This means for example, that locating a 
pure depressed population in childhood is more difficult than in adulthood. Moreover, as 
discussed in the general introduction to this thesis, affective disorders are rarely formally 
diagnosed in childhood, not least because it is difficult to tell whether disorders are mediated 
by environmental factors in childhood rather than reflecting an internalised disorder. To test a 
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pure depressed child population means delineating clinical depression via clinical interview 
and clinical assessment questionnaires, with strict exclusion criteria. Stringent criteria reduces 
sample sizes but hopefully presents as clean a population as is currently possible, given our 
present understanding of these disorders in youth. 
4.1.5. The OGM Trajectory 
Although results of cognitive-developmental studies have added layers of complexity, which 
single level developmental studies avoid, examining affective disorder from a cognitive- 
developmental perspective speaks to the underlying nature of depression and ideally offers 
insight into the possible development of depressive biases. Single level studies can tell us 
what biases exist, but not where they may have come from. For example, as discussed in the 
General Introduction (Chapter 1) cognitive theories of depression (e. g. Beck et al, 1979) often 
hint at developmental origins and principal theories of cognition and emotion (e. g. Power & 
Dalgleish, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) contain fundamental elements such as `schema', 
which by necessity invoke developmental implications (i. e. our experiences from childhood 
onward inform schema content). However, research efforts in cognitive and clinical domains 
have not yet systematically studied bias and functioning across age using the same 
methodologies. One of the few studies to replicate adult results in child populations is 
Dalgleish, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Canterbury & Yule (2003) who compared 
children (aged 7-18) with MDD, GAD, PTSD and controls on tests of attention, memory and 
prospective judgement. When the studies do exist uniting child and adult research in this way, 
our understanding of depression and other disorders with likely developmental trajectories, 
will be transformed. Investigating the existence of OGM across such developmental groups 
can help elucidate the possible course of the bias and thus inform theoretical discourse. 
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4.1.6. Dysphoria versus Depression 
Thirdly, this study seeks to extend the previous investigation of the effects of dysphoria in 
childhood, to an investigation of the effects of depression in childhood. Changes, in terms of 
the extent or nature of the biases are expected. Biases may be more pronounced in clinical 
groups. As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis advocates a continuity theory of depression, not 
only in terms of continuity of the disorder from childhood to adulthood, but also in terms of 
continuity of bias from dysphoria to depression. Meaning, that these two labels (dysphoria 
and depression) may ultimately be distinguishable in terms of quantity (length and severity of 
symptoms) rather than in terms of quality. It is acknowledged that this proposition is 
speculative given the lack of work specifically examining the cognitive substrates of these 
two conditions. Nevertheless, it is possible that underlying cognitive nature of dysphoria and 
depression in childhood is the same, or at least very similar. 
Consistent with this view, Gotlib, Lewinsohn & Seeley (1995) found that sub-clinical 
depression was associated with the same level of social dysfunction in adolescents as 
clinically diagnosed depression. Similarly, if the same levels of OGM bias are found in 
dysphoric as depressed children, this has serious implications for the significance of sub- 
clinical depression in childhood. In effect, children suffering from sub-clinical levels of 
depression may not meet arbitrary criteria for affective disorder, however they may be 
demonstrating similar levels of dysfunction, which may predispose them to future onset of 
depression. Indeed, we may assume that in many cases depression as a disorder at some point 
existed in comparable, but less severe form. Furthermore, high recurrence rates for childhood 
depression (Birmaher, 2004; Kovacs, 1996); sensitisation (Post, 1996), and kindling theories 
(Kovacs, 1997; Post, 1992), would also suggest that the experience of pervasive or significant 
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negative mood in childhood has long-term deleterious effects, which are then difficult to 
repair or ameliorate. It would therefore seem appropriate, from a research perspective, to pay 
close attention to the possible relationship between biases in dysphoria and depression in 
childhood. 
4.1.7. Valence 
Valence effects also continue to be of interest. The potential significance of valence effects 
was substantiated in the dysphoric child sample in the previous chapter (Study 1) whereby 
effects of dysphoria were more pronounced for positive recall. If dysphoria primarily affects 
positive recall in youth, what effects will the presumably more severe, clinical depression, 
have on valenced recall? Will depressed children also show reduced positive recall or will the 
effects also be carried by or incorporate negative recall? Such findings will inform our 
understanding of the differences or similarities between dysphoria and depression. For 
example, negative events may be better remembered as schema congruent in depressed 
groups, whereas positive events may be dismissed as schema incongruent. This would result 
in specific negative recall but overgeneral positive recall. Alternatively depressed individuals 
may view negative events as prototypical and therefore also recall overgenerally to negative 
cues. In dysphoric children, this effect may not be as pronounced, as dysphoric children may 
not evidence such extreme negative views, but instead may endorse mixed schema. This 
would result in overgeneral recall, but not to the same extent as depressed groups. It is also of 
interest to observe what pattern of valenced OGM retrieval is found in depressed children, as 
opposed to adolescents and adults, since an age related valence effect was observed in the 
previous study (Study 1). 
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4.1.8. Age versus Depression 
Finally, results from the previous chapter indicated that age accounted for unique variance in 
AMS over and above depressive symptomology, in a sub-clinical, normal population of 
children aged 7-11 years. It is of interest to investigate whether the same result is found in the 
present depressed population with an increased age range. However, it should be 
acknowledged that due to the difficulty in recruiting clinically depressed children, numbers in 
the present study do not permit the same age specific analyses. 
4.2. Study Rationale 
This study is designed to extend OGM research to a clinically depressed child population and 
to address the effects of depression across age by also testing adolescent and adult groups on 
the same task. Results of this study should contribute to our understanding of the development 
of the OGM bias. Results also allow direct comparison of the effects of depression on AMS, 
with the previous data on the effects of dysphoria in childhood. This allows us to draw 
conclusions on the possible continuity of the OGM bias across age and across different levels 
of depression. The study also allows a comparison of effects of depression with effects of age 
on AMS. 
4.3. Hypotheses 
1. There will be evidence of reduced AMS in depressed children and the effects of depression 
will hold across age-group such that each depressed group will be overgeneral relative to 
controls. The OGM effect may be valence specific. 
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2. In the depressed groups there may be different valence patterns across age. 
3. The Continuity of Bias hypothesis may be evidenced such that depressed children will 
demonstrate less AMS relative to dysphoric children and dysphoric children will 
demonstrate reduced AMS relative to non-depressed /non-dysphoric controls. 
4. Depression will account for variability in AMS over and above that of age. 
4.4. METHOD 
4.4.1. Participants 
A total of 100 participants was recruited for this study. Fifteen clinically depressed children 
(aged 7-11; mean age 8.66), 15 clinically depressed adolescents (aged 14-18; mean age 15.47) 
and 20 clinically depressed adults (aged 25 to 55, mean age 40.95) were tested. The male: 
female gender distribution for each depressed group was; children 12: 3, adolescents 9: 6, and 
adults 8: 12. Fifty age and gender matched non-depressed controls were also tested. For some 
analyses data from the previous chapter were utilized. Where this is the case, this is made 
clear in the text. For details on dysphoric participants see Chapter 3 (section 4.1). 
Child and adolescent clinical groups were recruited from Child and Adolescent Services 
within the South London and Maudsley (SLAM) NHS trust. Ethical approval was granted by 
all relevant authorities. The recruitment procedure then followed two streams. Clinicians were 
made aware of the study through various presentations and information sheets and were asked 
to forward details of any clients they felt would meet the study criteria. In the adolescent unit 
clinicians were asked to recruit any individual who met criteria for MDD (not co-morbid and 
not remitted). In the child unit, either children who were suspected as meeting depressive 
criteria were highlighted by the clinician, or children who met criteria for `abnormal 
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affectivity' as demonstrated by case files were highlighted by the experimenter and more 
specific details were then sought from the relevant lead clinician regarding the exact nature of 
this problem. If it was felt to be depression (as opposed to any other affective abnormality) 
these children were also highlighted for directed recruitment. 
After this initial stage of recruitment, permission to contact the parent/guardian or the 
adolescent (in children over 16) was sought by way of an initial `permission to contact 
consent-form' available at reception. Once this was completed the experimenter was able to 
contact the families direct and make testing arrangements if welcomed. At this stage no 
family, child or adolescent declined to participate. 
Clinicians at the Affective Disorders Clinic (ADC), Ninewells Hospital Dundee, recruited 
depressed adults. Clinical status was assessed according to ICD-10 diagnostic criteria 
following a semi-structured interview by a psychiatrist. Depressed adults met MDD criteria 
without bipolar or psychotic symptoms, without recent ECT treatment, suspected substance 
abuse, or neurological disorder. Written informed consent was obtained for all participants 
(and guardians, if under 16) on the day of testing. 
There are pragmatic problems when comparing clinical groups across age due to 
inconsistencies in diagnosing and assessment. Patients in the adolescent and adult groups all 
met ICD-10 criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). The depressed child group 
however differed in that typically no child below the age of 13 was formally diagnosed with 
depression at the approached clinic. Instead, children were included in this group if they met 
suspected depression criteria as judged by the lead clinician, supported by case notes and if 
they scored highly on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; see Appendix 4.1). 
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The SDQ is an initial assessment questionnaire completed by all patients on entrance into the 
clinical system in the Clinics under study (see next section). If a child scored highly ('high'- 
`very high') on the `Emotional Disorder' component of this measure, and met criteria on this 
measure for psychiatric disorder but did not meet criteria for any of the other conditions, 
she/he was referred for potential testing. The lead clinician then confirmed whether 
depression was suspected over any other affective diagnosis. Any child who scored highly on 
any other component was not recruited for testing. Children with autism were also excluded 
due to the potential bias in affective information processing. Most children in the clinic met 
co-morbid criteria. Using these inclusion and exclusion criteria therefore 15 children were 
included in the depressed group. All control group participants were community-based 
volunteers, in the child and adolescent groups these controls were recruited via schools, 
friends and colleagues. In the adult group these controls were recruited via university and 
community settings. Only participants with scores lower than the cut off for `significant 
depressive symptoms', as designated by the authors of each measure, were included in control 
groups. 
4.4.2. Materials and Measures 
The Strengths and Difficulties First Assessment Questionnaire (SDQ): measures various 
psychiatric symptoms in childhood and is completed by children aged 11-15 (or by parents if 
this is felt more appropriate in younger children). A computerised program calculates scores 
for each child. Scores on the measure are grouped into four bands such that in the general 
population, roughly 80% of children, score `close to average', 10% have `slightly raised' 
scores, 5% score `high' and 5% score `very high' for each component. A total difficulties 
score, an emotional symptoms score, a conduct problems score, an inattention 
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hyperactivity/hyperkinesis score, peer problems score, pro-social score and an impact score 
are provided for this measure. A category of `very low' through to `very high' is produced for 
each of these components. A computer based diagnostic prediction is then calculated based on 
these scores. This consists of a prediction concerning: Any Psychiatric Disorder; Emotional 
Disorder; Oppositional Conduct Disorder; ADHD or Hyperkinesis. 
AMT: The AMT was completed by all participants as was described in the methodology 
section of Chapter 2 section 4.2). The administration of this task was the same across all 
groups except that task instructions for children were worded differently using age- 
appropriate language (see Appendix 4.2) and one AMT cue-word differed such that children 
and adolescents were tested with the word `sad' whereas adults were tested with the word 
`sorry'. The word `sorry' was replaced in the AMT-C as subsequent to pilot testing, it was felt 
to require second order social appraisal not appropriate for very young children (see Chapter 3 
section 4.2 for details of validity regarding AMT-C cue words). 
Depression Inventories. The Child Depression Inventory short form (CDI-S; Kovacs, 1992) 
was administered to all children and adolescents (for full description see Chapter 3 section 
4.2). The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, et al 1961) was administered to all adults as 
the adult equivalent of the CDI. The BDI is a 21 item questionnaire with four possible 
responses coded 0-3. It has a range of 0-63. A score of less than 10 is coded as normal, 10-18 
reflects mild depression, 19-29 denotes moderate depressed symptoms, and scores of 30 or 
above are believed to reflect severe depressive symptoms. Mean scores on the CDI-S and 
mean scores on the BDI are shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Mean Scores on the Mood Measures 
Mood Scores (n) Measure Mean SD 
Child D 15 CDI-S 10.47 (2.35) 
ND 15 CDI-S 1.20 (1.15)* 
Adolescent D 15 CDI-S 11.13 (2.29) 
ND 15 CDI-S 1.13 (1.64)` 
Adult D 20 BDI 30.70 (8.96) 
ND 20 BDI 3.75 (2.83)* 
* significant difference (p<. 001) between depressed (D) and non-depressed (ND) groups 
Independent t-tests for unequal variances confirmed significant differences in mood between 
depressed and non-depressed age-matched groups (child depressed vs. non-depressed t(20) = 
13.70, p< . 001, adolescent 
depressed vs. non-depressed = t(25) = 13.73, p< . 001 and adult 
depressed vs. non-depressed 1(23), p< . 001). There was also no significant difference 
between child and adolescent CDI scores, t(28) =. 79, p =. 44. 
4.4.3. Procedure 
All child and adolescent clinical participants were tested individually and face to face, in a 
quiet testing environment within a child and adolescent outpatient unit in London. All adult 
clinical participants were tested within an adult outpatient clinic, in Fife. All controls were 
community-based volunteers. All participants were first asked to complete the AMT, 
followed by the CDI (or BDI for adults). Task order was fixed to avoid possible 
contamination effects of the mood measure on the AMT. Once the participants had completed 
the experimental tasks they were thanked for their participation and fully debriefed. All child 
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and adolescent data were collected by Lyndsey Drummond. Adult data were collected by Dr. 
N. Rideout, at Ninewells Hospital, Dundee or at the University of St. Andrews, School of 
Psychology. 
4.5. RESULTS 
As can be seen in Table 4.2 the OGM data approximates the AMS data. AMS data is the 
dependent variable most typically analyzed in the literature. Therefore, as described in the 
methodology section of Chapter 3, AMS was the dependent variable analyzed throughout the 
present study. 
Table 4.2. Means (and standard deviations) for AM data 
Child Adolescent Adult 
AM Valence 
D ND Total D ND Total D ND Total 
OG +ve 2.26 1.40 1.83 2.60 1.53 2.07 1.45 0.30 0.87 
(0.88) (1.30) (1.18) (1.30) (0.64) (1.14) (1.57) (0.57) (1.30) 
-ve 3.13 1.67 2.40 2.53 1.47 2.00 1.75 0.40 1.07 
(1.46) (1.45) (1.61) (1.81) (1.25) (1.62) (1.86) (0.60) (1.52) 
Specific +ve 2.67 3.53 3.10 2.13 3.40 2.77 3.10 4.45 3.77 
(0.97) (1.46) (1.29) (1.30) (0.63) (1.19) (1.62) (0.76) (1.42) 
-ve 1.67 3.33 2.50 2.27 3.53 2.90 2.55 4.15 3.35 
(1.29) (1.45) (1.59) (1.62) (1.24) (1.56) (1.67) (0.87) (1.54) 
Total OG 5.40 3.10 4.23 5.13 3.00 4.07 3.20 0.70 1.95 
(2.20) (2.37) (2.54) (2.87) (1.07) (2.39) (3.19) (0.92) (2.64) 
Total Sp 4.33 6.87 5.60 4.40 6.93 5.67 5.65 8.60 7.13 
(2.06) (2.50) (2.59) (2.75) (0.96) (2.40) (2.81) (1.23) (2.61) 
D= depressed, ND = nondepressed, OG = overgeneral memories Sp = specific memories 
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Hypothesis 1. There will be evidence of OGM such that all Depressed Age groups will show 
reduced AMS relative to controls and this OGM effect may be valence specific 
First, to compare the levels of depression across Age-group, the raw scores on the appropriate 
depression inventory were converted into percentage scores for each individual. This allowed 
direct comparison of severity of depression across Age-group. As can be seen in Table 4.3, 
the mean percentage scores and the percentage score range on the depression measures were 
not significantly different across each age group. That is, the magnitude of depressive 
symptoms across groups was not significantly different. This was confirmed by a non- 
significant between group difference according to ANOVA, F(2,49) = 1.29, p= . 28 and by a 
non-significant test of Levene's homogeneity of variance, Levene's (2,47) = 1.35, p= . 27, 
indicating the variances in depression scores in these groups were not significantly different, 
thus validating further between group analyses of depression. 
Table 4.3. Converted Percentage Mean Depression Scores across Age-group 
Depressed Group Mean Score % Range 
SD Minimum Maximum 
Child 52.33 (11.78) 35 - 80 
Adolescent 55.67 (11.47) 40 - 80 
Adult 48.70 (14.26) 30 - 79 
Total 51.88 (12.83) 30 - 80 
Hence, a2x3x2, Depression (depressed vs. non-depressed) x Age-group (child, adolescent 
and adult) x Valence (positive vs. negative) ANOVA was conducted on AMS. Results for this 
analysis confirmed a main effect of Depression (F(1,94) = 37.03, p< . 001) such that 
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depressed persons were less specific than non-depressed persons, a main effect of Age-group 
(F(2,94) = 5.65, p= . 005) such that adult AMS was significantly higher than AMS in the two 
younger age-groups, and no Depression*Age-group interaction (F(2,94) = . 110, p= . 90), 
indicating that depression did not operate significantly differently across the three age groups 
(see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Effects of Depression on AMS 
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The within-subjects results revealed a main effect of Valence (F(1,94) = 4.55, p= . 04) such 
that overall fewer specific negative memories were recalled compared to positive but there 
were no significant interactions (Depression*Valence, F(1,94) = 1.58, p= . 21; Age- 
group*Valence, F(2,94) = 2.35, p= . 10 or Depression*Age-group*Valence, F(2,94), = . 67, 
p=. 52). 
In order to examine the main effect of Age-group t-tests were carried out. T-tests on negative 
AMS confirmed the main effect of depression across all three Age-groups (ps < . 01). T-tests 
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on positive AMS then confirmed significant differences between depressed and non- 
depressed groups in the adolescent and adult samples (1(28) = 3.39, p =. 002 and 1(38) = 3.38, 
p= . 002, respectively). 
The difference in positive specificity between depressed and non- 
depressed did not reach statistical significance in the child sample (1(28) = 1.91, p= . 
066), 
though there was a trend in the right direction. 
Hypothesis 2. In depressed groups AMS may result in different valence patterns across age. 
Given the previous results from Study 1, we were specifically interested in Valence and Age 
effects in the depressed group. The previous omnibus 3x2x2 ANOVA did not yield the 
significant predicted interaction (e. g. between Age-group and Valence in the Depressed 
group). To better test this hypothesis AMS data was therefore analyzed for depressed and 
non-depressed groups separately. Two 3x2 ANOVAs involving Age-group (child, 
adolescent and adult) and Valence (positive and negative) were therefore conducted. 
In the non-depressed sample, results showed a main effect of Age-group (F(2,47) = 6.30, p= 
. 004) such 
that AMS increased with age. There was no main effect of Valence (F(1,47) =. 37, 
p= . 55) and no 
Age-group*Valence interaction (F(2,47) = . 42, p= . 
66). In contrast, in the 
depressed group, there was no significant effect of Age-group (F(2,47) = 1.48, p= . 24), such 
that AMS did not significantly increase with age. There was however a main effect of 
Valence (F(1,47) = 6.08, p= . 02) such that 
fewer specific negative memories were recalled 
relative to positive. There was also an Age-group* Valence trend (F(2,47) = 2.72, p= . 076), 
suggesting that negative or positive AMS altered as a function of Age-group in the depressed 
sample. T-tests were conducted in order to clarify these results. 
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Across the non-depressed age-groups, specific recall increased with age (p =. 004) such that 
non-depressed adults recalled more specific positive memories than both children (t(33) = 
2.42, p= . 
02) and adolescents (1(33) = 4.34, p< . 001). Non-depressed adults also recalled 
more specific negative memories relative to children (t(33) = 2.07, p= . 05) and 
showed a 
suggestive trend for increased negative AMS relative to adolescents (t(33) = 1.72, p= . 09). 
There were no significant differences in specific positive or negative recall across the three 
depressed age groups (ps > . 05). Hence, while AMS increased from childhood to adulthood in 
non-depressed groups, AMS did not significantly increase with age in depressed groups. 
Moreover, in explaining the Age-group* Valence result in the depressed sample, differences 
for positive and negative specific recall in the child depressed group were significant, t(14) _ 
3.87, p= . 002. 
Depressed children recalled fewer specific negative memories than specific 
positive memories. There was however no significant within group difference in valenced 
recall for the depressed adolescents (t(14) = 4.87, p= . 63) and though depressed adults 
recalled slightly fewer specific negative memories compared to positive, unlike the child 
group, this difference was not significant, t(19) = 1.45, p= . 16. Hence, AMS did not 
significantly increase across the three depressed Age-groups, but compared to the older 
depressed groups, depressed children were particularly vulnerable with respective to negative 
overgeneral recall (see Figure 4.2). 
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Hypothesis 3. The Continuity of Bias hypothesis will be evidenced such that depressed 
children will demonstrate less AMS relative to dysphoric children and dysphoric children 
will demonstrate reduced AMS relative to same-age controls. 
To examine this hypothesis child clinical data from the present study were compared to 
dysphoric data imported from Study 1. Age and gender (non-depressed or dysphoric) matched 
controls for the depressed children (NDDI) were used from the present study. Age and gender 
(non-depressed or dysphoric) matched controls for the dysphoric children (NDD2) were 
imported from Study 1. There were no age differences across the four groups, F(3,57, = 1.74, 
p=. 17. 
As illustrated in Table 4.4, it appears the continuity hypothesis is supported. As predicted, 
mean total AMS declined from the control groups (6.86 and 6.57), to the dysphoric group 
(mean 4.93), with the lowest level of specificity in the depressed group (mean 4.33). This 
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effect was demonstrated statistically in a4x2 ANOVA with Group (depressed, dysphoric, 
NDDI and NDD2) and Valence (positive and negative) on AMS. 
Table 4.4. Mean AMS (standard deviations) and gender ratios across depressed, 
dysphoric and control child groups. 
Mean Gender AMS AMS AMS 
n= Age (m: f) Positive Negative Total 
Depressed 15 8.67 12: 3 2.66 (0.97) 1.67 (1.29) 4.33 (2.06) 
Dysphoric 14 9.19 6: 8 2.36 (1.08) 2.57 (1.91) 4.93 (2.53) 
NDD 1 15 8.13 12: 3 3.53 (1.46) 3.33 (1.45) 6.86 (2.50) 
NDD 2 14 9.14 6: 8 4.14 (0.86) 2.43 (1.70) 6.57 (1.95) 
NDD I- controls for the depressed group. NDD2 = controls for the dysphoric group 
Results of the 4x2 (Group x Valence) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Valence, F(1,54) = 
10.83, p =. 002, such that overall children recalled fewer negative specific memories relative 
to positive memories (mean 2.50 vs. 3.17). There was also a main effect of Group, F(3,54) = 
4.34, p= . 008, such that the 
depressed and dysphoric groups recalled fewer specific memories 
than their matched controls. These main effects were qualified by a significant Group x 
Valence interaction, F(3,54) = 4.26, p= . 
009, such that the difference between depressed 
children and their matched controls was more prominent for negative recall than for positive, 
but the difference between dysphoric children and their matched controls was more prominent 
for positive recall, as can be seen in Figure 4.3. 
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Independent t-tests on relevant hypothesis driven pairs, confirmed that the difference between 
depressed children and matched controls (NDDI) was significant for negative recall, 1(28) = 
3.3 3, p= . 002, 
but that the difference between these groups for positive recall only produced a 
significant trend, 1(28) = 1.91, p= . 066. 
On the other hand, the difference between dysphoric 
children's recall of positive memories relative to matched controls (NDD2) was significant, 
t(26) = 4.82, p< . 001, while the 
difference between matched controls and dysphoric 
children's recall was not significant for negative recall, t(26) _ . 21, p= . 84. Furthermore, 
when the AMS of depressed and dysphoric children was compared, results showed that there 
was no significant difference between these groups for either positive, t(27) = . 810, p= . 
43, or 
negative recall, t(27) = 1.50, p= . 14. Results therefore 
indicate that the effect of depression on 
AMS, relative to controls, lies with negative recall. The effect of dysphoria on AMS, relative 
to controls, lies with positive recall and although depressed and dysphoric groups are less 
specific than controls, there are no significant differences in AMS between these groups. 
What is of equal interest are the within-subject valence effects Depressed children were less 
specific (more overgeneral) to negative cues relative to positive cues (t(14) = 3.87, p= . 002, 
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2-tailed). Dysphoric children did not show this bias (t(13) = . 44, p= . 66) they produced an 
approximately equal number of specific responses to positive and negative cues. The means 
for negative and positive specific recall across the two controls groups did not statistically 
differ (for positive, t(27) = 1.36, p =. 19 or for negative recall t(27) = 1.55, p =. 13). However, 
while there was no valence difference in the depressed control group (NDD1), t(14) = .57, p= 
. 61, the 
dysphoric controls (NDD2) were more specific to positive cues relative to negative 
(t(13) = 3.45, p= . 004) suggesting that normal children demonstrate AM recall somewhere 
between valence-balanced AMS and positively biased AMS. 
Alternatively the difference in valenced AMS in these groups may be attributable to 
differences in gender ratios, with near equal males: females in the dysphoric and dysphoric 
control groups but predominantly males in the depressed and depressed control groups. To 
test this possibility, the 4x2 ANOVA was repeated with Gender as a covariate. Results of 
this analysis showed the main effect of Group remained, F(3,53) = 11.17, p= . 009, as before, 
the Group x Valence interaction remained, F(3,53) = 4.16, p= . 01, as before and there was 
no main effect of Gender, F(1,53) = . 317, p= . 58. The only difference, when controlling 
for 
Gender in the present analysis, was the loss of the main effect of Valence, F(1,53) = . 34, p= 
. 56. 
Even when controlling for gender all other previous effects remained. 
Hypothesis 4. Depression will account for variability in AMS over and above any variability 
in AMS attributable to age. 
When age-group and depression as a categorical variable, were added into an enter-stepwise 
regression analysis, with age-group entered as the first step and depression added as the 
second step, and child, adolescent- and adult total AMS as the dependent variable; Age 
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accounted for a significant 5% of the variability in AMS, F(1,99) = 6.66, p= . 011, AdjR2 = 
. 05. 
The addition of depression resulted in a significant model explaining 32% of variability 
in AMS, F(2,99) = 23.99, p< . 001, AdJR2 = . 33. Thus, 
depression accounted for 27% of the 
variability in AMS over and above age in this study. 
4.6. DISCUSSION 
This study, to my knowledge, is the first to examine effects of clinical depression on AMS in 
a child population. It' is also the first study to attempt to compare depressed child, adolescent 
and adult functioning on the AMT and to consider effects of dysphoria and depression on 
child AMS. 
4.6.1. Main effects of Depression, Valence and Age 
The first finding is that clinical depression in children is associated with reduced AMS. As 
with adolescents and adults, clinically depressed children were less specific than age matched 
non-depressed controls. The main effect of depression on AMS held for recall to positive and 
negative cues. Overall, participants recalled fewer negative than positive specific memories. 
In addition, there was a small but expected overall improvement in AMS with age. Hence, 
results suggest that in a normal sample, by age 10, AMS is similar to adult specificity, with 
specificity increasing only slightly thereafter. This pattern is consistent with developmental 
data regarding the relatively minor improvements in AM abilities following age 7 
(Gathercole, 1998). However, interestingly, this main effect of age-group on AMS was not 
significant in the depressed groups, where AMS remained static across age. 
131 
CHAPTER 4. A CLINICAL STUDY 
4.6.2. Effects of Depression across Age 
The second original finding resulting from this study was that in clinical groups the effect of 
depression in on AMS did not significantly vary across age-group. That is, the mean AMS for 
depressed children did not significantly differ from AMS mean of depressed adolescents or 
adults. Depressed children demonstrated 43% specificity (69% in controls), depressed 
adolescents demonstrated 44% specificity (69% controls) and depressed adults demonstrated 
57% specificity (86% in controls). The extent of this overgenerality in adolescents and adults 
is consistent with that previously found in clinical groups of a similar age (e. g. Swales, et al, 
2001; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Hence, depression related OGM is as striking a bias in 
childhood as it is in adulthood. However, there were interesting valence specific differences, 
such that depressed children were particularly vulnerable with respect to negative overgeneral 
AM. This is discussed in the next section. 
When comparing the effects of clinical depression across age it was important to first 
establish that the levels of depression were equivalent across age. Percentage scores on each 
depression measure indicated that variance in depression symptoms was not significantly 
different across child, adolescent and adult clinical groups. Differential severity of depression 
is unlikely to account for the OGM effect across age as analyses indicated comparable 
severity across group. The implications of this finding are therefore that depressed children 
display comparable levels of OGM as depressed adults. If OGM in depressed adults is 
associated with various forms of dysfunctional cognition, including hopelessness and 
suicidality (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane & Beck, 2005), then 
these children may be especially vulnerable to analogous cognitions. Basically, the 
seriousness of OGM in children may mirror the seriousness of it in adulthood. 
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Moreover, OGM in the child group cannot be explained in terms of the depressed children 
simply demonstrating an age appropriate overgeneral retrieval style. Depressed children in 
this study had a mean age of 8.13 years. We know from Study 1 that children below the age 
of 10 may typically demonstrate an OGM style, but in this study, depressed children were 
overgeneral relative to same age and gender matched controls. Hence, developmental level 
cannot account for this particular result. 
4.6.3. Valence, Age and Depression 
As in Study 1, there was also a main effect of cue valence. Overall, fewer specific negative 
memories were recalled relative to positive. Depression was associated with reduced AMS to 
positive and negative cues. In particular, depressed adolescents and depressed adults also 
showed reduced AMS to positive cues relative to their same age controls. However this 
difference was only a trend in the depressed child group. Instead, the more robust reduced 
AMS effect in the depressed child group was attributable to overgeneral negative responses. 
Thus, for memories to positive cues, depression was more strongly associated with reduced 
AMS between children and adolescents/adults. However, for memories to negative cues, the 
effect of depression was more stable. That is, depressed adolescents and depressed adults 
showed significantly reduced positive and negative AMS relative to controls, whereas 
depressed children only showed significantly reduced AMS to negative memories. This would 
support an AR interpretation. That is, early experience of negative life events (predisposing 
vulnerable children to experience depression) may result in the adoption of a passive 
avoidance strategy and therefore overgeneral recall to AMT cues designed to activate these 
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negative memories. An assumption of the ARH is that OGM originates with OGM for 
negative information and spreads to include positive AMs, as a bi-product of the system level 
bias. So the presence of OGM to negative cues in childhood, but the strengthening of OGM to 
positive cues with later development would support this theory. 
The result is also somewhat in keeping with a schema-based interpretation of OGM. That is, 
negatively biased schema, developing in early childhood, may incline a depressed child to 
view negative information schematically. Children's actual life experiences may originally 
inform these schemata. Hence, these children view negative events as prototypical and present 
with overgeneral responses to negative cues. However, it is unclear how to interpret the 
relatively weaker effect for positive OGM in children in terms of schema theory, since 
negative schema should also make specific positive recall less likely i. e. specific positive 
events dismissed as schema incongruent. One possibility is that depressed children retrieve 
trivial or inconsequential positive memories, which by default are specific. Ad hoc inspection 
of depressed children's responses to AMT cues did not indicate particularly trivial or recent 
positive AM responses, relative to controls, however formal content analysis would be needed 
to properly test this supposition. Alternatively, it may be that during child development 
schema congruence (the acceptance of congruent information) is more proficient than schema 
incongruent processing (i. e. rejecting incompatible information). However, it is worth noting 
that the positive OGM effect in depressed children was a strong trend (p = . 066). Hence, 
caution is warranted when interpreting this particular valence effect. Future studies are first 
required to confirm or disconfirm the stability of this effect. 
4.6.4. Dysphoria and Depression 
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The third novel research area investigated in this study concerned the relationship between 
dysphoria and depression in childhood. AMS declined from non-depressed to dysphoric, to 
depressed children as predicted, suggesting this bias may operate on a linear continuum. 
However, there were subtle differences in the patterns of valenced AMS evidenced in these 
groups. For example, dysphoric children demonstrated evenhanded OGM across valenced 
cues, whereas same age depressed children showed the same level of overgenerality to 
positive cues words as dysphoric children, but further reduced specificity to negative cue 
words. Thus, depressed children were less specific (more overgeneral) to negative cues 
relative to positive cues. Dysphoric children did not show this bias. Moreover, the difference 
between depressed children and controls was for negative AMS. Depressed children were less 
specific to negative cues. However, the effect of dysphoria on AMS relative to controls was 
for responses to positive cues. Dysphoric children were less specific to positive cues. 
Results are in keeping with a mixed schema interpretation. That is, dysphoric individuals may 
have both negative and positive self-world beliefs, which equally effect memory recall. 
Depressed children, on the other hand, demonstrated negatively biased recall such that they 
produced more overgeneral negative responses than positive; suggesting predominantly 
negative underlying schema. The final result in the trio, was that control data rested 
somewhere between balanced and positively biased AMS. This supports the proposition that 
normal mood state individuals possess predominantly positive underlying schema (Mezulis, 
Abramson, Hyde & Hankin, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988; 1994). 
That the dysphoria effect lies with positive recall and the depressed effect lies with negative 
recall perhaps suggests differences in the nature of underlying information processing biases. 
The implications of these data are simply that there may be differences in the nature of 
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dysphoria relative to depression, which may be conceptualized as dysphoric individuals 
having difficulty in effectively processing positive information whereas depression, as a more 
severe form of dysphoria, seems to be more strongly associated with negative information 
processing biases. This was not hypothesized in the introduction to this study. The results 
raise interesting questions about the nature of dysphoria and depression, whether dysphoria is 
a lesser form of depression featuring biases that shift with depression severity, or whether 
dysphoria and depression reflect different underlying constructs. Differences in cognitive 
biases based on low levels of positive affect vs. high levels of negative affect have been 
posited in the child depression literature for example (Luten, Ralph & Mineka, 1997). 
Finally, though mean AMS declined in the predicted direction from non-depressed to 
dysphoric to depressed groups, the differences between dysphoric and depressed specificity 
were not significant. The fact that AMS did not significantly differ across depressed and 
dysphoric data can be interpreted as evidence that dysphoria in childhood reflects a serious 
condition, such that OGM effects are equivalent to those found in clinically depressed 
children. This raises serious questions about pervasive negative mood in normal child 
populations - specifically, that this is perhaps not a condition that should be overlooked. 
4.6.5. Age versus Depression 
The last hypothesis considered in this study examined the relative effects of depression and 
age on AMS. Results from Study 1 indicated that specificity increased as a function of age 
between 7-11 years but that dysphoria accounted for significant variance in AMS independent 
of age. The present study sought to investigate whether clinical depression would account for 
unique variance in AMS over and above age across a wider age range Due to the small 
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numbers of clinically depressed children, it was not possible to analyze the child data with the 
same age cut-offs as in the previous study. Instead, participants were grouped as child, 
adolescent or adult. The results confirmed the hypothesis, such that whether the participant 
was depressed or not accounted for significant variance in AMS over and above age in this 
study. 
4.6.6. Caveats and Limitations 
There are several limitations and caveats to be considered when reading the results of this 
study. Being unable to assess the comparative severity of depression precisely across the three 
age groups given the different mood measures somewhat compromises clear-cut interpretation 
of the age and depression results. However, this is an inevitable problem encountered by any 
study assessing depression over a wide developmental age range. Moreover, OGM tends to 
remain fairly stable for example, OGM is found in remission from depression (e. g. 
Brittlebank et al., 1993) and has only been shown to change following direct therapeutic 
intervention (Williams et al., 2000). Hence, even if the groups did differ in terms of severity 
of depression, this still may not be the most parsimonious explanation to account for any 
OGM effects across the three depressed groups. 
Another, perhaps more significant problem, is that trauma was not controlled for in this study. 
Given our increasing understanding of the relationships between trauma, depression and AMS 
(e. g. Hermans et al, 2004), future studies should perhaps pay closer attention to the discrete 
influences of depression and trauma. For example, in some cases, trauma is associated with 
less OGM (e. g. Kuyken et al in press; Swales, et al 2001). It is not possible to determine 
whether trauma influenced the valence specific OGM effects in the present study. For 
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example, it is possible that depressed children were particularly overgeneral to negative cues 
because depression is tied more closely to some form of trauma (or life adversity) in the 
depressed child group than in the adolescent and adult groups. The justification for this 
statement comes from the fact that depression has been more closely tied to adversity in youth 
than in later years where problems associated with MDD may have become more internalised 
(see Nolen-Hoeksema, Seligman & Girus, 1992, for a commentary on the strong links 
between adverse experience and depression in childhood). That is, in youth there is often a 
measurable external impetus (family disruption, bullying, illness) whereas in adulthood 
negative schemata are more often the candidate explanation for depression. Kindling theory 
(Kovacs, 1997; Post et al., 1992) would support this idea. Hence, future studies should 
investigate the relative roles of depression and trauma in accounting for any OGM effects. 
Finally, though gender was controlled for in the analyses where gender ratios were unequal 
across groups, it is preferable to ensure equal gender ratios methodologically. This proves 
difficult in an investigation of depression in youth, where considerably more boys are 
diagnosed with depression in childhood relative to girls (Mash & Wolfe, 2005). However, 
greater efforts and resources could ensure gender-matched groups. Small numbers also mean 
that caution must be aired when interpreting the results. For example, two-way ANOVAs 
were conducted to specifically test an a priori hypothesis although there was no significant 
three-way interaction. This means that there are no statistically significant differences 
between the clinical and non-clinical groups and so caution should be used in reading these 
results. Better mapping of age, i. e. with finer increments in age-groups would also allow for a 
more sophisticated analysis of the development of AMS with age, and of the parallel 
interactive effects of depression. Formal diagnosis of depression in children would help 
strengthen the conclusions that can be drawn. It would also be of great interest to examine 
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whether therapeutic intervention early in childhood would affect AMS. The depressed 
patients tested in this study were all recruited from outpatient services and although no 
cognitive-behavioural treatment was in effect, specifically designed to tackle memory 
overgenerality in these units, it is impossible to say whether experience of any intervention 
has modified OGM functioning in these groups. Again, longitudinal studies would be needed 
to address this issue. 
4.7. In conclusion 
Despite, these methodological shortcomings the present study is the first to demonstrate OGM 
in depressed children and to map effects of depression on AMS across age. The data also 
facilitates an interesting comparison with the previous findings in dysphoric children from 
Study 1, and extends our understanding of age and depression, as factors influencing the 
recall of personally relevant memories. The data can also be utilised to lend support to the 
theory of AR proposed by Williams (1996). Evidence is also consistent with various schema 
interpretations of the OGM effect. It may be that depression related OGM in childhood is as 
conspicuous a bias as it is in adulthood, and hence in conclusion, greater research attention 
should be paid to this phenomenon in youth. 
In the next study, Study 3, the potential for reduced AMS to predict later symptoms of 
depression/dysphoria, consistent with adult studies of AM (e. g. Brittlebank et al, 1993), was 
examined using a prospective-longitudinal design. 
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Chapter 51 Study 3A Longitudinal Study: The relationship between cognitive 
style, autobiographical memory and depressed mood and the ability of these 
variables to predict self-reported depressed symptoms in children 8 months 
later during a stressful life event 
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Abstract 51 Many studies have shown a link between depression and overgeneral 
autobiographical memory (OGM) in adults. Studies of children are required in order to 
examine the origins of this link. A subsequent issue with respect to testing OGM is whether 
this cognitive bias is linked to other biases in cognition such as those pertaining to cognitive 
style (CS). This study looked at self-report measures of CS in children aged 9-11 and a 
standard measure of AM retrieval. A measure of depressed mood was taken at Time 1 and 
then at a follow up 8 months later during a stressful life event. Results demonstrated a 
relationship between OGM and CS in children, such that OGM was positively correlated with 
an overgeneralising tendency and with making unstable positive attributions. Mood was the 
best predictor of subsequent mood. Both CS and AM were correlated with mood at Time 1 
and both predicted mood at Time 2, before controlling for previous mood. Few measures 
could predict mood above previous mood score. As with the bulk of previous work, the 
effects were stronger for processing of positive information. Results highlight the importance 
of studying OGM in the context of other biases and of the importance of downward extension 
of adult work in child populations to pre-empt depressive cognition early in development. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The previous study (Study 2) looked at the existence of OGM in clinically depressed youth. 
No study has considered OGM as a predictor of depressive symptoms in children, nor 
considered the possible relationship between OGM and other depression-related biases such 
Cognitive Style (CS) in childhood. In the following sections evidence of the predictive 
quality of OGM and CS in accounting for depression in children (or in adults where child 
data is absent), is presented. This is followed by an argument for the possible relationship 
between these variables. 
5.1.1. Longitudinal Studies of OGM 
Though there is some uncertainty regarding the total functional implications of OGM (see 
Hermans et al., 2005), it can confidently be assumed to be dysfunctional in the long-term due 
to its strong and robust association with psychopathology, in particular depression, in 
adulthood (Van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). To date there has been no investigation of 
OGM in childhood besides that demonstrated in this thesis, in which OGM memory was 
demonstrated in dysphoric children aged 7-11 years (Study 1) and in clinically depressed 
children aged 7-11 (Study 2). Moreover the importance of OGM in predicting depressed 
mood in children has not yet been investigated. However some studies have looked at OGM 
as a predictor of depression severity in adults. 
As noted in the Introduction (Chapter 2), one of the strongest findings in the adult OGM 
literature is that levels of OGM independently predict the course of depression. Specifically, 
to my knowledge, there are six studies examining longitudinal aspects of OGM in predicting 
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depression in adults. Brittlebank, Scott, Williams & Ferrier (1993) were the first to look at the 
longitudinal aspects of OGM style. Brittlebank et al. followed 13 adults with MDD for 7 
months. Positive OGM in this sample predicted 33% of variance in levels of depressive 
symptoms at follow-up. Initial depressive symptoms did not significantly predict subsequent 
depressed mood in this study. This OGM result was replicated by Peeters, Wessel, 
Merckelbach & Boon-Vermeeren, (2002) except the result was found for negative rather than 
positive cues in this study. Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend & Kuyken (2001) also found that OGM 
to positive cues (when depressed in winter) predicted symptom levels (when remitted in 
summer) even after controlling for initial symptom level, in a group of Seasonal Affective 
Disorder (SAD) patients. In another longitidunal study, Brewin, Reynolds & Tata (1999) 
followed 44 adults with MDD over 6 months. OGM in this sample predicted depressed 
symptoms at follow up, but not above that of prior depressive symptoms. 
Hence, three of these four studies looking at clinical levels of depression found evidence that 
OGM can predict depressive symptoms in adults with psychopathology above that of 
previous mood (Brittlebank et al., 1993, Peeters et al., 2002 and Dalgleish et al., 2001). The 
fourth study (Brewin et al., 1999) found some predictive power in OGM, though not as 
powerful as that of prior mood. Results from Dalgleish et al. suggest the differences in the 
predictive ability of OGM may be attributed to the specific depression measure used. In the 
studies that have demonstrated the predictive value of OGM above previous mood, the 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression was used (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960). This measure taps 
mainly somatic vegetative symptoms of depression. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck, Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961) was used in the Brewin et al. study 
where less impressive results for OGM were established. The BDI reflects more the cognitive 
symptoms of depression. Furthermore, Dalgleish et al., included both the BDI and the 
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Hamilton and showed that OGM did not significantly predict later BDI levels in SAD 
patients, despite being a unique predictor of later Hamilton scores. It is unclear whether the 
Hamilton is appropriate for use in children (Pavuluri & Birmaher, 2004). Also, all of the 
above studies used clinical samples where the Hamilton is appropriate. It is unclear whether 
the Hamilton is appropriate for non-clinical testing. 
A fifth longitudinal study investigated AMS and depression. However the standard AMT 
methodology was not used. Rottenberg, Joorman, Brozovich & Gotlib (2005) attempted to 
look at emotionality and detail in generated descriptions of memories of happiest and saddest 
events, in 26 depressed adults (19 at follow up) to assess whether detail or emotionality 
would predict depressed symptoms 1 year later. Importantly, however, this study did not use 
the standard AMT measure. Instead an idiographic memory procedure, which entailed an 
interactive interview, with several prompts for specific descriptions and no time limit, was 
used. Though this methodology does focus on meaningful AM events (i. e. the saddest and 
happiest memories that come to mind), responses were heavily prompted. Moreover, 
`emotionality' of the memories was not rated by the respondents themselves but by the 
researchers coding the videotaped interviews. Rating was based on language and detail used, 
which could confound the two variables of interest. Allowing for these methodological 
particulars, results indicated that `reduced emotional intensity' associated with sad memory 
descriptions was predictive of depressive symptoms at follow-up even after controlling for 
initial psychopathology. Memory detail, as measured in this methodology did not predict 
depressive symptoms. Rottenberg et al. introduce and discuss their results in terms of 
previous work on OGM. However caution must be used in interpreting the results in relation 
to previous OGM work, since a very different paradigm was used. It is unclear what the 
relationship is between results gleaned from a heavily prompted interview format discussing 
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`saddest' and `happiest' memories and that of the AMT cuing paradigm, which uses minimal 
prompts and 10 generic valenced cue words. Only a study using both paradigms could clarify 
this issue and speak to whether results on the tasks are comparable. 
Finally, Gibbs & Rude (2004) examined OGM, negative life events and depressive symptoms 
in a non-clinical sample of college students. Over a 4-6 week period and after controlling for 
initial depressive symptoms, negative life events were associated with increased depressive 
symptoms but only in those students who had initially demonstrated high OGM. Thus, OGM 
acted as a depression symptom vulnerability marker in a non-clinical sample. Despite this 
accumulating evidence, to date, there have been no longitudinal studies of OGM in children 
or adolescents. The primary aim of Study 3 was to examine this issue for the first time in a 
child population. 
5.1.2. Cognitive Style (CS) 
A second aim of Study 3 was to investigate the relationship between OGM and measures of 
depressive cognitive style (CS) within a longitudinal design. As noted in the General 
Introduction (Chapter 1) self-report studies indicate that depressed children exhibit more 
negative cognitions (e. g., Dobson & Shaw, 1987; Krantz & Rammen, 1979; Tems, Stewart, 
Skinner, Hughes, & Emslie, 1993; Robinson, Garber, & Hilsman, 1995) and more negative 
attributions (Abela, 2001; Blumberg & Izard, 1985; Gladstone & Kaslow, 1995; Hops, 
Lewinsohn, Andrews & Roberts, 1990; Metalsky & Joiner, 1992) than non-depressed 
children. Importantly, several longitudinal studies exist providing evidence regarding the 
possible causal relationship between these cognitive factors and depression in childhood (e. g. 
Joiner et al, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al, 1992; Panak & Garber, 1992). 
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In a longitudinal study examining the relationship between depressive symptoms and 
negative perceptions of the self (in a non-clinical sample of 248 children aged 8-11 years), 
McGrath and Repetti (2002) found that depressive symptoms predicted a change in negative 
cognition about the self. However, negative self-perceptions were not correlated with 
subsequent change in depressive symptoms. This suggests that negative self-beliefs were not 
playing a significant role in predicting depression. However, the stress component of the 
diathesis-stress model was not tested. This could be crucial. For instance, Metalsky et al 
(1993) found that depression scores in college students were only predicted by a 3-way 
interaction between attributional style, self-esteem and failure. Hence, testing the stress 
component of the diathesis stress model may be integral. 
This issue was examined by Nolen-Hoeksema, Seligman & Girgus (1992) who conducted a 
5-year longitudinal study of 8-13 year olds (n = 352). The primary question in this study was 
whether a negative explanatory style as measured by the cognitive attributional style 
questionnaire (CASQ), either alone or in the presence of a stressor would correlate or predict 
depression in children i. e. this time testing the applicability of the Beckian diathesis-stress 
model (Beck et al., 1979) in children. Results of the Nolen-Hoeksema study showed that the 
best predictor of depression in children was already-elevated depression. Negative life events 
also significantly predicted depression in younger children. With increasing age, explanatory 
style or the interaction between explanatory style and negative life events emerged as 
significant predictors of depression. Also the correlation between explanatory style and 
depression increased with age. The Nolen-Hoeksema study offers a provocative insight into 
the interrelationship between cognition and emotion in childhood. Arguably, the only 
limitation of this study was that a specific measurable stressor was not assessed. Further 
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prospective studies, which have tested a diathesis-stress theory, in which cognitive 
predisposition and negative life events (stress) are examined, rather than just a cognitive-trait 
vulnerability theory, have also found significantly improved predictability of depression in 
children (e. g. Hilsman & Garber, 1995; Panak & Garber, 1992; Robinson, Garber & Hilsman, 
1995). In addition, Hops et al., (1990) found that negative attributions predicted those who 
remained stably symptomatic of depression and those who were initially symptomatic, but 
improved in a one-month prospective study of 14-18 year olds. The results of this study 
suggested negative attributional style was involved in the maintenance of depressive mood. 
In line with Nolen-Hoeksema et al., Joiner et el., (2000) also showed that attributional style 
(specifically attributing negative events to stable and global causes) interacted with 
occurrence of negative life events to significantly predict depressive symptomology in youth 
psychiatric inpatients and this interaction did not predict increases in anxiety levels. Thus, 
several studies that have explicitly studied the cognitive-stress model (an interactive model), 
have found support for the existence of cognitive vulnerability to depression in childhood. 
These studies used grades, peer rejection and school transition as potential stressors and over 
different time periods found that cognitions (attributions, self-worth) measured before the 
stressors occurred, moderated the effect of the stressors on depressive symptoms in children. 
It appears then, at least during childhood that the expression of depression is more closely 
linked with stress exposure than in adulthood, when depression presumably becomes more 
endogenous. 
Although not in children, Alloy et al, (1999) demonstrated the importance of cognitive 
factors in predisposition to depression, in youth without any previous history of depression. 
In this significant study Alloy et al. tested 5378 undergraduates, who completed various CS 
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measures every 6 weeks for 2 years. After 2 years, high cognitive-vulnerability risk groups 
showed a 17: 1 likelihood of first episode depression compared to low risk groups. In contrast 
there was no group difference for first episodes of anxiety disorders (7: 3). Moreover, this 
effect remained even when co-varying out initial mood scores, suggesting that the cognitive 
biases themselves played a causal role. This prospective result is unique amongst the studies 
reviewed here, in that it provides direct support for the cognitive vulnerability hypothesis, 
uncontaminated by prior history of depression. As with the results from Joiner et al (2000) it 
also suggests depressogenic CS may confer specific risk for depression (i. e. and not for 
anxiety disorders). More-over, the results again highlight the importance of valenced 
processing in understanding depression vulnerability - high-risk individuals were less likely 
to process positive self related stimuli. 
Moreover, one further study that attempted to assess the specific forms of depressive 
attribution found that depressed adolescents differed significantly from a psychiatrically ill 
comparison group only on a positive events component, not on the negative (Curry & 
Craighead, 1990). So, depression in adolescents was specifically related to low scores on 
attributional style for positive events. This valenced bias is comparable to the depressive 
OGM bias found in adult and adolescent literature, that is, a more pronounced effect for 
positive cues, and suggests there may be a common mechanism. Low stable or self- 
attributions for positive events may render them less well encoded or memorable for 
example. 
5.1.3. CS and OGM 
148 
CHAPTER 5: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY 
To my knowledge, no study has looked at the relationship of OGM bias to other vulnerability 
markers for depression, such as CS measures, in children, nor examined which is a better 
indicator of depressed mood in children. For example, there is nothing in the literature to 
show the possible relationship between OGM and overgeneral thinking (Beck et al., 1979), 
despite clear theoretical links. Typically OGM has been studied in isolation. However some 
informative studies have recently emerged indicating a relationship between OGM and 
rumination (e. g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) and a relationship between OGM and a cognitive 
avoidant coping style (Hermans, deFranc, Raes, Williams & Eelen, 2005). Further studies are 
needed to develop our understanding of OGM in the context of other related biases. 
In this vein, and as already noted at various points throughout this thesis, schema 
explanations have been posited in trying to account for the OGM effect (e. g. Dalgleish et al, 
2003). However, no study has provided direct empirical evidence for the relationship between 
schema and OGM. Existence of negative self-schema (or an absence of positive self-schema) 
is a likely component in explaining poor specific positive recall in depression, for instance. 
However, little research has focused directly on assessing this link. Self-report scales of 
dysfunctional attitudes, cognitive errors and negative beliefs can be utilised to address the 
relationship between schema-based bias, OGM and depressed mood. 
In addition, there is a clear case for examining attributional style and AM in that the way in 
which causes are attributed to events may effect the way in which they are encoded, stored 
and retrieved. For example, overgeneralization can be a feature component of both 
attributional style and OGM. Cognitive theories of depression assert that `categorical' 
thinking is highly characteristic of depression (e. g. Beck et al, 1979) and OGM can be 
conceived as a form of categorical bias. Hence, cross modal `overgeneralising' could be a 
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possible underlying theme in explaining OGM in depression. Little comment has been made 
in the literature regarding the possible links between overgeneral thinking and overgeneral 
memory in depression. This seems to be an obvious omission in a discussion of OGM to date. 
This study therefore sought to address the possibility that CS and OGM would predict 
depressed mood in children and moreover, that there might be a relationship between CS (in 
particular certain subcomponents of CS such as overgeneralization) and OGM. 
Thus, some relationship between CS and OGM can be anticipated due to their common 
association with depression. Equally, some relationship between CS and AM would also be 
expected due to their reciprocal contribution in cognition. Ultimately cognitive style and 
memory form part of an ongoing appraisal-memory cycle (e. g. Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; 
Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Therefore views and appraisals about events affect the way in 
which events are processed, stored and later retrieved. Equally the way memories are stored 
and retrieved is likely to affect appraisal of future information. Events that are inconsistent 
with current schema (or goals), for instance, are less likely to be remembered (see Conway, 
2005). Therefore there is plausible reason to predict a relationship between CS and AM style. 
Another motivation for examining the possible relationships between schema, attributional 
style and OGM is that schema and causal attribution may help explain valence effects in the 
OGM literature. For example, OGM to positive cues in depression could be linked to positive 
material being dismissed as schema-incongruent. In addition, depressed persons may struggle 
to remember specific positive events if they are attributed to unstable factors outside 
themselves (low internal or stable attributions). There is nothing in the child (or adult) 
literature assessing this possibility. 
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5.2. Study Rationale 
We have seen then, that biases in CS and AM are linked to the development of depression. 
Biased AM may therefore be related to other cognitive factors implicated in depression onset. 
Following these factors over time in a child sample should therefore give us an indication of 
some of the relevant cognitive factors involved. Although several longitudinal studies have 
looked at the relationship between CS and development of depression in children (e. g. Abela, 
2001; McGrath & Repetti, 2002), no one study has looked at whether OGM biases can be 
used to predict depression in children, or considered whether there is a relationship between 
OGM bias and negative CS in children. The overarching aim of Study 3 was therefore to 
investigate these issues. The more powerful longitudinal studies of CS in children, as we have 
seen, utilised a diathesis-stress design. To my knowledge, no studies of OGM in any age 
group have applied this design, despite its obvious utility. The present study therefore used a 
longitudinal, diathesis-stress approach to investigate the relationship between AM, CS and 
mood in children. 
5.3. Hypotheses 
1. There will be a positive relationship between depressed mood, OGM and depressive CS in 
children at Time 1. 
2. OGM will positively correlate with particular CS sub-components, such overgeneral 
thinking, at Time 1. 
3. CS and OGM will predict depressed mood in children 8 months on during a stressful life 
event (Time 2). 
4. These predictive roles of CS and OGM will exert their influence independently of Time 1 
depressed mood. 
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5.4. METHOD 
5.4.1. Participants 
Thirty children aged 9-10 years at Time 1, were included. Of the sample, 14 were girls. 
Children were recruited from a London-based Primary School. The sample was ethnically 
mixed. No child with any known mental illness or Special Educational Need was included. 
Parental, School, University and Local Education Authority consent were obtained prior to 
testing and individual child consent was obtained on the day of testing. 
The children tested were in the final year of their primary school education and were about to 
undergo transition to secondary school at Time 2. At Time 2, all children had just received 
their SAT exam results. These are national examinations sat by all children in British primary 
school education. All children were in the process of finding out about acceptance or 
rejection from secondary schools. Children have to make certain grades to be admitted into 
their preferred school in London and will also be separated from friends. This is rated as a 
significant life event by children and has been used as a life stressor in previous studies (e. g. 
Hilsman & Garber, 1995). Children in this study rated the significance of the event on a scale 
of 1-10 (mean = 8.33, SD = 2.62 range 1-10). 
Two children did not rate the event (changing schools) as significant (i. e. rated as 1). 
However these 2 children did indicate high stress concerning starting their new school (i. e. 
rated as 8). Therefore these 2 children were not excluded from the data analysis, although it is 
acknowledged that their stress may have had a different locale compared to the other 
children, who rated both aspects of school transition as stressful. 73% of children in the 
sample rated the change of schools as a highly significant and stressful (scoring between 8- 
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10). Barring the two children already mentioned, all other children rated the event as 5 or 
above. 
5.4.2. Materials and Measures 
The measures used to capture schema-based biases in children in this study were the 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Beck, 2002), the Children's' Negative Cognitive Errors 
Questionnaire (CNCEQ; Leitenberg, 2002) and the Cognitive Triad Inventory for Children 
(CTI-C; Kaslow, 2002). The Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ; Kaslow, 
2002) was used to assess biases in attributional style in children. These measures have all 
been used previously to assess CS associated with affective disorder in children (Winters, 
Myers & Proud, 2002). These scales cover a broad domain of negative constructs and provide 
a broader representation of youth functioning than is covered by diagnostic scales alone. 
These were selected based theoretical significance. These scales are now detailed below. 
DAS (Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Beck, 2002): This scale measures pervasive negative 
beliefs about oneself in relation to others e. g. `I cannot be happy unless most people I know 
admire me' or `Asking for help is a sign of weakness' This measure is not specifically 
designed for use in children but has been validated for use in youth (see Winters et al., 2002). 
Dysfunctional attitudes are conceptualised as stable, higher-order depressogenic beliefs, 
which approximate trait constructs. Responses are recorded on a 1-7 point likert scale (totally 
agree- totally disagree). DAS is scored from +1 to +7 for adaptive responses and +7 to +1 for 
non-adaptive responses. Internal consistency is 0.9 and convergent validity is 0.4-0.66' for 
this measure. There are 40 items. 
All psychometric properties for cognitive style measures are derived from Winters, Myers and Proud (2002); a 
10-year review of cognitive ratings scales. 
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CNCEQ (Children's Negative Cognitive Errors Questionnaire; Leitenberg, 2002): The 
CNCEQ assesses overgeneralisation, personalising, catastrophising and selective abstraction 
(Beck, 1979). Cognitive errors in academic, social and athletic areas are tested. The measure 
presents hypothetical situations/vignettes followed by possible responses e. g. `Some of your 
friends ask if you are going to try out for the school sports team. You think what's the point, I 
didn't get in last year. ' ('exactly what I would think'- `not at all like I would think'). Each 
item is scored 1-5, with higher scores indicating more functional responses so that `exactly 
what I would think' is scored 1 and `not at all like I would think' is always scored 5, for each 
cognitive error. Item scores are summed for a total CNCEQ score. There are 6 items per sub- 
type of cognitive error. The score range is 24-120. The measure has good psychometric 
properties. Internal consistency is 0.75-0.89 and test-retest is 0.56-0.65, across the different 
sub-scales. This measure was developed with 4'8 1h graders. Distortions may not be specific to 
depression but may relate more generally to negative affectivity. There are 24 items. 
CTI-C (Cognitive Triad Inventory for Children; Kaslow, 2002): The CTI-C assesses Beck's 
cognitive triad in children: a negative view of self, world, and future e. g. `I am a failure', 
`Most people are friendly and helpful', `Nothing is likely to work out for me', `My worries 
will never go away' (rated `yes', `maybe', `no'). Adaptive responses are given a score of 2, 
maladaptive responses are scored with 0 and `maybe' responses are scored 1. The total score 
is simply a sum of all item scores, thus leading to a score range of 0-72, with lower scores 
indicating more depressive cognitive beliefs. This measure was developed with 4-7th graders. 
Kaslow et al. (1992) reported adequate internal consistency and convergent validity for this 
measure. There are 36 items. 
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CASQ (Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire; Kaslow, 2002): The CASQ measures 
depressotypic attributional style in children regarding stable, global, internal causes of 
positive and negative hypothetical events. Children are presented with an event and are asked 
to chose an explanation for this event e. g. `I get an "A" on a test. Is it because a) I am smart 
or b) I am good in the subject that the test was in' or `If I make a friend it is because a) they 
are nice b) because I am nice'. A score of 1 is allocated for every functional positive event 
attribution. A score of 1 is allocated for every dysfunctional negative event attribution. The 
composite score is the total negative score subtracted from the total positive score, providing 
a score range of minus 12 to plus 12, with the lower scores indicating a more depressive 
attributional style. Internal consistency is 0.31-0.66. Test-retest reliability at 3 months is 0.31- 
0.66 and at 12 months is 0.35-0.56. Convergent validity is 0.34-0.43 with good discriminant 
ability and good predictive ability across multiple samples. There are 24 items. 
CDI-S (Children's Depression Inventory- Short Form; Kovacs, 1992): The CDI-S was 
administered as was described in the methodology of Chapter 3 (Study 1). This scale 
measures cognitive depressive symptomology in children. Each item offers three possible 
statements e. g. `Nobody really loves me, I'm not sure if anybody loves me, I am sure 
somebody loves me'. Of the 10 items (1,5,6) relate to negative mood. One item (3) relates to 
ineffectiveness. Two items (8,9) relate to anhedonia and items 2,4,7 and 10 relate to 
negative self-esteem. 
AMT (Autobiographical Memory Test; Williams & Broadbent, 1986): The AMT was 
administered as has been outlined in Chapter 3 (Study 1). 
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Additional Feeling State Questions: At Time 2, in addition to the CDI, a series of questions 
were presented to the children to gain a fuller account of their feeling state during the 
potential life stress. Of the 23 questions presented, 6 related to ratings of the significance of 
the life event and feelings about changing schools, 5 questions were directed at assessment of 
mood control and the remaining 12 questions were adapted from the Birelson Self-Rated 
Depression Scale (BSRDS; Birelson, 1981) (see Appendix 5.1). The Birelson questions were 
included to try to capture additional mood related statements, which are not captured by the 
CDI (for example, `I like to go out', `I have lots of energy', `I sleep ok', `I look forward to a 
lot of things'). These questions were presented to children either in a `often' `sometimes', 
`never', response format, scored 1-3, or on a 1-10 rating scale (the life stress related 
questions). 
5.4.3. Procedure 
At Time 1 children were asked to complete the standard AMT cuing task, the four 
questionnaires designed to measure cognitive style, and the CDI. All cognitive style 
questionnaires were completed in a classroom setting, with instructions and all questions read 
out loud by the experimenter. Practice examples were given on a white board for each 
measure and three support staff were on hand to offer assistance to children if any was 
needed. The AMT and the CDI were completed on an individual basis with each child in a 
classroom within the school. The same experimenter (L. Drummond) administered all testing. 
These children were re-tested at Time 2 after an 8-month period. Time 2 testing took place 
during the final week of teaching, prior to school transition. At Time 2 the CDI and several 
feeling state questions were individually administered to obtain a measure of mood. 
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5.5. RESULTS 
The mean data on CS, AMT performance and the Mood measures are presented in Table 5.1. 
From Time 1 to Time 2,10 children showed no change in mood score, 11 children reported 
slight decreases in depressed mood and 9 children reported slightly increased depressed 
mood. However, there was no significant difference between CDI scores at Times 1 and 2 
(t(29) = 1.30, p = .2 1). Children's mood at Time 1 was highly correlated with mood at Time 2 
(r(30) = . 79, p< . 00 1). For a note on 
Gender see Appendix 5.2. 
Table 5.1. Means (and standard deviations) scores for CS, AMT and CDI 
Measures Mean SD 
CS DAS (range 40 - 280)** 130.63 (36.79) 
CASQ (range -12 - 12)* 3.93 (2.95) 
CTI-C (range 0- 72)* 52.40 (10.88) 
CNCEQ (range 24-120)* 76.47 (13.78) 
AM +ve Overgeneral 2.23 (1.19) 
+ve Specific 2.50 (1.20) 
-ve Overgeneral 1.63 (1.47) 
-ve Specific 2.57 (1.41) 
CDI Time I (range 0-13) 3.60 (3.66) 
Time 2 (range 0-10) 3.07 (3.13) 
** higher scores indicate more depressive cognitions 
*lower scores indicate more depressive cognitions 
Throughout this thesis I have focused on AMS responses on the AMT as outlined in the 
method section of Study 1. In the previous studies involving the AMT (Studies 1& 2), AMS 
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and OGM results have mirrored each other. Therefore as discussed in Study 1 (Chapter 3 
section 4.2), only one set of data, AMS data, were presented as the most typically reported in 
the literature. In this study some effects were absent for AMS but present for OGM. 
Moreover as the longitudinal relationship in the adult literature has been found for categorical 
memories, both OGM and AMS data are presented in this study. 
Hypothesis 1. There will be a positive relationship between depressed mood, negative 
CS and OGM, in children at Time 1 
As expected all four measures of CS significantly correlated with children's mood (on the 
CDI) at Time 1 (see Table 5.2). Thus, increased low mood was associated with increased 
dysfunctional CS in children. There was also some inter-correlation between the CS measures 
(see Appendix 5.3). In addition, with respect to the relationship between AM and mood, 
AMS to positive cues was negatively associated (and OGM to positive cues was positively 
associated) with depressed mood at Time 1. There was however no correlation between 
children's mood and recall to negative cue words (Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2. Correlations between mood, CS, and AM in children at Time 1. 
CS DAS CTI-C CASQ CNCEQ 
CDI r . 58 
AM 
p . 001 
-. 52 
. 003 
Overgeneral 
-. 38 
. 040 
Specific 
Positive 
-. 64 
. 000 
Negative Positive Negative 
CDI r . 51 . 18 -. 44 -. 15 
p . 004 . 351 . 019 . 433 
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Thus, increased low mood was associated with the retrieval of fewer specific memories to 
positive cue words and greater retrieval of overgeneral memories to positive cue words in 
children (see Figure 5.1) 
Figure 5.1. The Relationship between Positive AM and mood at Time 1. 
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With respect to CS and AM in children, AM recall style was significantly correlated with all 
four CS measures as predicted. These effects were more pronounced for recall to positive 
cues (see Table 5.3). Results showed that as cognitive errors (CNCEQ), dysfunctional 
attitudes (DAS), depressive biases (CTI-C) and negative attributional style (CASQ) 
increased, the frequency of specific positive recall decreased and positive OGM increased. 
Note that high scores on the DAS and low scores on the CNCEQ, CTI-C and CASQ are 
associated with depressive cognition. In summary, results showed that, as hypothesized, 
positive OGM in children was highly correlated with a dysfunctional, negative CS. 
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Table 5.3. Correlations between CS and AM at Time 1. 
AM 
Overgeneral Specific 
CS Positive Negative Positive Negative 
rrrr 
DAS . 56 . 
35 -. 42 -. 16 
p . 00* . 
06 . 02 . 40 
CTI-C -. 59 -. 30 . 63 . 24 
p . 00" . 
10 . 00* . 21 
CASQ -. 44 -. 41 . 52 . 43 
p . 02 . 02* . 00* . 02* 
CNCEQ -. 39 -. 19 . 37 . 20 
p . 03 . 
32 . 04 . 26 
* significant correlations after controlling for mood. 
In addition, it was critical to establish that the relationship between CS and AM was not fully 
explained by mood i. e. that mood was not accounting for the correlation between these two 
important variables. Partial correlations were therefore conducted between CS and AM, 
controlling for mood at Time 1. Once the variance accounted for by mood was removed, the 
CNCEQ no longer significantly correlated with AM. Other significant associations remained 
(see Appendix 5.4). 
Hypothesis 2. OGM will positively correlate with certain CS components at Time 1 
In order to explore the relationship between CS and AM more fully, the subcomponents of 
the CS measures were analysed separately. Three of the four CS measures are derived from 
component scores. The CTI-C is constructed from three components; negative beliefs about 
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self, world and future. The CASQ is composed of several subcomponents, these being; 
internal, stable and global attributions, to both positive and negative events (a total of 6 
components). The CNCEQ comprises 4 elements; catastrophising, personalising, selective 
abstraction and overgeneralisation. The DAS has no subcomponents. The mean data for the 
three CS sub-component scores are shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4. Mean (and standard deviations) for CS Sub-component Scores 
Mean SD 
CS Sub-component 
CTI Self 17.87 (5.26) 
World 16.40 (3.37) 
Future 18.13 (3.84) 
CASQ +ve Internal 2.83 (0.79) 
+ve Stable 2.23 (1.25) 
+ve Global 2.00 (0.91) 
-ve Internal 1.43 (1.01) 
-ve Stable 0.97 (1.07) 
-ve Global 0.73 (0.64) 
CNCEQ Catastrophising 19.13 (4.43) 
Personalising 18.90 (4.60) 
Selective Abstraction 19.93 (4.33) 
Overgeneralisation 18.50 (5.04) 
Subsequently, correlations were investigated between sub-components of the three CS 
measures and AM response categories. See table 5.5 for a summary of the sub-component 
correlational analyses with AM. 
CTI-C. All three sub-components of the CTI-C were significantly correlated with specific and 
overgeneral positive AM recall. Dysfunctional beliefs about self, world and future were 
correlated with positive AM retrieval style in children, such that greater negative beliefs 
about self, world and future were associated with reduced positive AMS. There was no 
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correlation between any of the CTI-C subcomponents and negative AM recall. Thus the 
presence of negative schemata were associated with overgeneral positive recall. 
CASQ. There was a significant correlation between stable positive attributions and AM, such 
that more positive unstable attributions were associated with reduced positive and negative 
AMS. There was also a trend between stable negative attributions and increased overgeneral- 
positive retrieval (p = . 052). Thus, whether a child regarded an event as stable (likely to 
change over time or not) was related to AM retrieval style. Unstable positive and stable 
negative attributions were associated with OGM in children. There was no relationship 
between globalisation and AM or between internalising tendencies and AM in children, as 
demonstrated by this measure. 
CNCEQ. This measure assessed negative cognitive errors in children. There are 4 component 
parts assessing recognized categories of cognitive error associated with depression. Out of 
these 4 subcomponents there was no correlation between children's AM and catastrophizing, 
personalising or selective abstraction. The relationship between CNCEQ and AM in children 
was therefore carried by the significant association between overgeneralising and positive 
OGM. Children, who demonstrated an overgeneralizing tendency with respect to negative 
events, were relatively less likely to recall positive specific events and more likely to recall 
overgenerally to positive cues. There was no correlation between overgeneralising and 
responses to negative cue words for either specific or general recall. 
Therefore the relationship between AM and CS in children is principally a relationship 
between reduced positive AMS and increased negative views (of self, world and future), an 
unstable attributional style for positive events and a negative overgeneralising tendency. For 
a graphical depiction of the significant associative relationships see Appendix 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 Correlations (2-tailed) between AM and Sub-Component CS Scores. 
AM 
Cognitive Style Components 
a) 
a) 
co 
a) 
co CF) a) 
z 
Overgeneral 
Positive Negative 
Specific 
Positive Negative 
-. 49 -. 29 . 50 . 
23 
Self 
. 01 . 13 . 
01 
. 23 
-. 47 -. 24 . 55 . 
09 
World 
. 01 . 
20 . 00 . 
64 
-. 60 -. 26 . 
62 
. 
29 
Future 
. 
00 
. 
17 
. 
00 
. 
13 
-. 25 -. 03 . 
31 
. 
09 
+ve Internal 
. 
18 . 
90 
. 
10 
. 
65 
-. 36 -. 55 . 
38 
. 
35 
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Note: lower CTI-C, CASQ and CNCEQ scores reflect higher depressive cognition. 
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Hypothesis 3. CS and AM will predict depressed mood in children at Time 2 
A series of regressions were conducted to test the hypothesis that CS and AM would predict 
depression symptoms in children at Time 2 during a stressful life event. (For correlations 
between CS, AM and Mood measures at Time 2 see Appendix 5.6). Regression analyses 
were first conducted before controlling for previous mood then secondly when previous 
mood was controlled for (by forcing mood scores at Time 1 in to the first step of a linear 
regression stepwise model). This procedure is consistent with the statistical procedure 
employed by Brewin et. (1999). In addition, due to the recommended ratios of predictor 
variables to participants in regression analyses (Howell, 2002), a series of analyses were 
conducted, rather than entering all variables simultaneously. Unsurprisingly, in all Time 2 
analyses, previous mood at Time 1 was the strongest single predictor of mood at Time 2 
(AdjR2 = . 61, p< . 
001). A summary of the results of the regression analyses is presented in 
Table 5.6. 
CS. The first set of predictor variables were CS measures reflecting the extent of negative 
cognition found in children at baseline. In the presence of a stressor CNCEQ accounted for a 
significant 40% of variance in mood scores and the CTI-C added a significant additional 7% 
to predictive variance in a model of best fit (F(2) = 13.85, AdjR2 = . 47, p< . 001, beta 
CNCEQ = -. 45 1, beta CTI-C = -. 352, significant increment p= . 04 1). When controlling for 
baseline mood, only the CTI-C and the CASQ predicted significant variability in depressed 
mood at follow up (F(3) = 22.66, AdjR2 = . 69, p< . 001). The CDI accounted for 61% of 
variability in Time 2 mood scores, the CTI-C accounted for a further 4% of variability and 
the CASQ a further 4%. 
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AM The second set of predictor variables to be examined were the AMT responses. From 
among the four AM predictors (overgeneral-positive, overgeneral-negative, specific-positive 
and specific-negative), Overgeneral-positive recall was the strongest predictor of mood at 
follow up (F = 9.97, AdjR2 = . 24, p= . 004). Positive overgeneral recall predicted a significant 
24% of variability in mood scores at Time 2. No other AM variable predicted significant 
variance in mood above that of positive overgeneral recall. After controlling for mood at 
baseline however, no AM response category was able to predict mood at Time 2 in children, 
above the variance already predicted by reported mood at Time 1. 
Overall Model. To compare the relative predictive values of CS and AM, a stepwise linear 
regression analysis with mood at Time 2 as the dependent variable, and with CNCEQ, CTI-C, 
Positive OGM (as the strongest CS and AM predictors) was conducted. The CNCEQ was the 
strongest relative predictor, significantly predicting 40% of variability in depressed scores in 
children at an 8-month follow up (F = 20.41, AdjR2 = . 40p <. 001). The addition of the CTI- 
C added a further 7% to the model (R2 change = . 072, p= . 045). Positive overgeneral recall 
did not contribute significant additional predictive value to this model and was therefore 
excluded (beta = . 102, p= . 55, n. s. 
). After controlling for mood at Time 1, only the CTI-C 
added significant predictive ability above that of the predictive value of previous mood (F 
change = 4.43, R2 change = . 053, p= . 045). When this analysis was repeated, replacing the 
CNCEQ with the CASQ (since the CASQ was earlier shown to significantly predict mood 
scores once prior mood was controlled for), the CASQ was again included in a best fit model 
predicting variance alongside the CTI-C and CDI, when previous mood was controlled for, 
F(3) = 22.66, AdjR2 = . 69, p <. 001, R2 change = . 05, p= . 049. 
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Thus, the CNCEQ was the best predictor of Time 2 mood. OGM also predicted 24% of 
variance in mood, but after controlling for mood at Time 1, only the CASQ (attributional 
style) and the CTI-C (negative schema) significantly predicted variance in depressed mood at 
Time 2. 
Table 5.6. Summary of Predictors of Depressed Mood at Time 2: CS and AM 
Significant Before controlling for After controlling for 
Predictors of Mood at Time 1. Adjusted R2 Mood at Time 1. Adjusted R2 
Mood at Time 2. 
CS CNCEQ . 40 -- 
CTI-C . 07 CTI-C . 04 
- - CASQ . 04 
AM + ve OGM . 24 - - 
Overall CNCEQ . 40 - - 
CTI-C . 07 CTI-C . 04 
- - CASQ . 04 
+ve OGM Excluded -- 
Finally, children were asked to answer several feeling state questions at Time 2 in addition to 
the CDI. This was designed to provide a fuller description of children's feelings during the 
life stress. Correlational analyses indicated that many of these individual questions (such as `I 
feel worried') correlated with mood as a composite measure in the form of the CDI (for 
examples see Appendix 5.7). Interestingly, OGM predicted some of the responses to these 
questions even after controlling for previous CDI score. For example, OGM to positive cues 
predicted assenting responses to `When I'm in a bad mood it lasts for a long time' and `I find 
it difficult to control a bad mood'. AMS to positive cues, on the other hand predicted positive 
responses to `How happy are you right now' on a scale of 1-10, again, after controlling for 
previous mood (see Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7. Predictors of Feeling State at Time 2: AM and Mood (Time 1) 
Feeling State Significant 
F df Adj R2 P Summary Relationship 
Question Predictor(s) 
? AMS - happier How happy are you 
+ve AMS 10.50 1 . 25 . 003 during a stressful life on a scale of 1 -10? event 
When I'm in a bad T OGM - more likely to 
mood it lasts for a +ve OGM 4.81 1 . 12 . 037 report an enduring bad 
long time mood 
T CDI and T OGM 
I find it difficult to CDI and 7.53 1 . 31 . 003 more likely to struggle control a bad mood +ve OGM to control a bad mood 
When I am in a good T CDI - less likely to 
mood I allow myself to CDI 8.05 1 . 20 . 008 allow oneself to feel in 
feel that way totally a good mood totally 
T OGM - less likely to I am looking forward +ve OGM 4.55 1 . 11 . 042 be looking forward to to secondary school the new school 
Thus, AM was able to predict responses to certain bespoke feeling state questions even after 
controlling for baseline mood. Furthermore, positive OGM predicted responses to `I am 
looking forward to going to secondary school' on a scale of 1-10. Therefore children 
demonstrating OGM to positive cues endorsed less positive feelings about going to secondary 
school, indicating a possible relationship between positive OGM and children's anticipation 
of future events. The CDI in contrast, did not predict responses to this question. 
5.6. DISCUSSION 
This study was designed to tackle several questions pertaining to children's CS, AM and 
experience of depressed mood. The study aim was to elucidate possible relationships between 
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these variables and to examine the possible predictive value of CS and AM in explaining 
mood in response to a stressful life event (school transition). This study assessed children on 
a range of CS questionnaires and also on a test of AM. No study with either children or adults 
has previously examined this particular theoretically driven combination of measures. 
5.6.1. Association between CS, AM and Mood 
This is the first study to demonstrate a relationship between CS, AM and mood in children. 
Results provide evidence that if children think negatively they are unlikely to remember 
positively. That is, there was a significant correlation between a negative CS in children and 
failure to retrieve specific positive memories. Specifically, if children endorsed negative 
beliefs about self, world and future (on the CTI-C) and if they demonstrated a depressogenic 
attributional style (on the CASQ) then they were less likely to remember positive specific 
memories, independent of their levels of mood. CASQ scores were also significantly related 
to AMS to negative cue words, independent of mood. 
In addition, all negative CS measures and OGM to positive cues were associated with low 
mood in children. A possible account of these data, as put forward in the introduction to this 
chapter, is that children with a negative CS dismiss specific positive events due to cognitive 
dissonance. In other words, positive events are not compatible with negative views of self, 
world, future and are therefore may be remembered less well. This would likely reduce the 
availability of positive information for the future and thereby consolidate negative cognition 
and facilitate negative mood. Though speculative, this account is plausible given our 
understanding of cognition-emotion interactions (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993, Power & 
Dalgleish, 1997, Conway, 2005). 
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5.6.2. Sub-components 
It is also highly important to note the relationship between AM and specific CS components. 
This is the first study to demonstrate a relationship between an overgeneralising tendency 
(consistent with Beck's Cognitive Theory of depression) and the overgeneral AM 
phenomenon associated with depression (van Veerswijk & de Wilde, 2004). OGM has been 
conceived as an avoidant coping strategy (Williams 1996; Hermans et al., 2005) or as 
reflecting deficits in executive function (Dalgleish et al., in press). However, present results 
with children would suggest that another possibility is that the OGM bias originates as part of 
a wider, cross modal `overgeneralising' tendency, typical of depressed cognition. Increased 
overgeneralising errors were associated with increased OGM errors to positive cues in 
children. 
Overgeneralizing is a core characteristic of depression `I always fail things', `People always 
let you down'. This will inevitably have implications for event encoding i. e. specific events 
becoming merged under `overgeneral' labels. Hence overgeneral memories may be very 
easily retrieved and map closely onto depressive overgeneral memory tags such as `lonely', 
`sad' or `happy'. As indicated, this relationship was specifically a relationship between 
overgeneralising and overgeneral positive recall. However, the relationship between CNCEQ 
and AM disappeared once initial mood was partialled out. These two findings strongly 
suggest that the relationship between overgeneralising and overgeneral positive recall may be 
highly mood related. 
The positive OGM bias was also specifically associated with the `stability' component of the 
CASQ i. e. in viewing events as more or less likely to change over time. An unstable positive 
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attributional style (viewing positive events as temporary and likely to change) was associated 
with failure to retrieve specific positive memories in children. Again, if children view 
positive events as unstable, unreliable, or unpredictable they may be unlikely to commit these 
events to memory. It may be that fewer resources are allocated to events that are considered 
random compared to events that are considered stable in childhood. There are clear 
implications here for a dynamic between attributions regarding events and memory in 
childhood. If these results are found to be reliable, this unstable positive attribution error, 
alongside an overgeneralising tendency, could be targeted for cognitive intervention. 
There was no relationship between AM and globalising or internalising in this study. It may 
be that these cognitive errors are less relevant to children. In support of this view, Joiner and 
Wagner (1995), in a meta-analytical review of the CASQ in children, demonstrated that while 
findings for the two dimensions internalising and globalising were equivocal, the stability 
dimension was reliably correlated with depression in children. Interestingly there was also no 
consistent evidence of a link between CS and negative recall in the present study. It may be 
that in early-mid childhood biased processing originates with positive information processing 
and only encompasses negative information processing later in development or following 
greater severity in negative mood, indeed possibly as a long-term consequence of poor 
processing/assimilation of positive information. This is consistent with evidence from Studies 
1 and 2. Further evidence to support this hypothesis comes from Nandrino, Dodin, Martin & 
Henniaux (2004) whereby first episode depression was associated with problems with 
positive information processing. Subsequent depressive episodes were associated with 
negative-information processing biases in addition to the positive. Moreover, in remission, 
the negative bias remitted, but the positive-information bias remained. 
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5.6.3. Predicting Symptoms of Depression 
The final aim of this study was to investigate the importance of CS and AM in predicting 
depressed symptoms during a stressful life event. Unlike cross-sectional analyses, assessing 
predictors of depression allows some determination of temporal precedence in non- 
experimental, longitudinal designs. All children deemed the change of schools (or the 
anticipation of the new school) stressful. Before controlling for Time 2 mood and apart from 
prior mood, the CNCEQ was the best CS predictor of depressive symptoms at Time 2. This 
questionnaire uses hypothetical vignettes and tackles cognitive errors in domain specific 
areas such as academia or sports performance, which are directly relevant to a child's life. 
This may explain the stronger effects for this measure. However when controlling for mood 
this measure did not predict further variability in mood, suggesting that it overlaps 
significantly with the CDI measure. 
To precis the other CS measures; the DAS asks mainly relational questions e. g. `people like 
me because x' and was not predictive of depression. The CASQ is a comparatively difficult 
questionnaire due to the fact that the response options are quite closely related and require 
significant thought to pull apart the abstract distinctions, such as `I get an A on a test because 
I am smart or because the test was easy'. This measure proved to be a significant predictor of 
mood even after controlling for previous mood, suggesting that causal attributional style is 
tapping something distinct from the CDI. Finally, the CTI-C is a very direct questionnaire i. e. 
`no-one likes me'. The reason this may have emerged as a significant predictor at time 2, 
during a stressful life event, may be because more extreme thinking occurs during stressful 
experiences, or because it is very similar in content but more extensive than the statements 
asked in the CDI. Of the CS measures both the CASQ and the CTI-C predicted Time 2 mood 
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and in both cases these relationships remained significant, once Time 1 mood was partialled 
out. This suggests that depressive attributional style and a wide-reaching negative belief 
system help to independently drive mood state during times of stress. 
Out of the AM predictors overgeneral positive recall was the strongest predictor of Time 2 
mood, consistent with the adult literature (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Dalgleish et al., 2001). 
However, relative to the CS measures and after controlling for previous mood, AM was not 
able to significantly contribute additional predictive power in line with Brewin et al, 1999. 
Though the two facets of cognition were associated, AM recall appeared to be a less useful 
predictor of mood than negative CS in children. It could be that memory recall is less central 
to mood processes than cognitive attitudes. For instance, in another longitudinal study, 
Dalgleish et al. (2004) found a correlation between attributional style, negative word 
endorsement and depressed mood in patients with SAD. There was however no correlation 
between word-recall and mood. Is this further evidence demonstrative of a more removed 
relationship between mood and memory compared to mood and CS? Or could some other 
individual difference variable mediate the relationship between mood and memory, such as 
rumination? Alternatively memory may simply be less well measured. For instance, cognitive 
attributional style questionnaires assess various domains of dysfunctional thought, while the 
AMT measures only one aspect of memory functioning- its specificity. An advanced AMT 
could perhaps be developed whereby facets in addition to specificity are coded. For example, 
latency, recency versus remoteness of memory, detail, richness, diversity/recurrence of 
personal themes could all be considered. This might offer a fuller measure of `memory style', 
equitable to that found in CS measures. 
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This null finding for OGM may also be because the effects of a stressor in school children are 
not sufficiently profound so as to relate to AM style. Alternatively, the very fact that a 
diathesis-stress design was used at all may have washed out any effects (previous studies 
have looked at mood at Time 2, without an identifiable stressor). Alternatively, the CDI may 
not be sufficiently sensitive as to pick up any longitudinal associations with AM. As noted in 
the Introduction, studies using the BDI in adults to index Time 2 mood have not detected 
longitudinal AM effects. This interpretation is given further weight by the finding that certain 
bespoke feeling questions presented to children at Time 2 were able to reveal independent 
relationships with prior AM style. 
5.6.4. When controlling for Previous Mood 
The CDI alone predicted 62% of variability in depressed symptoms at time 2. Though 
important in terms of confirming the stability of depressed symptoms in childhood. To say 
depressed mood predicts depressed mood tell us nothing of the underlying mechanisms at 
work. Hence, although the CDI best predicted mood (consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema et al, 
1992), it is important to look at which variables predicted mood irrespective of previous 
mood in order to gain insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. In this respect, it 
appears that negative overgeneralising errors (in child specific domains such as academia) 
and positive overgeneral recall, as well as an unstable attributional style for positive events 
and negative schemas are all prime candidates for intervention. When controlling for 
previous mood only the CTI-C and CASQ predicted mood at follow up. This suggests that 
only these measures are tapping something discrete from the symptoms of depression. For 
example, `attributional style' is not captured by any of the CDI items. 
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5.6.5. Other Mood related Feeling State Questions 
Moreover a tenuous but nevertheless intriguing finding was that positive OGM at Time 1 
predicted responses to statements regarding mood control (e. g. `I find it difficult to control a 
bad mood' and `when I'm in a bad mood it lasts for a long time'). This effect remained even 
after controlling for initial mood. Thus, children's statements endorsing failure to improve a 
bad mood and the enduring quality of their bad mood, was predicted by information 
regarding overgeneral positive memory gathered 8 months previously. Is this evidence in 
support of the potential mood regulating importance of specific positive recall? For example, 
Joorman & Siemer (2004) found evidence that non-depressed persons used specific positive 
recall to repair a bad mood whereas depressed individuals failed to do so. Similarly, present 
results show that reduced positive AMS predicted self-reported poor negative mood repair in 
children. 
5.6.6. Valence 
Moreover, a consistent valence specific pattern was found throughout the results of this 
study. All associative relationships were stronger for positive (as opposed to negative) recall, 
so that reduced positive AMS was associated with negative cognition. Also, only children's 
recall of positive memories was significant in terms of predicting depressive mood. The 
relationship between positive OGM and low mood found in children, mirrors that often found 
in depressed adults (e. g. Brittlebank, et al., 1993; Dalgleish et al., 2001; Puffet, et al., 1991; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The result is also consistent with the results from Study 1 
whereby dysphoric children, irrespective of age, demonstrated OGM to positive cues. In 
Study 2 the effects of clinical depression were found for both positive and negative recall. 
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This suggests a possible central role for biases in positive information processing in the 
psychopathological aetiology of depression. 
5.6.7. Research Implications 
One of the immediate practical implications of this work is that children who fail to disclose a 
possibly serious negative and pervasive mood could be highlighted through performance on 
cognitive measures. If strong correlations are found between certain cognitive measures and 
mood, the cognitive measures may offer better insight into the underlying mechanisms 
contributing to a depressed mood. Also, this work helps to locate vulnerable children, i. e. 
those who demonstrate negative self-beliefs and (long term-) dysfunctional OGM styles, but 
who do not report depressed mood. These may be `vulnerable' children who in the course of 
life stress, may go on to develop depression. This is particularly salient given national 
government and local education authority investments in the UK, for example, into schemes 
such as `Positive People' designed to intervene to teach psycho-emotional-social skills to 
vulnerable children. At present, children demonstrating `bad behaviour' are selected for such 
in-house schemes. Given that depression in youth is often insidious and does not always 
manifest itself outwardly (e. g. Mash & Wolfe, 2005) a cognitive battery approach to target 
relevant children may prove more useful. 
5.6.8. Caveats and Limitations 
One limitation of the present study concerns the small numbers. Greater numbers would 
allow stronger conclusions to be drawn regarding the roles of the predictor variables. Another 
issue is the measurement of mood in children. Few scales are available for use with children, 
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which provide a good range of depressed mood scores (Pavuluri & Birmaher, 2004). This is 
an issue, which, though difficult, if resolved would vastly improve research potential in this 
area. A number of questions regarding feeling state were asked of children at Time 2, in 
addition to the CDI. A simple question of `how sad are you on a scale of 1-10' correlated 
highly with the composite CDI score. Developing better means of assessing mood in children 
is crucial if steps are going to be taken to investigate influences (cognitive or otherwise) on 
children's mood and subsequent development of psychopathology. Also, Dalgleish et al. 
(2001) concluded that "the exact measure used to assess levels of depressive symptomology 
may be crucial" in terms of assessing the predictive value of OGM. The possibility that 
alternative depression measures may be more appropriate for demonstrating the predictive 
quality of OGM in children is still to be tested. 
Moreover, school transition, though potentially highly stressful for any child, is a complex 
stressor in the sense that mixed feelings seem to be evoked as demonstrated by responses to 
feeling state questions, which showed some children to be excited, apprehensive and sad. 
Less complex stressors should perhaps be pursued in future, which do not generate mixed 
feeling states but are more exclusively negative. However, it is difficult to find a measurable, 
predictable stress in childhood that potentially affects all children, irrespective of individual 
vulnerability. In order to deal with this problem, therefore, school stressors could be 
continued to be pursued, but with significantly increased numbers, so as to separate groups 
into those who only find the event stressful and those who also have mixed or positive 
feelings about the life event. This should produce stronger data. In addition, future 
longitudinal studies in clinical child groups would be important. 
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5.7. In Conclusion 
It is possible to predict emotional responses to a stressful life event in children from prior 
information regarding CS and AM recall style gathered 8 months previously. There is some 
support for the prediction for instance, that children who overgeneralize negative events and 
explain positive events by causes that are unstable are more likely to feel depressed during a 
stressful life event. There was also an association between these specific negative CS 
components and OGM in children. OGM had no predictive power once prior mood was 
controlled for, whereas CS still managed to predict additional variance in depressive mood. It 
is unclear what implications exist here in terms of the mechanisms through which AM affects 
mood. Further studies are needed to establish whether CS is more central to mood than 
memory style, or whether these effects are measure-specific. Work could also be developed 
looking at specific cognitive interventions tackling specific areas such as poor specific 
positive recall. If confirmed by future prospective studies, these valence findings suggest that 
primary prevention efforts could best be aimed, not at reducing negative information 
processing biases, but at building positive information processing, in children. 
The final AM study in this thesis shifts the focus to the effects of trauma on AM style in 
children, independent of depressed mood (Study 5). This study also seeks to examine 
relationships between AM and other experimental and non-questionnaire measures of 
negative cognitive functioning. For this reason, the study reported in the next chapter (Study 
4) represents a diversion from the series of AM studies, as it reports an attempt to validate 
another experimental measure of affective processing in young children which, along with 
the EF measure validated in Study 1, is used in Study 5 to give a broader index of affect- 
related processing in children. 
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Chapter 61 Study 41 The Effects of Age and Dysphoria on Labelling of Facial 
Emotion 
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Abstract 61 Perception of facial information is one way in which cognition can be biased in 
adult depression. However there is less evidence concerning how depressed mood may 
influence children's processing of facial-affect. In this chapter, empirical evidence concerning 
the existence of biases in the processing of facial emotion in children and young adults is 
presented. Sixty-seven children (aged 6-11) and 33 young adults (aged 17-22) were asked to 
label the emotion in a series of 62 previously rated adult faces displaying happy, sad and 
neutral affect. Analyses focused on the effects of age and depressive symptoms on the correct 
identification of facial emotion. Both age and dysphoria were positively correlated with 
correct labelling of sad faces. Results are discussed in terms of the development of 
depression-related information processing biases. 
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6.1. Introduction 
A characteristic of the research on OGM is that, to date, the effect has rarely been studied in 
the context of other information-processing biases associated with depression. As noted, in 
the General Introduction, depression can be characterized by the selective processing of 
negative stimuli. To what extent, therefore, does memory overgenerality relate to such 
negative biases? The current study reports the validation of an experimental task to examine 
biases in the processing of facial affect in children and its relationship to dysphoric mood. 
This is an important issue in its own right, as to date there have been no studies of the effects 
of naturally occurring mood on facial emotion processing in children. However, the broader 
aim is to validate a methodology for examining biases associated with emotion processing in 
dysphoric children for use in the final study of the thesis (Study 5) which will, amongst other 
things, examine the relationship between biased processing of facial emotion, OGM, and level 
of emotion focusing in a sample of children in residential care (Chapter 7). 
6.1.1. Why a New Paradigm? 
Rather than validate a new task, an alternative would have been to utilize an existing 
experimental paradigm that examines negative bias from the child depression literature. 
However, as noted in the General Introduction, few experimental studies exist and several of 
those seeking to validate standard adult methodologies such as the emotional stroop paradigm 
(Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule & Dalgleish, 1997) and the dot-probe task (Neshat- 
Doost, Moradi, Taghavi, Yule & Dalgleish, 2000) have generated non-significant results with 
respect to depression in children. Those studies, which have generated significant data have 
generally used memory tasks (e. g. Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule & Dalgleish, 1998). 
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There is some evidence from non-memorial tasks that (as with adults) underlying alterations 
may exist associated with the processing of and allocation of resources towards negative 
emotional information in paediatric depression. For example, depressed children were 
distracted by negative emotional stimuli (whereas controls were distracted by positive 
emotional stimuli) in keeping with adult depressed literature, in a selective attention task (e. g. 
Ladouceur, Dahl, Williamson, Birmaher, Ryan & Casey, 2005). Similarly, Bishop, Dalgleish 
& Yule (2004) found high-depressed children showed enhanced recall of sad emotional 
stories, relative to positive stories, compared to a low-depressed group. Thus, when child- 
oriented materials are used, depression-related biases towards negative information may be 
observable even in a non-clinical sample of children. However, most studies of the 
relationship between mood and cognition have used word paradigms to convey emotional 
content, in both children (Neshat-Doost et al., 1998; Bishop et al., 2004) and adults (e. g. 
Williams, Watts, Mathews & MacLeod, 1997; Bradley, Mogg, Millar & White, 1995). 
The aim here therefore, was to find a child friendly task that was clearly different from the 
AMT but would also highlight possible biases associated with the processing of affective 
stimuli. We therefore decided to seek to validate a facial-affect processing task due to the use 
of faces for work in children and due to the promising results using such methodologies in 
depressed adults. In the following sections, the literature concerning facial affect processing is 
briefly reviewed, before developing the specific hypotheses involved in validating the face- 
emotion recognition task in children. 
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6.1.2. Why Faces? 
Faces can depict a range of emotions without recourse to verbal cues. This is important when 
testing children with low reading abilities. Facial stimuli are also ubiquitous, salient social 
stimuli relevant across all age ranges and cultures. Facial emotions are used as social tools to 
negotiate social encounters and do not just occur randomly but are more often directed at an 
audience (Fridlund, 1994). Moreover, the ability to decode facial expression is an important 
component of social interaction because of the significant role of accurate facial processing in 
the appropriate modification of social behaviours (Philippot & Feldman, 1990). With more 
than 50 different facial movements, the face offers a great diversity in social or interpersonal 
signals. Recognition of these facial signals "represents the early utilization of social cues on 
which subsequent interpretations and behavioural responses will depend" (Pollak, Cicchetti, 
Hornung & Reed, 2000; see also Herba & Phillips, 2004) Moreover, misinterpretation of 
facial signals may be of interest, especially when examining potential mood biasing effects or 
emotion avoidance tendencies. 
Finally faces may induce a different type of processing compared to verbal stimuli. According 
to the ICS framework of Teasdale & Barnard (1993), processing of hot cognitions in 
depression involves the implicational meaning subsystem whereas cold processing is more 
likely to involve the propositional meaning subsystem. Affective faces may be more likely to 
invoke an implicational type of processing because they are rich in sensory/ proprioceptive 
properties, a key component in arousing hot cognition. Indeed, the importance of examining 
facial affect processing and depression in adults has already been recognized. This work is 
now reviewed. 
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6.1.3. Adult Depression and Facial Affect Processing 
In adults, depression is associated with recognition -errors across a range of facial expressions 
(Persad & Polivy, 1993). Depressed adults make more `neutral as sad' type errors (Mandal & 
Bhattacharya, 1985) and, compared to non-depressed controls, also show subtle deficits in the 
correct identification of facial happiness (Surguladze, Young, Senior, Brebion, Travis & 
Phillips, 2004). Depressed adults have also been shown to rate emotional expressions as more 
sad on a sadness scale, compared to non-depressed adults (George, Huggins, McDermut, 
Parekh, Rubinow & Post, 1998; Gur, Erwin, Gur, Zwil, Heimer & Kramer, 1992). 
There is also evidence that depression in adults is associated with heightened attention to 
negative facial emotion. Studies using faces in a dot probe task have found evidence of 
decreased attention to happy faces in dysphoric adults (Bradley, Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 
1998) and of selective attention towards sad faces in adults with major depressive disorder 
(Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Neubauer & Joorman, 2004). Dysphoric adults showed `even handed' 
allocation of attention to angry faces in a dot probe task, using faces (Bradley, Mogg & 
Millar, 1997). However out of 15 depressed adults, 13 had co-morbid general anxiety disorder 
(GAD) in this study. Mogg, Millar & Bradley (2000) repeated this study in a carefully 
diagnosed sample of MDD adults (with no co-morbid anxiety). Depressed adults, in this 
study, demonstrated greater vigilance for sad faces compared to controls, i. e. they were 
relatively faster to detect dot probes when they appeared in the same location as a sad face. 
This is evidence consistent with a depressive bias, in favour of preferential processing of 
negative facial information relative to controls. A convincing body of evidence is therefore 
emerging to suggest depression in adults is associated with biases in processing of facial 
affect. 
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6.1.4. Developmental Face Studies in Early Childhood 
Despite the work in adults, surprisingly little work has been replicated in children. Much of 
the literature has focused on examining how normal (non-depressed) children can recognize 
different emotions portrayed in faces, particularly in infant and pre-school periods. These 
studies show that even infants are able to discriminate between different facial expressions 
(for a review see Nelson & de Haan, 1997). However, infant methodologies rely on 
habituation and preference as the index of recognition and therefore may be measuring a 
different underlying construct to that investigated in adults. Thereafter, in preschool studies, 
children as young as 3 years demonstrate ability to correctly label emotion in faces 
(Ridgeway, 1985). In fact a number of studies have examined the onset of children's ability to 
identify facial emotion in pre-school years (Pollack, Cicchetti, Hornung & Reed, 2000; 
Vicari, 2000; McClure, 2000). 
The precise developmental trajectory regarding children's improved ability to recognise 
emotion, however, is less well understood, as few studies have looked at age and the 
processing of facial affect systematically across a broad age range. The few studies, which 
have, have not found consistent patterns. Kolb, Wilson & Taylor (1992) found that the 
development of emotion facial emotion recognition was static between the ages of 6-9 and 
only subsequently improved. Gosselin & Laroque (2000) found increases in the ability to 
label facial expressions between the age groups 5-6 and 7-8 but not significant improvement 
thereafter. In contrast, MacDonald, Kirkpatrick & Sulivan (1996) found yearly increases in 
facial expression recognition ability between the ages of 3 and 6 years. 
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Therefore, there is evidence to suggest that ability to recognize discrete facial emotions does 
improve across age, (typically with recognition of happiness occurring first, followed by 
sadness or anger, and with identification of neutral faces remaining poor in early childhood; 
Gross & Ballif, 1991). However, no consistent age-related pattern is found across studies. 
This is possibly as a result of methodological inconsistencies. For example, some studies use 
verbal recognition of the stimulus images whilst others use stimulus matching to an 
appropriate word card, which is read aloud. Also, no consistent facial stimuli are used and 
varied skills are required, such as verbal, visuo-spatial, cognitive or attentional, which could 
affect results. 
6.1.5. Performance of Children and Adults on the same task 
Moreover, to my knowledge, only one study has directly examined the ability of children to 
process facial emotion, relative to adults, on the same task. From a visual science perspective, 
by De. Sonnerville et al (2002) tested children across a good age range (7-10 years) and in 
comparison with adults. Adults were faster and more accurate than children on a range of face 
discrimination tasks, especially for negative expressions. Speed of processing of negative 
faces improved with age. This valence specific effect is interesting and may offer clues in 
terms of understanding the development of depressive biases. For example, do normal 
children typically demonstrate poor interpretation of negative facial affect, relative to positive 
in others, and would the same apply to dysphoric children? To develop this work further 
information regarding the type of errors of interpretation would be of use, as would a 
consideration of ambiguous stimuli and mood. 
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6.1.6. Facial-Affect Processing in Depressed Children 
To our knowledge no study has examined naturally occurring mood effects on the 
performance of children on a task of facial emotion recognition. One study however examined 
effects of induced mood and processing of facial affect information in children. Terwogt, 
Kraemer & Stegge (1991) induced mood in 6 year olds using a mental imagery procedure. 
Children completed three face tasks (a preference task; a labelling task; and a recall task). The 
main results indicated that all children showed a preference for happy faces. Happy-induced 
children labelled ambiguous faces as happy and sad-induced children recalled fewer faces 
overall, though this was not valence specific. Thus, some evidence of mood congruency in 
children was demonstrated in that happy-mood induced children rated ambiguous faces as 
happy. However, this effect did not extend to sad-induced children. A proviso regarding this 
study is that a non-validated mood induction procedure was used. Terminology such as 
`which face looks nicest to you' also makes it difficult to know what exact criteria the 
children were using to judge the faces (e. g. were children judging niceness based on hair 
styles or facial affect? ) Moreover, while all faces were judged `ambiguous' by the authors, 
there is no explanation as to how this ambiguity was defined or established. Mixed stimuli 
were also used and ranged from drawings with `irrelevant features' to photographs, which 
may be problematic in terms of restricting conclusions that can be drawn regarding the 
specific effects of face valence. For example, I believe some drawings included individuals 
wearing `funny hats'. Nevertheless, this study is the first to provide useful evidence that mood 
can effect children's processing of facial affect. 
6.1.7. Interpretation of Ambiguous Stimuli in Depression 
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Another important issue to consider when using facial stimuli and one central to the 
examination of face processing in this thesis is the idea of ambiguity. For example, negative 
interpretations of ambiguous faces are predictive of relapse and episode persistence in 
depressed adults, (Bouhuys, Geerts & Gordijn, 1999; Bouhuys, Geerts, Mersch & Jenner, 
1996; Hale, 1998). Geerts & Bouhuys, (1998) found negatively biased interpretations of 
ambiguous faces were associated with depression, persistent after 6 weeks. The same index 
predicted relapse at 6 months (Bouhuys, Geerts & Gordlin, 1999). This bias was associated 
with relapse even after controlling for type of depression, severity of depression at baseline 
and residual symptoms at remission. Authors suggest a fundamental cognitive bias in the 
processing of nonverbal ambiguous interpersonal stimuli in depression. 
Adult studies of interpretation of ambiguous non-facial stimuli and depression, though 
informative and interesting, remain disparate. Some findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that depression is associated with a negative interpretative bias (e. g.. Butler & 
Matthews, 1983) where as other studies have failed to find such a bias (e. g. Lawson & 
MacLeod, 1999). Differences may be related to the level of mood examined. For example, 
low-positive affect was related to neutral interpretations and high-positive affect was related 
to positive interpretation of ambiguous sentences in adults (Pury, 2004). Though use of 
ambiguous emotional stimuli to assess depressive biases is underused, neutral facial emotion 
may act as useful ambiguous emotional stimuli for the purposes of testing theories of 
depressive biases. 
Based on these adult findings, one might also predict that dysphoric/depressed children would 
interpret ambiguous emotion stimuli, including faces, in a mood-congruent manner. However, 
to date, there have been few studies of such issues, and none examining facial processing. 
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Dineen & Hadwin (2004) investigated judgements of intention in ambiguous scenarios (in 
reference to either self or other) in anxious and depressed children aged 7-9. Consistent with 
cognitive theories of depression and with adult data, levels of depression in children predicted 
increased negative interpretations for `self' but not `other'. Similarly, Hadwin, Frost, French 
& Richards (1997) tested trait anxiety in children and interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, 
using a pictorial homophone task. Interpretations were significantly related to level of anxiety, 
i. e. anxiety resulting in more threatening interpretations. However this study did not look at 
depression. Likewise, Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule & Dalgleish (2000) examined the 
processing of homographs in children with general anxiety disorder. These are the only three 
studies known to have used ambiguous stimuli to assess negative bias in mood disorders, in 
children. 
6.1.8. Impact of Negative-Information Processing 
Finally, in order to highlight the potential affective significance of negative-information 
processing it is worth drawing attention to a fascinating and elegant experimental study by 
MacCleod, Rutherfords, Campbell, Ebsworthy & Holker (2002). In this study selective 
attention to emotional stimuli was manipulated in adults, using a modified dot probe task. 
Induced attentional bias towards negative stimuli resulted in emotional vulnerability. 
Emotional vulnerability was defined as increased self-reported negative mood ratings on 
anxiety and depression scales. Those trained to attend to negative probes (i. e. where targets 
were always in negative word location) demonstrated higher post-stress negative mood 
scores. It is particularly important that the attentional training procedure did not exert an 
effect on mood state per se. That is, immediately prior to an anagram stress task mood state 
was equivalent across the two groups. Differential mood effects were only found after a 
stressor. Thus attentional biases seem to impact emotional vulnerability rather than mood per 
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se. To a similar degree, individuals who were trained to avoid negative information showed 
reduced emotional vulnerability after the stressful anagram task. In fact, the extent to which 
individuals learned to avoid negative information was precisely correlated with their 
emotional reactions- those who better learnt to avoid negative information were less stressed. 
This has clear implications for the potential interaction between processing of negative 
information (such as sadness in faces) and subsequent vulnerability to depressed mood. 
6.2. Study Rationale 
Though there is clearly separate evidence to suggest that both age and mood affect children's 
processing of emotional material as already noted, to my knowledge there is no literature 
specifically examining information processing biases for emotionally valenced facial material 
in naturally occurring depressed or dysphoric children. Moreover, strong conclusions about 
the effects of children's age on their ability to recognise facial emotion is also constrained by 
methodological inconsistencies across studies. More importantly, for the present purposes, 
effects of mood have also not been considered. Most studies concentrate on accuracy. In 
testing depression related biases, however, we are also interested in the nature of inaccuracies 
i. e. the nature of errors and aberrant patterns associated with depressed mood in childhood. 
Given the existence of adult biases in processing of facial affect associated with adult 
depression and given experimental evidence that attention to negative stimuli may induce 
emotional vulnerability in otherwise healthy individuals, it is important to study potential 
biases in the processing of facial emotion in children. Several specific predictions regarding 
children's mood related processing of facial emotion were therefore generated 
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6.3. Hypotheses 
1. Children will be able to categorize emotional facial expression appropriately. 
2. Accuracy of face categorization will improve with age 
3. Dysphoria will be associated with a) greater accuracy in identifying facial expressions 
of sadness; and b) a more marked tendency to label neutral emotional expressions as 
sad. In contrast non-dysphoric children are expected to rate more happy faces as happy 
and more neutral faces as happy in a mood congruent manner. 
4. Dysphoria will account for a significant proportion of the variance in children's 
labelling of emotion, independent of any effects of age. 
6.4. METHOD 
6.4.1. Participants 
There were 100 participants in this study (67 children and 33 adults). The children were aged 
between 6-11 years and were recruited from 3 age groups (6-7 years, 8-9 years, 10-11 years). 
This was felt to offer a broad age range without tackling adolescent populations. During pilot 
testing it was felt children younger than 6 struggled to concentrate on the task. Age six was 
therefore taken as the starting point increasing in increments until age 11. Overall there were 
29 boys (43%) and 38 girls (57%). Children were excluded if they were known to have 
special educational needs such as autism, which would potentially interfere with their 
performance on the task. A young adult comparison group was also tested to make direct 
comparison with adult research possible and to verify adult ratings of the face stimuli. Thirty- 
three young adults were tested, aged between 17-22 years. These were volunteer 
undergraduate students, 52% male, 48% female. (Table 6.1) 
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Table 6.1. Age and Gender of the Child and Adult Samples 
Age (yrs) (n) Female: Male (%) 
Child 6-7 25 56: 44 
8-9 19 42: 58 
10-11 23 70: 30 
Adult 17-22 33 48: 52 
Total 6-22 100 54: 48 
6.4.2. Materials and Measures 
Facial Emotion Recognition Task. A total of 62 grey scale photographic images of headshots 
of male and female adults showing happy, sad and neutral affect, were presented to children 
as a paper and pencil task. The photographs were arranged in groups of 4 per page in a 
booklet format. The presentation of faces was randomised for gender and expression. The 
stimuli in this study were drawn from Le Gal & Bruce (1999). See Appendix 6.1 for example 
faces. The faces were previously rated for emotion by a group of 100 adults and each face had 
achieved over 75% subjective-rater agreement as to the emotion being portrayed (Le Gal & 
Bruce, 1999). Correct identification of emotion was defined as labelling the emotion of the 
face consistent with this previous inter-rater agreement. The standard Ekman & Friesen 
(1987) face set was not used in this study because insufficient individuals were available 
(n=10) portraying the different facial emotions. The current stimuli set offers a wide range of 
individuals exhibiting the facial emotions of interest. This was deemed important in reducing 
the likelihood of results being explained in terms of facial distinctiveness. Happy, sad and 
neutral faces were used as those considered most relevant to assessing depression relevant 
biases given previous research in adults. Neutral faces reflected faces not rated as one emotion 
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or another, i. e. they do not conform to any distinct emotional characteristic or type and are 
therefore considered ambiguous. Including a greater range of emotions (e. g. anger and fear) 
would have allowed an investigation of `positive' and `negative' valence effects, which would 
have been ideal. However, this would have resulted in a significantly larger stimulus set and 
with already 62 faces for children to rate, this was deemed impractical. 
Photographs were labelled through use of a schematic labelling tool. Schematic drawings of 5 
faces were in place below each photograph (see Appendix 6.2). Schematic faces were used to 
circumvent the problem of using verbal cues (a potential limitation of testing young children). 
Schematic faces made the task more child-friendly. These schematic faces were adapted from 
Wong & Whaley (1986) and consisted of a simple line drawing of a face with a highly 
schematised mouth. The schematic faces represented "very happy", "quite happy", "neutral", 
"quite sad" and "very sad" facial expressions. As no differential effects were found for `quite 
happy-very happy' or `quite sad-very sad', a collapsed scoring scale was therefore used, 
whereby quite happy and very happy were collapsed into the category `happy' and quite sad 
and very sad were collapsed to form the category `sad'. 
Emotional face labelling tasks can vary in the type or depth of processing required. The 
current face task was designed to minimize the involvement of unnecessary visuo-processing 
skills that might impose cognitive and memory loads on the participant. The task was also 
designed to limit time/attention requirements and to be engaging for young children. These 
methodological decisions were made to make the task equitable across the widest possible age 
range. The task was also designed to be of use in examining biases in interpretation of an 
ecologically valid emotional stimuli. Specific task instructions can be found in Appendix 6.3. 
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Validity of Schematic Face Labelling Tool: In order to test participants' identification of 
emotion as denoted in the schematic face-labelling tool and to confirm participants' 
comprehension of the task, a simple preliminary task was included. The schematic scale was 
presented to participants and they were asked to verbalize what they thought was being 
represented in each face from left to right (very happy through to very sad). Correct labelling, 
correct labelling with prompts, and incorrect labelling responses were recorded. No 
participant incorrectly labelled or failed to label the faces. 
Of the 67 children, 56 immediately correctly labelled the schematic faces. Eleven of the 
children tested needed to be prompted. Of the 11 children who did not spontaneously label the 
emotions, all the children still labelled along positive and negative dimensions for instance 
`pleased' through to `worried' but did not use specific reference to happiness and sadness. Of 
the 11 children who did not spontaneously label the faces on a happiness-sadness dimension, 
8 were from the youngest age group aged 6-7, and 3 were from the older group aged 8-9. Of 
this group of children, 7 were female and 4 were male. A subsequent analysis of correct 
labelling of faces showed there were no significant differences between children who had 
(n=11) and those who had not (n=56) required prompting; (F(1,66) = 0.1, p= . 75). All 
participant responses were therefore included in the analyses. 
Measurement of Depression. As in Studies 1,2, and 3, the CDI was used to assess depression 
in children. An a priori decision was made to also use this instrument with young adult 
participants to ensure comparability of results, since this measure is designed for use with 7- 
17 year olds (Kovacs, 1992). However, preliminary analyses revealed non-significant results 
for effects of dysphoria on facial emotion identification in young adults. This could be 
because depression was not well measured in this young adult group using the CDI. For the 
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purposes of all statistical analyses regarding the effects of dysphoria on processing, adult data 
were therefore excluded. This issue is discussed further in the final section. 
6.4.3. Procedure 
The participants were first asked to complete the facial-emotion task. The participants were 
instructed to label the photographs of individual faces by circling the relevant schematic 
drawing underneath. The task was completed on an individual basis with each participant. 
The participants were told there were no time constraints and no right or wrong answers, but 
that it was their opinion of each face that was important. Each participant was then asked to 
complete the CDI. 
6.5. RESULTS 
One sample t-tests were used to examine the first hypothesis that children's labelling of each 
emotion would be greater than chance. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine 
whether correct recognition of emotion varied as a function of emotion category, and the 
effects of age on accurate recognition. To test the third hypothesis, that mood influences 
labelling of emotion, non-parametric tests were used as the data were not normally distributed 
due to small sample sizes. Finally, a multiple regression analysis was used to compare the 
relative contributions of age and dysphoria in explaining variance in face labelling. 
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Hypothesis 1: Children will correctly label Facial Emotion above chance 
To test the hypothesis that children would accurately label facial emotion as denoted in the 
methodology of this study three one sample t-tests were carried out on correct responses to 
happy, neutral and sad faces. Correct labelling of facial emotion was above chance for all 
three face-types (children correctly labelled 96% of Happy faces, 1(66) = 55.12, p <. 001; 64% 
of Neutral faces, t(66) = 18.02, p< . 001; and 51% of Sad faces, t(66) = 4.37, p< . 001) such 
that children were able to correctly discriminate facial emotion using the current paradigm. 
Next, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on correct labelling of facial emotion with Face- 
type (happy, neutral and sad) as the within-subjects factor to examine differences in accuracy 
across face-type. There was a significant effect of Face-type on children's labelling of 
emotion (F(2,92) = 100.37, p< . 001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Paired t-tests revealed 
that children rated significantly more happy faces correct than sad (p < . 001) and neutral faces 
(p < . 001) and significantly more neutral 
faces correct than sad faces (p = . 003). Children's 
rating of face-type (with adult controls as a point of comparison) is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1. Children's Overall Correct Rating of Face-type relative to Adults' 
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Hypothesis 2: There will be an effect of Age on identification of facial emotion. 
In order to examine the precise effects of Age and Face-type on labelling of emotion a4x3 
ANOVA was conducted on correct labelling involving Age-group (6-7,8-9,10-11 and 17- 
22, ) and Face-type (happy, sad and neutral). Results showed a significant main effect of Age- 
group (F(3,96) = 12.94, p <. 001), a significant main effect of Face-type (F(1,136) = 134.34, 
p< . 001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) and an Age-group by Face-type interaction (F(4, 
136) = 2.75, p= . 001, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). 
Figure 6.2. Effects of Age and Face-type on Correct Labelling of Facial Affect 
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Post hoc analysis confirmed that the Age-group by Face-type interaction was attributable to 
adults making significantly fewer sad errors compared to children in all age categories (adult 
vs. children 6-7; t(56) = 5.0 1, p< . 001, adult vs. children 8-9; t(50) = 3.35, p = . 002 and adult 
vs. children 10-11; t(54) = 2.44, p= . 02). In addition, only by age 10-11 did the significant 
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difference between correct labelling of sadness and neutrality in faces disappear (age 10-11 
neutral vs. sad, 1(22) = 1.21, p= . 24, n. s. ). Correct responses by Face-type and Age-group are 
shown in Figure 6.2. 
The difference between adults and children on labelling of sad faces, was attributable to adults 
making significantly fewer `sad as neutral' type errors (t(98) = 3.23, p= . 002, equal 
variances assumed). Percentage correct FER responses and percentage FER errors by age- 
group are presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Correct Face Recognition Reponses and Errors of Recognition 
Mean % HH HN HS NH NN NS SH SN ss 
6-7 92.88 4.84 2.36 6.20 61.88 32.12 9.04 47.44 43.76 
8-9 97.05 3.05 0.00 6.26 66.47 27.58 7.95 40.05 52.37 
10-11 98.61 1.48 0.00 10.43 65.30 24.43 7.87 33.57 59.00 
total (child) 96.03 3.18 . 88 7.67 64.36 28.19 8.33 40.58* 51.43* 
Adult 98.55 1.52 0.00 4.97 68.48 26.76 2.06 26.45* 71.70* 
Total 96.86 2.63 . 59 6.78 65.72 27.72 6.26 35.92 58.12 
"significant differences (p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 3: Mood will affect labelling of facial emotion in children. 
The previous hypothesis concerned effects of age on labelling of facial emotion, for which an 
adult comparison group were used. The present hypothesis considers the effect of mood on 
processing of facial emotion in children. Contrary to the mood congruent hypothesis 
regarding ambiguous stimuli, there were no between group effects of dysphoria on rating of 
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neutral faces in children. Mann Whitney U tests showed that dysphoric children did not make 
significantly more 'neutral as sad' type errors as predicted (U = 134.00, n, = 6, n2 = 61, p= 
. 30). 
Similarly non-dysphoric children did not make significantly more `neutral as happy' 
type errors compared to dysphoric children (U = 123.00, n1 = 6. n2 = 61, p= . 20). Rating of 
neutral faces though non-significant, was in the predicted mood congruent direction (see 
Figure 6.3a) 
Figure 6.3a. Effect of Mood on Children's Labelling of Neutral Faces as happy (NH) as 
neutral (NN) or as sad (NS) 
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Instead results showed that dysphoric children were significantly more accurate at labelling 
sadness compared to non-dysphoric children (U = 89.00, n1 = 6, n2 = 61, p= . 04). Moreover, 
though results for non-dysphorics' labelling of sad faces as neutral were non-significant (U = 
108.50, nj = 6, n2 = 61, p= . 10) the means 
for non-dysphoric mislabelling sad faces as neutral 
were in the right direction (see Fig 6.3b). 
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' ure 6.3b. Effect of Mood on Children's Labelling of Sad faces as happy (SH) as neutral 
(SN) or as sad (SS) 
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There were no significant between group effects on rating happy faces. Results were at ceiling 
level for this facial emotion (p > . 05). (Figure 6.3c) 
Figure 6.3c. Effect of Mood on Children's Labelling of Happy faces as happy (HH) as 
neutral (HN) or as sad (HS) 
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Thus the effect of dysphoria on children's processing of facial emotion was specific to sad 
face valence such that dysphoric children rated sad faces more accurately than non-dysphoric 
children, who tended to mislabel sad faces as neutral. Correlation analyses using the full range 
of CDI scores confirmed these results. Dysphoria (as a continuous variable) was significantly 
positively correlated with correcting rating of sad faces (r(67) = . 26, p= . 
034) and 
significantly negatively correlated with incorrect labelling of sad faces as neutral (r(67) =- 
. 
24, p= . 047). 
Dysphoria was not significantly associated with any other face-labelling 
category (p>. 05). 
Hypothesis 4: Dysphoria will contribute to variance in labelling of facial emotion above 
effects of age. 
Regression analyses were conducted to examine the effect of dysphoria on children's accurate 
labelling of sad emotion. First an enter-stepwise multiple regression with correct labelling of 
sad face valence as the dependent variable was conducted. Age and Dysphoria were included 
as independent variables. Age was entered on a first step, and Dysphoria (as a continuous 
measure) was entered as a second step to assess whether dysphoria predicted unique variance 
in sad face labelling independent of age. Both Age and Dysphoria (as measured by t-scores) 
were included in model of best fit. Age predicted 8% of the variance in correct responses to 
sad faces (AdjR2 = . 078). The addition of 
Dysphoria in the model resulted in a significant 
increment in explained variance (R2 change = 6%, F(1,64) = 5.86, p= . 018). Together Age 
and Dysphoria explained 14% of the response variance. The beta weights for Age (ß = . 32, p 
= . 007) and 
for Dysphoria (ß = . 28, p= . 018) were significant. The overall model significantly 
predicted variance in correct responses to sad face valence (F(2,66) = 6.49, p= . 003). 
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A second enter-stepwise multiple regression was conducted following the same procedure as 
above, but with NS face recognition errors as the dependent variable. Again, both Age and 
Dysphoria were included in model of best fit. Age predicted 6% of the variance in correct 
responses to sad faces (AdjR2 = . 064). The addition of Dysphoria in the model resulted in a 
significant increment in explained variance (R2 change = 6%, F(1,64) = 4.97, p= . 029). 
Together Age and Dysphoria explained 12% of the response variance. The beta weights for 
Age (ß = -. 29, p= .0 14) and 
for Dysphoria (ß = -26, p= . 029) were significant. The overall 
model significantly predicted variance in correct responses to sad face valence (F(2,66) = 
5.40, p= . 
007). Dysphoria did not account for variance over and above Age for any other face 
recognition response. 
6.6. DISCUSSION 
This study utilised a forced choice, schematic labelling tool to examine children's labelling of 
facial emotion as portrayed in adult photographic images. The first aim was to determine 
whether children could successfully discriminate between happy, neutral and sad faces using 
the present methodology. The results confirmed that children on average correctly labelled 
96% of happy faces: 64% of neutral faces and 51% of sad faces. Thereafter, the effects of age 
and mood on processing facial affect were examined. 
6.6.1. Effects of Age 
There was a significant difference between children and adults' labelling of sad faces. 
Children's labelling of sadness in faces was significantly poorer than adults' with children 
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making more `sad as neutral' type errors. The interaction between age and valence was 
significant, such that the ability to correctly label sad faces improved with age. 
There was no significant effect of age on labelling of neutral faces. There was also no 
significant effect of age on labelling of happy faces with correct labelling of happy faces 
already near optimal by age six. Studies have found adult recognition of happiness to be 
around 100% (Vicari, 2000; Rideout et al., 2003). The expression of happiness may therefore 
be more salient from birth i. e. directing a child towards a caregiver. The present results are 
consistent with an innate predisposition in young children to better perceive happiness in 
faces. Children may therefore be better neuronally pre-disposed to encode happiness. 
Repeated presentation of happy stimuli from birth may lead to stronger representations and 
therefore sensitivities to this particular emotion. Alternatively, happy expressions may simply 
be easier to label in a purely visuo-spatial way. 
The ability to correctly label sad faces increased with increasing chronological age in this 
study. One reason may be that sadness is a more perceptually difficult emotion to 
discriminate. For example, sadness as portrayed in faces, arguably has less distinctively 
circumscribed physical boundaries unlike happiness, which has a distinct `upturned' mouth. 
Greater complexity in prototypes and neural pathways may therefore be required for accurate 
processing of sad facial stimuli. Additionally, young children may hopefully have less 
experience of sad faces relative to positive and may be trained on fewer `exemplars'. As a 
result, the development of a sensitivity to sad faces may be slowed. The importance of initial 
visual stimuli on the development of neural patterns from birth was evidenced in a study 
looking at the impact of bilateral congenital cataracts on the development face processing. 
Visual deprivation in infants during the first 7 weeks of life impaired some aspects of face 
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processing 8-10 years later (Geldart, Mondoloch, Maurer, Schonen & Brent 2002). Therefore 
it is possible that the patterns in experience of facial affect in early childhood may affect the 
developing visual system. A final possibility is that there may be some age related response 
bias, such that children are less likely to label faces as sad, irrespective of how they are 
perceived. Evidence to militate against this possibility is that children and adults did not 
significantly differ in there incorrect use of the response label `sad' (t(98) _ . 56, p= . 58). In 
summary, relative to adults children tended not to correctly identify sad faces as sad. 
However, as described in the next section, mood modified this result. 
6.6.2. Effects of Dysphoria 
The third and central aim of the study was to examine the effect of dysphoria on processing of 
facial emotion in children. It was hypothesized, according to a schema and mood congruent 
theory of depression that dysphoric children would tend to make more `neutral as sad' errors 
compared to non-dysphoric children and that non-dysphoric children would make `neutral as 
happy' type errors. This hypothesis was not confirmed. Though results were in the predicted 
direction, they did not reach significance. However, as predicted dysphoria was indeed 
associated with better labelling of sad faces as sad 
Dysphoric children were accurate in labelling sad faces as sad. It may be that dysphoric 
children see sad as sad because negative schema may lower the perceptual thresholds for 
elements (perceptual or conceptual) congruent with them. Evidence of accurate processing of 
negative information is consistent with Williams et al's (1997) elaboration theory of 
depression (see Chapter 1). Low dysphoria was also associated with children mislabelling sad 
faces as neutral. These results may, therefore, also be interpreted in terms of depressive 
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realism. Depressive Realism postulates that in some circumstances depressed and dysphoric 
individuals do not distort reality, but demonstrate more accurate perception than their non- 
depressed counterparts (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Pacini, Muir & Epstein, 1998; Kapci & 
Cramer, 1998). The theory also contends that non-depressed individuals tend to positively 
distort their perceptions of themselves and/ or other people (Albright & Henderson, 1995). 
Present results can be interpreted such that, non-dysphoric children were demonstrating a 
positive perceptual bias whilst dysphoric children were demonstrating accurate perception, in 
keeping with the theory of depressive realism (see figure 6.3 d). 
Figure 6.3 d. Sample Sad Faces: Non-dysphoric children tended to rate sad faces as 
neutral while dysphoric children correctly labelled these faces as sad. 
Of course, it is not necessary to assume a perceptual bias to explain the present results. The 
effect could instead reflect a response bias. That is, non-dysphoric children may be less 
willing to label a face as sad though not necessarily, not perceiving it as sad. It could then be 
argued that dysphoric children do not demonstrate this reluctance. However, an analysis of 
the percentages of inappropriate `sad' responses by dysphoric and non-dysphoric children 
showed that dysphoric children did not endorse significantly more incorrect `sad' responses 
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than non-dysphoric children (U = 137.50, nl = 6, n2 = 61, p= . 33). This perhaps reduces the 
credibility of an exclusive response bias interpretation. 
6.6.3. Dysphoria and Face Processing 
In light of the reviewed literature, there may be implications with respect to cognitive and 
affective responses, depending on how a child decodes facial emotion. Initial accuracy of 
perception with respect to negative information in children, may affect mood. If a child more 
accurately perceives sadness compared to peers, this would likely affect developing schema, 
views of social interactions and subsequent behaviours (Herba & Phillips, 2004). Over time 
this could result in future distorted negative perception of reality. 
One can speculate that accurate perception of sadness in young dysphoric children is 
illustrative of IP tendencies which may act to cause or maintain a dysphoric mood whilst in 
contrast, failure to perceive sadness in non-dysphoric children, may act as a buffer. Given 
what we know about information processing biases in depression and development (i. e. 
egocentric) young dysphoric children may be particularly prone to interpret sad faces as "my 
fault". The mechanisms through which dysphoria, age and processing of sad facial emotion 
might interact of course remains unclear but this study has identified fundamental differences 
in identification of basic emotional signals based on mood and age. There appears to be 
evidence of a differential effect of mood on processing of emotional material in children, 
consistent with adult literature dysphoria was associated with improved labeling of sad faces 
as sad. Age also influences the accuracy of facial affect recognition. 
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6.6.4. Limitations 
There are also a number of limitations concerning the present study, which for the sake of 
clarity will be discussed in individual sub-sections. 
Small numbers 
As evidenced, only a small number of children in a normal school setting reported significant 
depressive symptoms in this study. Though numbers of dysphoric children are small, the 
dysphoric children do behave in a predictable way and in ways indicative of depressed adults- 
suggesting that this extreme group may be representative of a sub-clinical depressed sample. 
Moreover the results with categoric data are complimented by analyses with continuous 
dysphoria scores (the regression analyses). There is evidence in the child depression literature 
that sub-clinical depressed mood has long lasting and pervasive negative effects on child's 
functioning (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992) therefore the effects of dysphoria should be taken 
seriously. It should however be acknowledged that the effects may not be stable and that 
negative perceptual biases may be found in clinically depressed children. 
Use of the CDI with Adults 
The second limitation was that the measure of depression used may not be suitable for all age 
groups studied. This needs to be examined by testing participants at the upper age limit of the 
measure. If the measure is found not to be suitable, then it should be replaced with an adult 
measure of depression in the adult group at the sacrifice of direct comparability with the 
measure used with children. We elected to use the CDI across all participants due to the fact 
that only some of the participants in the adult sample exceeded the upper recommended age 
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limit for the measure. In hindsight the CDI could have been used alongside an adult measure 
of depressed mood. As it stands, only 3 young adults reported depressive symptoms. It may 
be that there was no depressed mood in this particular sample, or that mood was not well 
measured in adults using the CDI. It was therefore considered prudent to exclude adult data 
from analyses concerning mood, especially since the literature already demonstrates a mood 
bias in perception of faces in adults. The primary goal of the study was to try to extend this 
work to a child sample. Adult rating of faces remained important as a benchmark against 
which to compare child performance but mood effects were only examined in the children. 
Gender 
Gender may have a role to play in decoding of facial affect however in this study gender 
differences were not examined due to sample size limitations. The conventional view is that 
females are more skilled in emotional processing than boys. Although a small but significant 
female advantage for facial emotion recognition has been found (McClure, 2000), the overall 
developmental literature on gender effects on emotion processing is inconsistent (Herba & 
Phillips, 2004). Given that this was a first in assessing natural mood effects and age in 
children, further delineations were avoided. Future studies can address these issues. 
Choice of Labelling Tool 
To our knowledge this is the first study to use a schematic labelling tool as a method for 
studying identification of facial emotion in children. To re-iterate, a central aim of the current 
thesis was to begin to develop methodologies, which could be utilised across age and to allow 
comparison of depression related biases and investigation of the origins of these biases at a 
lower age range. In doing so we attempted to use schematic faces to circumvent problems 
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with reading ability in very young children. The validity in terms of children's understanding 
that the schematic faces depicted different emotions was examined using a free verbal 
response format, and proved successful. The validity of using this schematic method over and 
above that of verbal labels `happy', `neutral', `sad' was not tested. However, it seems likely 
that the schematic tool has certain advantages e. g. removing cognitive load of vocabulary 
cues in young children. In added support for the schematic tool is the element of enjoyment 
and fun that the task affords. In testing children with limited attention and concentration this 
proved invaluable. All children completed identification of all 62 faces and all were engaged 
in the task. The importance of this when trying to secure child co-operation on various tasks 
should not be underestimated. On balance, we felt that the schematic labelling tool should be 
retained for Study 5 (Chapter 7) 
Perceptual Matching Bias Explanation 
One criticism levelled at this study is that results may reflect perceptual matching and tell us 
nothing about perception of emotion. That is, individuals may be matching the schematic 
faces to the physical features of the photographic faces rather than `extracting' the emotional 
content. For example matching the appearance of the mouths rather than engaging in a more 
global assessment of the emotional properties. First, the schematic faces differed only in 
terms of the tilt of the mouth, so this would be the only varying characteristic available on 
which to feature match the faces. Certainly a proportion of both children and adults will have 
used this strategy. However, such `template matching' as it is known, still allows for bias 
when there is no one-to-one matching of stimulus to template (Figure 6.4). Secondly, it is 
unlikely that such `feature discrimination' can fully account for the results because the 
significant effects were only found for sad faces. So, for instance if it were the case that 
dysphoria was simply associated with being better able to discriminate between similar 
208 
stimuli irrespective of the nature of the stimuli (- a criticism inherent in the perceptual 
matching interpretation) then dysphorics would also be better at rating neutral faces relative to 
controls. This is not the case. The effect is not symmetric; dysphoric children perform better 
only for sad face valence. Dysphoric and non-dysphoric children perform equally well on 
identifying the perceptually similar neutral emotion. 
Figure 6.4. Illustrating the difficulty in one-to-one mapping of faces to the schematic tool 
ýý 
\ 
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As can be seen from a random sample of neutral faces, there is no straightforward one-to-one 
mapping of the photograph images to the schematic drawings. That is, some subjective 
judgment is required whether implementing a piecemeal or global labelling strategy. 
Perceptual Similarity Bias Explanation 
Another potential criticism is that `perceptual similarity' accounts for the findings. That is, 
results for different faces may reflect perceptual similarity between sad and neutral faces 
relative to happy. At first glance this seems plausible i. e. that participants find discrimination 
between sad and neutral faces more difficult than discrimination of happy faces and that this 
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explains impaired labelling of these emotions. However, this argument cannot account for the 
fact that i) there is no effect with respect to neutral faces, rather, these faces are actually better 
rated than sad faces despite them arguably being more perceptually difficult to discriminate; 
ii) If the result was linked to perceptual similarity children would not be expected to mis- 
categorize neutral faces as happy. Instead, all participants should confuse neutral with (the 
perceptually more similar) sad faces. The fact that non-dysphoric children make this `neutral 
as happy' error makes the perceptual similarity explanation questionable (Figure 6.5. ) 
Figure 6.5. Results Predicted from a Perceptual Similarity Interpretation 
happy 
neutral 
sad 
To explain results according to a perceptual similarity hypothesis mis-categorization of 
neutral faces should be in the direction of neutral-sad (shown by the solid arrow) and not in 
the direction of neutral-happy (as shown by the broken arrow). Some children (in particular 
non-dysphoric children) made this neutral-as-happy error, which perhaps suggests something 
other than or in addition to face similarity is in operation. 
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Response Bias 
As already discussed, it is possible that effects are attributable to children demonstrating a 
preferred response style, e. g. dysphoric children making more sad responses and non- 
dysphoric children making more happy responses, in a mood congruent fashion. However, 
although dysphoric children made more sad response errors compared to non-dysphoric 
children (Figure 6.6) this difference was not significant (U= 137.50, ni = 6, n2 = 61, p= . 33). 
This somewhat discredits a response bias interpretation. 
Figure 6.6. Incorrect Sad Responses by Children 
Q non-dysphoric 
Q dysphoric 
Location of Bias 
In summary, it is not easy to distinguish between perceptual, interpretative, or response bias 
explanations given the present results. We do not know the location of the bias in terms of 
cognitive processes (i. e. at what stage the bias occurs) but we do know that irrespective of the 
location of the bias, dysphoria was associated with greater accuracy in labelling sad faces. In 
fact, an ICS approach to the study of cognition and emotion (see General Introduction) would 
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state that whether biases occur at the perceptual or implicational level of processing, either 
could affect subsequent emotional responses (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Mood is known to 
have perceptual effects, so no-matter at what level the bias is occurring such information 
processing systems feed into one another and reciprocally affect mood. Moreover, results 
from a similar study examining processing of facial affect in maltreated children found results 
were not attributable to biases at the visual perceptual level as demonstrated by a 
same/different discrimination task (Pollack, Cicchetti, Hornung & Reed, 2000). That is, the 
result was not attributable to children's ability to detect physical differences between the 
facial expressions. A second study Frewen & Dozois (2005) also showed that facial emotion 
processing bias associated with depression in adults was more likely linked to interpretative 
rather than bottom up perceptual biases. In this study attributional style was linked to face- 
emotion processing suggesting "that dysphoria is related to facial expression processing at a 
conceptual or schematic level of analysis, rather than at a more basic bottom up level of 
information processing. " Indeed biases in depressed persons' processing of facial affect may 
be increasingly prominent as the level of judgement of analysis increases, consistent with 
Williams et al's (1997) strategic bias hypothesis and with Power & Dalgleish's (1997) 
appraisal-based theory of emotion (see General Introduction section 1.10). 
The rationale for this dimension of research into facial affect processing was to source a task 
that may reveal information processing biases associated with mood that did not involve 
memory, in order to act as a companion measure to an assessment of overgeneral memory and 
emotion focussing in the next study (Study 5). The face processing task meets these criteria. 
However, it is also important to speculate about potential future studies of face processing per 
se. 
212 
CHAPTER 6A FACE STUDY 
6.6.5. Future Studies 
Future studies of facial affect processing should test a range of intensities of emotional 
expression to look more precisely at sensitivity to facial emotion in dysphoric and non- 
dysphoric children. Also, Harwood, Hall & Shinkfield (1999) found that people are better at 
recognizing facial emotion presented in animated form. It may therefore be more ecologically 
valid to present participants with faces animating from one valenced emotion to another. 
From a behavioural ecological perspective, Fridlund (1994) also theorised that facial 
expressions evolved to communicate social intents and contingencies. This theory was tested 
by Yik & Russell (1999) whereby participants were shown standard facial expressions of 
emotion and were asked to match them to a social message as predicted by theories of Ekman 
& Friesen (1976). Faces conveyed both social and emotional messages with high inter-rater 
agreement. This study was looking specifically for cultural differences in the interpretation of 
faces. No differences were found. This study therefore suggests that agreement on the social 
meaning conveyed by facial expression is universal. However, it would be interesting to 
repeat this experiment with deprcssed/dysphoric individuals to see if dysphoric individuals 
read the same social messages from faces as these non-dysphoric individuals. We know that 
depressed individuals can demonstrate poor social skills (Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 
1996), therefore it might be that depressed individuals do not interpret social signals in the 
same way as non-depressed individuals. Present results would support this prediction and it 
would be an interesting avenue of investigation. 
A paradigm could also be used in which faces start at a positive or negative valence and 
participants have to make a face look neutral using a computer morphing technology which 
morphs the faces in to various percentages of a particular emotion e. g. from 0% happy 
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through to 100% happy (e. g. Tiddcman, Burt & Perrett, 2001). This programme could be 
adapted to assess what participants perceive as sadness, happiness and neutrality, avoiding 
response biases. Reaction times could also be measured. It is possible that dysphoric 
participants may take longer to label faces overall, compared to non-dysphoric participants, 
due to psychomotor slowing. However, in addition a valence specific latency effect could be 
expected, such that dysphoric participants might take longer to process negative facial 
expressions, compared to happy and neutral faces, and compared to non-dysphoric 
participants. This would help test the proposition that depression is associated with biased 
elaboration rather than enhanced priming (Williams et al, 1997) and append recent work on 
sustained attention to negative faces in depression (e. g. Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue & 
Joonnan, 2004). 
6.7. In conclusion 
The present study has illustrated the use of a simple method to test processing of facial 
emotion, as one means of investigating information processing biases related to depression in 
children. An aim of this study was to source an information-processing paradigm that would 
be used as a companion measure with the AMT and EF tasks. Differential labelling of sad 
face valence was revealed, depending on age and mood. To my knowledge, this is the first 
study to combine a systematic study of age, dysphoria and processing of facial affect in 
children. In so doing the importance of the development of valenced processing in children 
and its relationship with mood in investigating the possible origins of depressive biases has 
been highlighted. 
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Dysphoria seems to be a relevant component in the accurate processing of sad facial emotion 
in children in line with either the integration-elaboration theory of Williams et al. (1997) 
according to which depression is mostly associated with elaboration of negative information, 
relative to controls or with depressive realism interpretations (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). 
Noting of course that enhanced accuracy to negative emotional cues in dysphoria does not 
imply unbiased responses to, or memory for, such cues. 
In the next study (Study 5) the present face-labelling task, the EF task (see Chapter 3) and the 
AMT wcrc used as %vcll as an additional measure of social problem solving, to further 
cxnminc dcpressivc binscs in children. 
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Chapter 71 Study 5. A Residential Study: Effects of Early Adversity on AMS and 
other aspects of Emotion-related Processing in Children aged 11-15 years 
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Abstract 71 Williams (1996) posits that an overgencral memory (OGM) style may result, in 
response to early childhood adversity, as part of an Affect Regulation (AR) mechanism. 
Though retrospective reports from adults have supported this AR claim, the hypothesis has 
not been directly tested in children. In addition, if we are to understand mechanisms 
underlying OGM, it is important to examine variables that may underpin such biases. 
Emotion processing variables have been neglected in this context. The current empirical study 
therefore examined autobiographical memory (AM) and other aspects of emotion-related 
processing known to be associated with adult depression, in a sample of 30 boys in long-term 
residential care, who had experienced serious life adversity. A group of 18 boys without any 
known history of abuse but from a similar socio-economic background acted as controls. The 
residential boys in this study were considered to be at high risk for developing depression, but 
were not con-currently diagnosed with any affective disorder. Results may help elucidate the 
temporal relationships between trauma, mood and valenced OGM. They also provide new 
empirical evidence regarding Emotion-Focusing and the relationship between OGM and other 
aspects of cognitive-affective functioning. 
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7.1. Introduction 
The AMT studies 1-3 reported so far have looked at experience of depression in children. A 
key point in the ARII is that experience of early adversity accounts for an individuals' 
motivation to adopt an OGM style. This study attempts to examine this hypothesis. That is, is 
there evidence of OGM in a child population who have clearly experienced negative life 
events? For the purposes of testing this theory a non-depressed residential population were 
approached - boys who had been placed in long term care for reasons pertaining to child 
protection. Would these children demonstrate reduced AMS as predicted by an AR account of 
OGM? A sample of non-depressed children with a history of adverse experiences was 
therefor: administered the AMT, the EF task (from Study l) and the face task that was 
validated in Study 4. In addition, a measure of social problem-solving was introduced to 
further contcxtualizc the OGM bias and extend work on adults in this area (e. g. Raes, 
Ilermans, Williams, nemyttcnacre, Sabbe, I'ieters & Erlen, 2005). In this introduction, the 
literature on OGM and trauma is reviewed in some detail (expanding on the summary 
comments from Chapter 2) and the rationale for investigating OGM in a residential sample is 
set out. Putative relationships involving these measures are then discussed. 
7.1.1. Affect Regulation: A developmental Perspective 
The primary motivation for the current study comes from Williams (1996) who suggested that 
in childhood, individuals who are either subject to numerous negative events or who have 
difficulty coping with negative affect, may develop an OGM style to minimize their 
experience of negative affect at recall. Acquiring the ability to inhibit categorical descriptors 
in order to be able to access specific information is a process, which is believed to take place 
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in early childhood (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Traumatic life circumstances during this critical 
developmental period may have the capacity to impair the establishment of these inhibition 
processes. The reason is argued to be that specific emotional information is too painful to be 
remembered and so is defended against by individuals remaining at a categorical level of 
analysis. This is the Affect Regulation Hypothesis (ARI-I; Williams, Stiles & Shapiro, 1999). 
Within this context, the claim of the ARI-I that was introduced and discussed in Chapter 2, is 
that im OGM style becomes manifest as a result of some disruption to the normal 
developmental trajectory in favour of less specific memory retrieval, such that retrieval 
becomes 'locked' at an overgeneral level to avoid the affect generated from (more specific) 
painful memories. Work in adults reporting early adversity has given support for this 
developmental OGM theory but as yet the critical studies in trauma-exposed children have not 
been carried out - hence the present research. 
As noted, evidence from adult trauma research supports the affect control hypothesis, in the 
sense that retrospective accounts of trauma are linked with reduced AMS in adults (McNally, 
1995; McNally, 1994; Harvey et al 1998; Startup et al 2001; Henderson, Hargreaves et al 
2002; 11crmans, van den ßrocek, Belis, Racs, Pieters & Edlen, 2004; Kuyken & Brewin, 
1995; Burnside, Startup, Byatt, Rollinson & Hill, 2004). Kuyken and Brewin (1995) for 
example, found that women who reported a history of abuse as children demonstrated more 
overbencral retrieval than those who did not. Reduced specificity has also recently been 
established as an associate of trauma in adolescents (de Decker, Hermans, Rues & Edlen, 
2003; Orbach, Limb, Sternberg, Williams & Dawd-Noursi, 2001; Meesters, Merceklbach, 
Muds & Wcsscl, 2(00). 
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Dc Decker et al. (2003) looked specifically at trauma in diagnostically mixed adolescents. 
Higher scores of sell-reported trauma were associated with more overgeneral memory. Again 
this was more marked in response to positive cues. Kuykcn, Howell & Dalgleish (in press) 
have also recently found evidence of reduced AMS associated with depression (with no 
trauma) in adolescents. The inclusion of a group with trauma (co-morbid with depression) in 
this study was associated with less ovcrgcneral recall than in the depressed-only group. 
Results clearly indicate that there are OGM effects associated with both depression and 
trauma in adolescence. The exact effects of trauma and depression in explaining the OGM 
effect, however, remain unclear. Results suggest that while depression results in greater 
ovcrgcnerulity, trauma may result in increased specificity. However this finding needs 
empirical clarification. 
Studies in depressed adolescent populations also lend some credence to the ARH. For 
example, Park et al. (2002) looked at clinically depressed adolescents (never depressed, first 
episode depressed and remitted groups). Currently depressed adolescents were more 
overbeneral compared to controls and remitted depressed adolescents. These adolescents were 
more overgeneml to positive cues compared to controls. The Park et al. result also highlights 
that OGM is unlikely to be a scarring effect from previous depressive episodes (since it 
occurred in first episode depression). In one further adolescent study, Swales, Williams & 
Wood (2001) found diagnostically mixed adolescents from a residential psychiatric unit (22% 
history of parasuicidal behaviours, 10% MDD) were more overgeneral than controls. In this 
study the parasuicidul subgroup showed increased specificity to cues. However this may be 
due to a repeated memory phenomena (or "chaining"), whereby some individuals in this 
subgroup gave the same memory to more than one cue. Of note, was that the OGM effect was 
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again more pronounced for positive memories than for negative in this group. However, work 
also needs to be replicated in child samples in order to better test hypotheses espousing 
developmental origins. This work has not been replicated in children. Moreover, it is unclear 
how AM functioning in children, who have experienced early adversity, may relate to their 
processing of affective information. A principle aim of the current chapter was to address 
these issues. 
7.1.2. Limitations of Previous Research 
While there is some evidence that ovcrbcneral retrieval may result from the experience of 
early trauma, methodological limitations arising from retrospective investigations limit the 
conclusions that can be drawn. For example, in the studies looking at trauma in adult samples, 
the link between OGM and experience of the negative life events is remote; allowing ample 
time for events and experiences other than the trauma, to modify AM functioning. In addition, 
the data regarding trauma, is often confounded by self-report, which is open to bias and is not 
independently verifiable. Instead, verified abuse is needed to eliminate the confound of self- 
reported abuse reflecting psychological vulnerability (Dalgleish et al., 2003). That the process 
of ovcrgeneral retrieval may be affected by objectively measured stress during childhood in 
children has not been tested. Furthermore, retrospective investigations make it difficult to 
disengage the temporal roles of trauma, depression and overgenerality. Finally, in many 
existing studies, depression and trauma are confounded. It is therefore important to examine 
traumatized child groups with little or no depression, matched on depression levels with 
suitable controls. 
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7.1.3. Temporal Relationships 
The second motivation for this study therefore comes from Dalgleish et al. (2003) who 
asserted that; "it seems essential to try to clarify empirically the relationship between adverse 
psychological experiences such as abuse and overgeneral memory and psychopathology. " 
Thus, studies arc required in order to determine if overgencrality arises from adverse 
childhood experience and precedes the onset of early affective disorder. Consequently, 
motivation for this study comes jointly from Williams' suggestion that one pathway for the 
origin of OGM may lie in childhood in response to negative life events. The second 
motivation comes from Dalgleish ct al. who stress the importance of unravelling the causal 
relationships between adversity, OGM and the development of psychopathology. Thus, 
studies tire required that examine OGM effects in children who have experienced trauma, yet 
have never been diagnosed with depression and who are not currently depressed. It was 
decided that children placed in residential care meet many of the criteria necessary, to begin 
to address these key research questions. First, they will have experienced significant verifiable 
trauma and second, they are a high-risk group for depression but they can be screened such 
that only those with no history of depression or current depression are included (see below). 
Such a residential sample can then be compared to a control sample, matched for depressed 
mood, but with no trauma. 
7.1.4. Children in Care 
Children placed in long-term residential care for child protection have suffered severe 
negative life experiences in order to warrant such intervention. A traumatic event is defined as 
an event that threatens the safety and well being of an individual. Almost by definition, those 
children who are removed from their families due to child protection meet this criterion. What 
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is particularly important is that these children are not self-presenting. Instead experience of 
adversity is independently verified. 
Children in care are generally considered a high-risk population for future onset of affective 
disorders. For example, depression is the most common symptom reported by those who have 
been abused, and elevated depressive symptoms have been found to carry well into adulthood 
(Briers, 1992). Poor maternal care, physical or sexual abuse, parental mental illness or 
substance abuse have all been linked to childhood and adult depression (Burge & Hammen, 
1991; Connell & Goodman, 2002; Ilanlmen, Burge & Adrian, 1991). Additional evidence for 
the role of negative life events such as abuse, in depression (and therefore further support for 
using this group in high-risk hypothesis testing) comes from Brown, Cohen, Johnson, & 
Smailes (1999). Brown et al. investigated the magnitude and independence of the effects of 
childhood neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse on adolescent and adult depression and 
suicidal behaviour. A total of 776 randomly selected children were studied from a mean age 
of 5 years to adulthood during a 17-yr period. A history of abuse was determined by official 
abuse records and by retrospective self-report. Importantly, adolescents and young adults with 
a history of childhood maltreatment were 3 times more likely to become depressed compared 
to individuals without such a history. For instance, risk of repeated suicide attempts was 8 
times greater for youths with a sexual abuse history. Therefore, risk for depression is an 
important factor for individuals who have been maltreated in childhood. What is important 
about the present sample is that these children have all experienced corroborated severe 
negative life events, are not currently depressed but are considered to be a high-risk group for 
depression according to epidemiological studies (e. g. Silverman, Reinherz & Giaconia, 1996; 
Toth, Manly & Cicchetti, 1992). 
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7.1.5. Valence Effects 
Also of interest is the issue of cue-valcnccd memories. Overgencrality is sometimes carried 
by responses to positive cues (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; de Decker, 2003), at other times 
by responses to negative cues (Mackingcr, Pachinger, Leibetseder & Fartacek, 2000) and 
sometimes the valence effect is absent altogether (Goddard, Dritschcl & Burton, 1996). Far 
frone being dismissed as an inconsistency- a by-product of the AM task- the valence effect 
raises important theoretical questions. It seems clear that there is a fundamental difference 
between a child who would respond overbenerally with, 'All the time' in response to the cue 
word 'I happy'. Versus a child who would offer the same ovcrgeneral response ('all the time') 
to the cue word `Sad'. The positive/negative cue word division may tell us something 
important about the underlying nature of the OGM bias. In Study I the OGM effect was more 
pronounced to positive cues and OGM to negative cues was not detected until late childhood 
(age 10-11). In Study 2, in contrast, clinically depressed children showed reduced specificity, 
in particular, to negative cues. This could signal a fundamental difference in valenced OGM 
as a function of age and depression severity. Finally, Study 3 showed consistently stronger 
effects for recall to positive cues. Reduced positive AMS was associated with a depressogenic 
cognitive style and increased positive OGM predicted depressive symptoms during a stressful 
life event. Results for AM recall to negative cues did not reach significance in this study. 
It is a common assumption in the literature that OGM, even if it originates with overgenerality 
to negative events as a form of AR, will spread to include positive events as a consequence of 
the general retrieval bias. I lowvevcr the theoretical underpinnings of such a process is unclear 
and it is difficult to account for overgeneral positive recall in terms of affect regulation alone. 
Competing explanations of OGM have been introduced and discussed in Chapter 2. Although 
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there is evidence to suggest depressed individuals may find positive stimuli aversive (Dunn, 
Dalblcish, Lawrence, Cusack & Oligive, 2004) it is unlikely an OGM system would develop 
to minimize affect caused by specific positive recall. Instead, overgenerality may be explained 
by schema functioning r1 ther than Alt. Dalgleish et al. (2003) suggested that active self- 
schcinas might be a source of OGM when cue words reflect the thematic content of such 
schema. Meaning irrespective of cue valence, cue words may trigger personal schema, which 
will result in OGAM responses (e. g. if the cue word 'Lonely' maps onto a self schema maps of 
being 'friendless and unlovable' this will more easily result in an overgeneral response than if 
there was no relevant scllctna) `laic existence (or absence) of negative and positive schema 
may help elucidate valence effects in the OGM literature. 
As a further point, it is perhaps preferable to view the experience of negative childhood events 
as a trigger to encode emotional features, or as the grounds for children to perceive negative 
life events as prototypical (schematic), rather than solely as the impetus for children to 
retrieve overgencrully. The positive overgeneral bias would thereby be explained in terms of 
positive specific events being less well encoded or recalled, as schema incongruent. It may be 
that the overbcncral effect rather than reflecting a defensive memory search strategy simply 
reflects the fact that some children arc more sensitised to encode emotion early in childhood 
(possibly due to exposure to negative life experiences), which could have secondary 
consequences on memory. 
7.1.6. EF and Memory 
In this respect we are particularly interested in Emotion-Focusing (EF). Theories of OGM 
have hinted at the importance of EF as a possible explanation for the prominence of global 
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AMs in dcprcssion. Williams (1996) claimed that encoding emotion could lead to global 
memories. From this, it can be assumed that people who have a greater tendency to encode 
the emotional content of situations will demonstrate differential recall to those who do not 
encode situational emotion. 
As described in Study 1, Chapter 3, EF is defined as individuals' predisposition to focus on 
the emotional features of their environment. In this way EF assesses what an individual may 
typically encode in a given situation and allows investigation of whether individuals 
preferentially describe, notice or encode emotion. It is well known that at encoding, only a 
subset of characteristic event features is actually encoded depending on feature salience, the 
encoder's expectation, attentional factors, and so on. Thus, people naturally focus on emotion 
to differing extents and this may have implications on their memory system especially given 
traumatic or difficult life experiences. As was demonstrated in Study 1, Chapter 3, EF is 
associated with increased AMS in children aged 7-11 years (Drummond, Dritschel, Astoll, 
O'Carroll & Dalglcish, 2006). Higher levels of EF were associated with increased AMS 
especially to negative cues. The link between EF and specificity, in the aftermath of serious 
negative life events has not yet been investigated. There are however strong theoretical 
grounds for anticipating an interaction. 
7.1.7. EF and Early Negative Life Events 
An interaction between EF and early life adversity is anticipated. For example, as described in 
Chapter 3, Williams (1996) suggested that an individual who is emotionally sensitised, due to 
early adversity, would be overgeneral on an the AMT because focusing on emotion promotes 
schematic level encoding. That is, early adversity may effect EF such that it may predispose 
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children to become either emotionally avoidant (Low EF) or emotionally sensitised (High 
EF). If a child becomes emotion-avoidant they will likely be a low emotion focuser. A low 
cntotion-focusing child may therefore struggle to retrieve AMs to emotional cue words 
because information is less likely to encoded/ stored or `tagged' in terms of emotion in these 
avoidant children; hence poor access to emotional memories in these individuals. LEF 
children are therefore more likely produce OGMs to AMT cues. A child who becomes 
sensitised, a high emotion focuser, on the other hand will arguably produce specific memories 
(in contrast to William's suggestions) to emotional cues because these children are focused on 
emotion and process it preferentially. Their memories are therefore dominantly labelled with 
emotional tags. Various theoretical models of cognition and emotion would support this 
prediction (Bower, 1981; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; 
Tcasdalc & Barnard, 1993). Additional predictions frone EF would assert that a low emotion 
focuser should be poorer on tasks related to emotion, compared to a high emotion focuser. 
To re-iterate, under normal circumstances one would expect high emotion focusers to be 
specific and low emotion focusers not to be specific to emotional cues. Under stressful 
circumstances however, rather than low emotion focusing simply being a result of disinterest, 
it is more likely to be due to an affect avoidance strategy in keeping with Williams' ARH 
(Williams, ct al, 1999). 
7.1.8. Other Emotion-related Measures 
The final question addressed in this study concerns the relationship between OGM, EF and 
other facets of social-emotional processing known to be affected in depression. Individuals, 
who have experienced negative life events from early childhood when cognitive-affective 
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systems arc developing, may well perceive emotion differently from other children. It is 
plausible that the emotional disorganisation and emotional disorder that belie those who have 
been victims ofscvcrc early ncgutive adversity support the idea that there may be impairment 
in social-emotional processing. It is important to begin to try to understand the network of 
biasses that may develop under such circumstances. It is also important to begin to evaluate the 
relationship bctwccn OGM cffccts und biases in information-processing (such as facial 
lubclling) us previous studies of OGM have generally neglected to contextualize OGM effects 
within a broader framework of rnore prototypical depressive biases. Similarly, it is important 
to contcxtualizc OGA1 within a broader social-interpersonal framework (such as social 
problem solving skill), us this work has not been replicated with respect to OGM in youth. To 
this end, the current study included a measure of perception of facial affect validated in Study 
4, and a measure asocial problem solving that has been used previously in the AM literature. 
7.1.9. Facial Emotion Recognition (FER) 
Depressed adults demonstrate a negative bias in their labelling of facial affect (e. g. George, 
l luggins, hlcDcrntttt, Parckh, ltubinow & Post, 1998) and we saw in Study 4, Chapter 6, that 
dysphoria in children is associated with greater accuracy in labelling sad faces and a tendency 
to label neutral faces its sad. It may be the case that this bias is found in the current population 
and adds to mapping of the cognitive-affective profile of these residential children. Pollack, 
Cicchctti, i iornung & Rced (2000) also found that maltreated children's recognition of facial 
emotion is consistent with the idea that variance in emotional experience affects children's 
recognition and understanding of affl ctivc cues. This may offer some insight into why 
maltreated children tend to develop many social and emotional problems (Dodge, Bates, Pettit 
& Valente, 1995; Rogosch, Cicchctti & Aber, 1995). The emotional signals a maltreated child 
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receives, for example, may be complex and inconsistent as well as distressing. Maltreated 
children have a myriad of problems involving emotion recognition (Blair & Coles 2000; 
Cummings, Hennessy, Rnbidcau & Cicchetti 1994; Hennessy, Rabideau, Cicchetti & 
Cummings, 1994; Klimcs-dougan & Kistncr, 1990). Of concern is the association between 
such difiicultics and increased risk of development of psychological disorders (Cicchetti & 
Toth, 1995). We do not yet know what the relationship is between such affect processing and 
AM retrieval in children, hence the inclusion of the face task alongside the AMT in this study. 
7.1.10. Social Problem-Solving 
Another key finding in tlic literature is that OGNI is related to impoverished social-problem- 
solving (SI'S) (Goddard, I)ritschel & Burton, 1996; 1997; 2001; Williams, Ellis, Tyers, 
Mucl. cod & Rosc, 1996), as noted in Chapter 2. Research has shown a relationship between 
OGNI und social problem solving in depressed (Goddard, Dritschcl & Burton, 1996), non- 
clinically depressed (Goddard, Dritschcl & Burton, 1997) and parasuicidial individuals 
(Evans, Williams, O'Loughlin & Howells, 1992; Pollock & Williams, 2001) such that 
reduced AKIS is ussociatcd with difficulties in describing effective SPS strategies. Theoretical 
accounts or sm cmphasisc the role of At 1, for example, in the retrieval of specific records of 
previous successes and fuilures, used to guide new action-plans and direct behaviour (e. g. 
Conway & l'lc)'dell-Pearce, 2000). The ability to access specific episodic memories is 
hypothesised to be key in the process of providing information for online schema. 
Inappropriate ovcrgcncrul retrieval should therefore impair effective SPS. 
lt is also thcorizcd that SPS depends on the capacity to cope %Nith interpersonal problems and 
that this depends on a complex combination of cognitive and emotional factors (Shure, 1997). 
For example, individuals have to consider emotion-related aspects of a situation; their 
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fcclings, anothcr's feelings, consequences of their actions on another's feelings, and elicit 
cmotion"rclatcd memories of such instances in order to best direct behaviour, given such 
constraints. Impairments in emotional-related processing should therefore also affect SPS 
performance. Iking unable to come up with effective solutions may not only aggravate 
problem situations but also fuel hopelessness and negative self-judgments feeding into a 
downward spiral of dysfunctional cognitions and sad mood (Nezu & Nezu, 1989). 
Unsurprisingly, individuals with affective disorders such as depression are known to show 
such SPS deficits. 
It is proposed that dcpressed and parasuicidal individuals are poor at SI'S because of their 
deficient access to specific 'helpful' memories (e. g. Williams Ct al., 2005). However, in the 
context of socially disadvantaged children this engenders the issue of whether specific 
memories are always facilitative, or whether they can actually be dcbilitative. For example, if 
children recall specific negative instances of witnessed or experienced SPS would this 
actually impair SPS? If cfectivc SPS requires an appreciation of social and emotional 
dynamics, individuals who have negative social models, may find it difficult to think of 
positive social solutions (Dodge ct al. 1995). Hamilton, Asarnow & Tompson (1997) found 
that depressed children demonstrated poorer social skills than controls, yet did not differ on 
cognitive or academic performance. Poor social problem solving was also highlighted as a 
moderator of the impact of negative life events on subsequent experience of depression in 
children aged 8-12 (Goodman, Gravitt, d: Kaslow, 1995). Segrin (2000) also found social 
skills deficits in depressed children and adolescents, though the direction of causality in this 
study was unclear. Thus, while much of the available literature has focused on adult 
populations, there appears to be an emerging body of literature that demonstrates the 
relationship bcttwwccn poor social skills and depression in children. 
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7.1.11. Possible Interrelationships between Variables 
Of further interest therefore, was whether AMS correlates with EF, FER and SPS. Is there a 
link between these emotion relevant tasks? Face labelling requires understanding emotion at a 
basic perceptual level. EF requires awareness and salience or preferential encoding, of 
emotion. The standard AM cuing task requires retrieval of emotionally labelled memories and 
SPS is both affected by emotion and by memories of emotional experiences. It would 
therefore not be surprising if performance on these tasks were related. 
7.2. Study Rationale 
This study was designed to test the Williams' (1996) developmental hypothesis that children 
who experience early adversity adopt or continue to use a generic style in retrieving AMs, 
even in the absence of significant depression. Based on findings from the adult and adolescent 
literature and the suggested importance of early adversity in theoretical accounts of the 
development of OGM, this study was conducted to investigate the possible relationship 
between experience of negative life events and retrieval of specific memories in childhood. In 
addition, this study sought to examine any observed cue-valence effects on AM retrieval, 
introduce a new variable EF as an operationalization of Williams' emotion encoding 
hypothesis, and to broaden investigation of OGM in the context of other indices of emotion- 
related processing. 
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7.3. Hypotheses 
1. Residential boys will demonstrate reduced AMS compared to controls and this effect may 
be valence specific. 
2. EF will explain significant variance in AMS, especially in the residential group, with high 
EF being associated with increased AMS, as in study 1. 
3. The residential group will exhibit impaired SPS and greater errors on the FER task. 
4. There will be significant positive correlations between AMS, EF, FER, and SPS in the 
residential group, with performance on all 4 tasks correlating negatively with severity of 
abuse. 
7.4. METHOD 
7.4.1. Participants 
All of the boys from a single residential care facility within the UK, aged 11-15 (mean = 
13.87, SD = . 076) were screened for testing (n= 40). A group of 18 boys of the same age 
range, similar socio-economic background and IQ acted as controls. Reasons for referral to 
the residential facility included physical, sexual and emotional abuse or neglect. In this study 
all boys had undergone some form of psychiatric/psychological assessment prior to entering 
the facility (though assessments vary). No boy tested in this study had a primary clinical 
diagnosis of depression or any other concurrent Axis I diagnosis. There was no current 
treatment of depression, and no known history of clinical depression or treatment of 
depression based on case records and in consultation with the lead clinician. Although all 
boys will experience depressed mood, there was nothing known, to warrant psychiatric 
attention. Seven boys in the residential group (23%) showed above average depressed mood 
scores on the CDI (raw score of 7 or above). This was matched in the control sample with 
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four boys (22%) demonstrating above average symptoms of depression. Hence there were no 
significant between group differences for depression, t(46) = 1.06, p= . 30. 
Exclusion criteria: Boys were excluded if there was ambiguity concerning referral, where the 
primary nature of the problem was unknown. For eight of the boys in residence, it was unclear 
whether child dysfunction as opposed to initial family dysfunction, was the primary cause for 
concern. These boys were therefore excluded. Non-cooperation on some tasks also led to data 
exclusion (n = 2). The data from 30 residential boys were therefore included in the analyses. 
All relevant authorities approved this study. Specific permission was obtained from the 
primary carer of each young person prior to testing and permission from each individual was 
obviously sought on the day of testing. The overarching reason for placement in care was 
`child protection'. Common reasons for referral into this care facility included failure of the 
family to protect. This encompassed physical abuse, parent alcohol and drug abuse, frequent 
and severe neglect, sexual exploitation, domestic violence, witnessing domestic violence, the 
parent deemed unsafe for criminal or psychiatric reasons, homelessness, child abandoned at 
birth, loss of parent, confused relations or inappropriate relations with parent or sexual abuse. 
Reasons for entry into this system were not based on family support or disability. Though 
some children do offend, this was not a primary reason for placement. 
The facility. The facility is a residential school with a strong therapeutic influence. The 
facility accommodates a maximum of 40 boys. Children are placed in this school, mainly via 
social services as part of child protection measures. This is not a short stay facility. Funding 
for each student usually comes from local government or social services. The facility operates 
under a highly structured milieu-situational model of therapy. Psycho-educational 
programmes are in constant effect within the school. A highly trained consultant psychologist 
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is available on a weekly basis and oversees staff training regarding the therapeutic aspects of 
care. The principal ethos of the school is `real life' therapy, conceptualised along a continuum 
of care across school, life, social and personal domains. Therapy is on a self-selection basis. 
All children are highly supervised. The nature of the trauma in this sample concerns severe, 
persistent developmental trauma, verified by social service reports as mandated by law, 
change of caregivers and prosecutions. The primary aim of the facility is education. Children 
with an active psychiatric disorder are not admitted to this school. It is a specialist, 
therapeutic, residential establishment for long term placements. All boys have had extreme 
negative experiences. This facility is one degree away from a secure unit. 
Rating of Abuse. In order to gain an objective measure of severity of abuse within the 
residential group experienced care staff independently rated severity of negative life 
experience for each boy. The care staff manager, in charge of overseeing the care and well 
being of all boys, was asked to rate `severity of life experience(s)' on a scale of 1-10 (with 1 
as the least severe and 10 as the most severe), with the worst case as a reference point. This 
rating was compared with ratings from four unit managers, who each gave ratings for the 10 
boys under their immediate care. These five individuals were chosen as having the most 
inclusive knowledge of the boys. Key staff rating of severity was considered to have good 
face validity and enabled objective comparison across all boys. At no point was there a 
discrepancy of more than 1 between the two staff ratings. Where there was a discrepancy of 1 
(n = 4), the lead clinician's decision on verifying all ratings, was primary. Thus, a score of 1- 
10 was allocated for each boy (M= 7.43 SD = 1.55, range 4-10). All ratings were based on in 
depth knowledge of the boy's case histories and disclosure of personal experiences. It is fair 
to assume that impact of severity was also being taken into consideration by the care staff. 
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Age of onset of abuse and estimated duration of abuse were ascertained from case records and 
were also recorded. 
Controls. The control group were selected from a local youth group, with the same (low) 
socio-economic group and age range (mean = 13.67, SD = . 84). Age and backward digit span 
matched controls were used to ensure similar IQ levels. Matching children on verbal IQ 
measures would have resulted in unacceptable age comparisons. This is due to the (to be 
expected) poor educational opportunities in the residential group resulting in between group 
differences in reading ability. Due to the low socio-economic background of these control 
children, hardship was present but not supra-normal. No trauma or mental health history was 
disclosed for any boy by the parent or guardian at consent. For ethical reasons children were 
not directly questioned regarding experience of trauma/abuse. It was felt that absence of 
social service intervention was persuasive of lack of adversity equitable to that found in the 
residential sample. 
Age. Finally, this particular age range (11-15) was considered optimal for investigating the 
impact of early negative life events on AMS, as results from Study 1 suggest it may be 
difficult to distinguish OGM bias from a natural age appropriate general memory style in 
children below the age of 10. 
7.4.2. Materials and Measures 
AM. The standard Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was 
used as outlined in Chapter 3, section 4.2. All participants demonstrated specific recall on at 
least 2 of practice words. An example of an OGM response to the cue word `Lonely' was, 
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"When I'm in my room at night". A specific memory response to the same cue was, "When I 
got sent to my room as punishment last week even though I didn't do much wrong. " 
EF. The EF task was administered and scored as outlined in Chapter 3, section 4.2. Where 
emotion was implied but an emotional adjective was not directly used, for example, `being 
shouted at' in response to an image description card, it was again decided that a strict criterion 
would be used and only a clear emotional descriptive would result in an emotion response 
classification. 
Face Emotion Recognition (FER). The FER task was administered as described in Chapter 6, 
section 4.2. Children were asked to label the emotion in happy, sad and neutral faces. 
Identification of facial affect was done using schematic drawings of happy, neutral and sad 
faces. Correct recognition was considered labelling consistent with previous over 75% inter- 
rater agreement as to the emotion being portrayed (le Gal & Bruce, 1999). 
Child Depression Inventory Short Form (CDI-S, Kovacs, 1992). This measure was 
administered as outlined in Chapter 3, section 4.2. 
The Means-Ends Problem-Solving Task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack 1975). This is one of the 
most frequently used measures of social problem solving ability in the AM literature 
(Williams et al, 2005). The MEPS is a hypothetical social problem-solving task, consisting of 
vignettes. This measure has been shown to correlate with real life social problem solving skill 
(see Williams et al, 2005). Participants were presented with social-problem scenarios 
describing an initial situation and the desired end outcome. After a practice item in collusion 
with the experimenter, individuals were given 5 hypothetical social problems, which they 
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were asked to verbally solve to reach the prescribed goal. The problems involve social- 
relational conflict. Problems were modified slightly for the residential group to make them 
apposite e. g. not getting along with `some-one you care about' to replace `a parent'. Each 
participant was asked to verbally describe ways of resolving the problem e. g. `making up with 
some-one you have fallen out with', `making friends in a new school' (see Appendix 7.1). 
Participants were encouraged to make as many suggestions as possible and to draw on their 
experiences or to imagine helping some-one else through the situation, if that facilitated ideas. 
Problems were also presented in the first person to encourage self-reflection and thereby 
presumably enhance the self-relevance of responses. 
Due to the fact that a lot of the boys face difficulties in writing due to educational 
disadvantages, the test was administered in an interview format. The experimenter recorded 
all responses to ensure consistency and to avoid a `no-response' due to problems with reading 
and writing comprehension, rather than because of failure to social problem-solve. The same 
method of recording social problem-solving was used with controls. For each problem 
scenario, mean ratings of effectiveness on a 1-7 point scale (1 = not at all effective to 7= 
extremely effective) and the number of relevant means (active problem-solving steps) are 
calculated. 
The Backward Digit Task: The Backward Digit Span task is a resilient measure of IQ. 
Immediately following the oral presentation of a series of numbers the participant is required 
to repeat the numbers out loud but in the reverse order to that in which they were presented 
(i. e. last through to first). The list starts at 2 and goes up to 7, producing a maximum possible 
score of 36. Additional numbers are added to the set in increments until the participant makes 
three consecutive errors. The length of numbers for which backward spans can be generated 
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without errors is the backward digit span. The task requires children to store and manipulate 
the digit sequence. This task is considered to be a good guide to mental age. In this study the 
digit span task was used to indicate that any deficits on the Schonell Reading Test (see below) 
were a result of educational impairment not intellectual impairment. The backward digit span 
is a good indicator of central executive function, effortful working memory, mental double 
tracking, normal cognitive function and language processes (Bender, 1979) and has been used 
successfully with children (Pickering & Gathercole, 2001). If residential children were 
intellectually impaired, they would show deficits on this task, relative to controls. Instead, age 
matched controls were used as no impairment was found. 
The Schonell Reading Test (Newton & Thomson, 1976): This test consists of a list of words 
which are to be read out loud by the participant and which increase in difficulty as the reader 
progresses (see Appendix 7.2. for word list). The reader is asked to stop once he or she has 
mispronounced a word. An indication of reading ability and therefore IQ can be extrapolated 
by reference to the Schonell conversion table, which converts the number of words 
pronounced correctly into a score. As mentioned the backward digit span task was also 
included which provides a measure of central executive functioning independent of 
educational ability. The prediction in the present study was that the residential children would 
perform more poorly than controls, matched on backward digit span. 
Distractor Task. A short mood repair distraction task was included at the end of the testing 
session. This involved a standard electronic pinball game and was included to dissipate any 
induced negative mood or negative rumination caused by the nature of the study tasks or 
performance thereon. It was felt this task would be enjoyable and would also be something on 
which the boys would perform well. 
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7.4.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and face-to-face, in a private testing room within the 
school environment. Participants were first asked to complete the AMT, followed by the EF 
tasks, the FER task and the MEPS. The CDI, Schonell Reading Test and Backward Digit 
Span task were then completed, ending the session with the distractor task. The order of tasks 
was fixed to maximize co-operation from the boys (i. e. easiest/ most enjoyable first) and also 
to minimize the possible confounding effects of the emotional tasks. Once the participants had 
completed all tasks, they were thanked for their participation and fully debriefed. No 
individual child was paid for his participation but a small donation was made collectively, to 
spend on group recreational activities once testing was completed. No child was aware of this 
prior to testing. 
7.5. RESULTS 
Table 7.1 shows the demographic data for the residential and control groups. There were no 
group differences on backward digit span (t(46) = 1.09, p= . 28); Age (1(46) = . 85, p= . 40); 
CDI scores, t(46) = 1.06, p= . 30; Dysphoria ()? _ . 008, df= 1, p= . 93) or EF (x2 = . 096, df= 
2, p= . 95). The significant 
difference in Schonell scores (1(46) = 2.24, p= . 03) was expected 
and has been discussed above in the methodology section. There was however no correlation 
between verbal IQ scores and AMS in either the residential (r = -. 08, n= 30, p= . 68) or the 
control group (r =3 1, n= 18, p =. 21) and when a subset of 13 residential boys were matched 
precisely (within 2 points of their verbal IQ score) with 13 controls, AMS still distinguished 
between the groups (F(1,25) = 14.93, p< . 001). Therefore verbal IQ did not affect AMS in 
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any obvious way in this study. There was also no correlation between depression scores, 
verbal IQ (r=. 07, n= 30, p=. 66) or performance on the digit task (r=. 07, n= 30, p=. 63) 
Table 7.1. Demographic Variables 
Residential Control 
(n= 30) (n= 18) 
Mean SD. Mean SD. 
Age 13.87 0.76 13.67 0.84 
Backward Digit Span 113.03 16.96 107.78 14.73 
Schonell reading score 77.93* 15.57 87.50* 11.97 
CDI-scores 4.20 3.51 3.17 2.83 
Dysphoric: Non-dysphoric 7: 23 - 4: 14 
*significant difference between groups (p < 0.05) 
Hypothesis 1: Residential boys will show reduced AMS and this effect may be valence 
specific 
The AMS data for the residential and control samples are shown in Figure 7.1. A2x2 
ANOVA involving Group (residential vs. control) and Valence (positive vs. negative) was 
conducted on the AMS data. Results confirmed the predicted main effect of Group, F(1,46) = 
12.87, p= . 001, such that residential children (who have experienced severe negative 
adversity) showed reduced AMS. There was no significant Valence effect, F(1,46) = 1.11, p 
= . 30, 
indicating that overall children responded to positive and negative cues with 
comparable specificity. There was also no Group x Valence interaction, F(1,46) = 2.04, p= 
. 16, so that residential and control children produced similar responses to valenced cues. 
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Across all ten cue-words all participants produced a mean number of 4.46 specific responses 
(SD = 2.77, range 0-8). The mean number of specific positive memories in the residential 
group was 1.7 (SD = 1.62) and controls, 3.28 (SD = 1.07). The mean number of specific 
negative memories recalled by residential children was 1.77 (SD =1.38) and for controls, 2.83 
(SD = 1.15). The overall mean number of specific responses in the residential group was 3.47 
and was 6.11 in the control group. This difference was significant (1(46) = 3.59, p< . 001). 
Figure 7.1. AMS scores for the Residential and control samples 
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 control (n = 18) 
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The absence of any valence effect given the residential/ control division was unexpected and 
contrary to hypothesis. Of interest, given previous adult and adolescent literature in the field, 
was therefore whether mood, rather than the experience of a negative life event, would 
account for valence effects. To test this post-hoc hypothesis we looked at the relationship 
between dysphoria and valenced specificity. The total sample (residential and control 
combined) was divided into dysphoric (n = 11) and non-dysphoric (n = 37) according to 
national averages (t-score above or below 60). A2x2 ANOVA Group (dysphoric vs. non- 
dysphoric) by Valence (positive vs. negative) was again conducted on the number of specific 
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AMs retrieved. When data were re-analysed in this form, there was no significant main effect 
of Dysphoria, F(1,46) = . 97, p= . 
32, and no Group x Valence interaction, F(1,46) = . 42, p= 
52. However, the between group means for total and for positive valenced recall remained in 
the anticipated direction, i. e. the dysphoric group were less specific overall but in particular to 
positive cues (mean dysphoric positive specific memories = 1.73; mean non-dysphoric 
positive memories = 2.46: 1(46) = 1.4. p= . 19, equal variances not assumed) (Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2. AMS scores for Dysphoric vs. Non-dysphoric groups 
Positive Negative Total 
Hypothesis 2: EF will explain variance in AMS 
Table 7.2 Residential and Control Children in Low, Medium and High EF categories 
N (and %) = LEF MEF HEF 
Residential: (n = 30) 18 (60) 6 (20) 6 (20) 
Controls: (n = 18) 11 (61) 3 (17) 4(22) 
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The second study hypothesis concerned the role of EF in explaining variance in AMS. To test 
this hypothesis a3x2x2 ANOVA involving EF (high, medium and low) x Group 
(residential vs. control) x Valence (positive and negative) was conducted. The numbers of 
children in the EF categories are shown in Table 7.2. A main effect of Group remained, F(1, 
42) = 6.18, p= . 02, such that residential children were 
less specific than controls. Across all 
participants EF showed no main effect on AMS, F(2,42) = 2.19, p= . 13. In addition, there 
was no main effect of Valence (F(1,42) = 2.48, p= . 12), no Group x Valence interaction 
(F(1,42) = 1.43, p= . 
24), no EF x Valence interaction (F(2,42) = 1.12, p= . 34) and only a 
Group x EF trend (F(2,42) = 2.74, p= . 08). However, these non-significant 2-way 
interactions were qualified by a significant 3-way Group x EF x Valence interaction, F(2,42) 
= 4.10, p= . 02. 
In order to deconstruct this 3-way relationship, two 3x2 ANOVAs were 
conducted with EF x Group, on positive and negative valenced memories separately. 
Positive AMS. As can be seen from Figure 7.3, results showed that for positive recall there 
was a main effect of Group (F(1,42) = 7.43, p< . 01), no main effect of EF (F(2,42) = 1.60, p 
= . 
21, but a Group x EF interaction (F(2,42) = 4.93, p< . 01) such that there was no effect of 
EF in the control group (F(2,42) _ . 69, p= . 52) 
but a significant effect of EF on positive AM 
in the residential group (F(2,42) = 6.50, p< . 01). High emotion-focusers in the residential 
group were more specific to positive cues than either medium or low emotion-focusers in this 
group. These differences were significant (Tukey HSD = . 047 and . 
004, respectively). Thus, 
higher EF was associated with increased positive specific recall in the residential group 
relative to lower levels of EF. 
Negative AMS. Regarding the analysis of negative specific recall, there was no main effect of 
Group (F(1,42) = 2.92, p= . 01) , no main effect of EF (F(2,42) = 2.36, p= . 11) and no EF x 
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Group interaction (F(2,42) = 1.00, p= . 38). Although the results for negative AM were non- 
significant, the pattern was in the expected direction as can be seen in Figure 7.3. Hence, EF 
affects AMS but only in the residential group and in particular for positive recall. 
Figure 7.3. The effect of EF on AMS across Residential and Control groups 
D Positive   Negative D Total 
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LEF = low emotion focusing, MEF = medium emotion focusing, HEF = high emotion focusing 
Positive = responses to positive AMT cue words, Negative = responses to negative AMT cue words 
Hypothesis 3: Residential children will demonstrate impaired Social Problem Solving 
and deficits on the Facial Emotion Recognition Task. 
Facial Emotion Recognition. The data on emotion facial recognition across the residential and 
control groups are shown in Table 7.2. A2x3 (Group x Face-type) ANOVA was conducted 
on numbers of correct responses to neutral, sad and happy face valence. Results revealed a 
main effect of Group (F(1,46) = 28.96, p< . 001), a main effect of Face-type (F(2,92) = 
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95.33, p< . 001) and a Group x Face-type interaction (F(2,92) = 5.12, p< . 01). This 
significant interaction was expounded by a series of t-tests, showing that the residential group 
were worse than controls on correct recognition of sad face valence (t=(33) = 2.93, p= . 01) 
and also on neutral face valence (1(46) = 4.34, p< . 00 1), with a trend for worse performance 
on correct recognition of happy face valence, 1(46) = 1.83, p= . 07. Errors of emotion- 
recognition were then analysed using Mann-Whitney U, to allow for small numbers of 
category data. For analyses testing the a priori hypotheses that the residential group would 
make more neutral as sad errors an uncorrected level of alpha = . 05 was used. For all other 
comparisons a corrected alpha level = . 01 was employed. There were significant between 
group differences for `neutral as sad' (p = . 036), `neutral as happy' (p < . 001) and `sad as 
happy' (p < . 001) errors; all greater 
in residential group. The residential group also made 
more errors of the type `sad as neutral' and `happy as neutral', though these did not differ 
significantly from controls (p = . 12 and p= . 11, respectively). 
Social Problem Solving. The data for SPS performance across groups are presented in Table 
7.2. For the measure of SPS, the mean number of relevant steps and the mean effectiveness 
scores were calculated for each participant, from performance across all five problems. A one- 
way ANOVA on group data for relevant means showed that residential children demonstrated 
marked deficits compared to controls, F(1,47) = 59.91, p< . 001. In terms of effectiveness, a 
one-way ANOVA also showed residential group deficits on average effectiveness of social 
problem solving, F(1,47) = 70.77, p< . 001. When examined individually deficits significant 
to the level of p< . 001 were found, for means and for effectiveness, on all five problems. 
Overall (across all five problems) residential children produced an average 6.53 means 
compared to 27.61 in the control group. Residential boys scored an average effectiveness 
rating of 7.5. The control group scored 22.67 on the same scale. 
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Table 7.3. Group Differences for Face Emotion Recognition and SPS 
Residential Controls 
Mean SD Mean SD 
P-value Residential 
% Correct Face Recognition- Independent t-tests 
HAPPY 
SAD 
NEUTRAL 
TOTAL 
96 
49 
55 
64 
7 
17 
20 
9 
99 
65 
77 
78 
3 
19 
11 
9 
. 074 
. 006 
. 000 
. 000 
- 
deficit 
deficit 
deficit 
% Errors of Recognition- Mann U 
N as S 34 19 22 11 . 036 Sig. Higher 
N as H 11 09 00 02 . 000 Sig. Higher 
S as H 08 09 00 00 . 000 Sig. Higher 
S as N 43 19 36 19 . 117 - 
H as N 03 07 01 03 . 110 - 
H as S 00 02 00 00 . 439 - 
SPS, problem with, ANOVA 
1. Some-one you care about 
means 1.60 1.85 5.72 2.78 . 000 deficit 
effectiveness 1.40 1.43 4.83 1.20 . 000 deficit 
2. A teacher 
means 1.03 . 76 6.11 2.92 . 000 deficit 
effectiveness 1.50 1.17 5.11 1.32 . 000 deficit 
3. Friends 
means 1.06 1.22 5.50 3.38 . 000 deficit 
effectiveness 1.17 1.58 4.33 1.64 . 000 deficit 
4. Making friends 
means 1.53 1.76 6.44 3.11 . 000 deficit 
effectiveness 1.80 1.37 4.72 1.67 . 000 deficit 
5. A false accusation 
means 1.33 1.80 3.83 2.40 . 000 deficit 
effectiveness 1.60 1.81 3.67 1.45 . 000 deficit 
Total SPS 
means 6.53 6.56 27.61 12.34 . 000 deficit 
effectiveness 7.5 5.81 22.67 6.45 . 000 deficit 
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Hypothesis 4: There will-be positive correlations between AMS, FER, EF and SPS in the 
residential group 
The final hypothesis was that there would be a significant relationship between AMS and the 
other emotion-related variables. Analyses examining hypothesis four were conducted with 
residential data only as it is only within this group that biases on these tasks were predicted. 
The emotion relevant tasks included EF, FER and SPS. In addition to this, certain factors 
characterizing abuse in the residential group were recorded such as duration of abuse, onset of 
abuse and severity of abuse. Emotional task performance was also correlated with the abuse 
data. Reported duration and onset of abuse were not found to be significantly associated with 
AMS or any other dependent variable (ps > . 05) and were therefore excluded. Objectively 
rated severity of abuse, however, was correlated with some of the emotion-related tasks and 
was therefore included in the following descriptions. The data are presented in Table 7.4. As 
can be seen, a number of positive associations were found between the emotion-related 
measures. A priori hypotheses were examined with an uncorrected level of alpha = . 05. All 
other correlations were subjected to a corrected level of alpha = . 01. 
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Table 7.4. Correlations within the Residential Group (2-tailed) 
I. 2. 
Total Pos. 
AMS AMS 
3. 
Neg. 
AMS 
4. 
EF 
5. 
SPS 
means 
6. 
SPS 
effect. 
7. 
FER 
Neutral 
8. 
FER 
Happy 
9. 
FER 
Sad 
10. 
FER 
Total 
11. 
Abuse 
Severity 
1. 1 . 
95 . 
94 
. 
45 
. 
53 
. 
56 
. 
17 
. 
28 
. 
23 
. 33 . 
42 
- . 00 . 00 . 01 . 00 . 00 . 37 . 14 . 23 . 09 . 02 
2. 1 . 
78 
. 
49 
. 
48 
. 
51 
. 
15 
. 
37 
. 
32 
. 
36 
. 51 
- . 
00 . 
01 
. 
01 
. 
00 
. 43 . 04 . 
09 
. 
05 
. 
00 
3. I . 
38 
. 
52 
. 56 . 
17 
. 14 . 
09 
. 
23 
. 
26 
- . 04 . 
00 
. 00 . 
36 
. 
48 
. 63 . 
23 
. 17 
4. I . 
32 
. 
26 
. 
22 
. 
25 
. 
27 
. 
35 
. 
40 
- . 
09 
. 
17 
. 
25 
. 
19 
. 
16 
. 
06 
. 
03 
5. 1 . 93 . 
08 
. 
16 
. 
23 
. 
21 
. 
07 
- . 00 . 69 . 41 . 23 . 26 . 72 
6. 1 . 14 . 21 . 22 . 28 . 00 
- . 47 . 26 . 24 . 14 . 99 
7. 1 . 
20 
. 
38 
. 
84 -. 06 
- . 
28 
. 
04 
. 
00 
. 75 
8. 1 . 
31 
. 54 -. 05 
- . 
09 
. 00 . 
81 
9. 1 . 
16 -. 04 
- . 
40 
. 
84 
10. 1 -. 08 
11. 
- . 
67 
1 
No FER-errors were significantly correlated with any variable of interest and were therefore excluded 
Parametric correlations were conducted for all variables except EF, which is a categorical 
variable. Correlations reported for EF are therefore non-parametric. In contrast to hypothesis 
total AMS was positively correlated with severity of trauma (p = . 02) so that the more abused 
boys were more specific (less overgeneral). As predicted, AMS was also negatively correlated 
with SPS (means; p= . 
003 and effectiveness; p= . 001) so that reduced specificity was highly 
associated with poor social problem solving thus replicating previous adult findings. The 
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association between AMS and accuracy of emotion-recognition was suggestive for total 
specificity (p = . 087) and was significant 
for positive specificity (p = . 05), where reduced 
AMS to positive cues was especially associated with low correct-responses to happy face 
valence, p= . 044. In contrast to our prediction, there was no significant correlation 
between 
accuracy of sad face processing and AMS. Associations between AMS and other aspects of 
face processing did not reach the corrected level of significance. Also as predicted, there was 
a significant correlation between EF and AMS, such that increased EF was associated with 
increased specificity in line with the results of Study 1. Though true for both negative and 
positive valence, this correlation was more pronounced for positive cues. EF was also 
positively correlated with accurate emotion-recognition. Finally, EF was positively associated 
with severity of negative life experience such that the most severely abused boys tended to 
fall into the High EF category. A diagrammatic representation of these associative 
relationships is offered in Figure 7.4. 
Figure 7.4. Associative Relationships between Residential Group Variables 
EF 
05 
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Severity of Abuse 
. O1 . 
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f 
Facial-Emotion Recognition 
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- significant correlation -- suggestive trend 
AM specificity 
Social Problem Solving 
(SPS) 
Means p= . 02 Ends p <. 001 
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7.6. DISCUSSION 
The present study sought to investigate AM functioning and related socio-emotional 
processing in maltreated boys, to directly test the developmental-origins hypothesis of OGM 
and secondly to investigate the possible inter-relationships between these variables in 
children. Boys were tested on the standard AM cuing task, a measure of EF, facial affect 
recognition and a measure of social problem solving ability. The results of these tasks are 
discussed and subsequent implications are considered. 
7.6.1. Child OGM and Adversity 
Salient points emerging from the results of this study are first that experience of early 
negative life events is associated with reduced specific retrieval in children who are not 
significantly depressed. Typical cued responses were: angry: `all the time', hurt: `every 
weekend', lonely: `in my room at night'. In fact, overall only 35% of memories retrieved by 
maltreated boys were specific. The boys were more overgeneral than is typically observed in 
depressed or traumatized adult populations (where on average some 50% of memories 
recalled are specific; Hermans et al, 2004; Dalgleish et al, 2003). To my knowledge, to date 
this is the most marked evidence of 0GM in the literature. Chronic developmental trauma 
may therefore have greater impact on AMS than one off traumatic events, or the trauma in 
this population may have been particularly severe. Alternatively, trauma may more severely 
impact children's retrieval style, relative to adults. In adults there is perhaps more time and 
opportunity for cognitive damage-repair. Results are also consistent with adolescent studies 
showing an association between overgenerality and self-reported trauma (e. g. de Decker et al. 
2003). This is the first study to demonstrate the link between early adversity and 
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overgenerality in childhood, and to my knowledge, the first in any age group to use 
independently verified reports of trauma. Results are consistent with Williams' (1996) Affect 
Regulation Hypothesis. 
7.6.2. Valence 
There was no main effect of cue valence on AMS. This was not expected given previous 
research, which demonstrated cue-valence effects and with the previous AMT valence effects 
in Studies 1,2 and 3. Several possible reasons for the absence of a main valence effect can be 
offered. Especially in the residential population, where there is significant disturbance in 
emotion processing (as indexed by performance on the emotion-related tasks), and where 
boys are heralding from an emotionally complicated past, valence cues may not reflect the 
valence of the actual memories retrieved. Instead many cues may elicit mixed-valence 
memories, evoking negative as well as positive thoughts and associations. For instance, 
several of the boys gave memories directly pertaining to `family', in response to the cue word 
`happy'. These memories were not negative in content, but given what we know about the 
family-perpetrated abuse histories of these boys, it is doubtful that these memories were not 
also triggering some negative or mixed emotions. So although the cue word was positive the 
memories elicited may not necessarily be exclusively so. 
The same issue applies when the boys for instance gave memories of `the school', meaning 
the residential school facility, in response to the cue word `safe'. Though these memories 
were of being safe, they are unlikely to be purely positive and not also evoke some negative 
thoughts, such as' I am not with my family or `my family don't make me feel safe'. Thus, the 
nature of the complex emotional lives of these children perhaps makes it difficult to make 
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assumptions about the valence of the memories recalled. In effect, non-verified valence cuing 
may prove redundant in some populations. Asking the boys to state the valence of each 
memory on a dimensional scale may help. However, this in itself is a difficult introspective 
task, especially in light of afore mentioned emotional complexity of many of the boy's 
autobiographical events. 
The second explanation proffered here is that mood, as opposed to trauma, may determine 
valence effects in the AM literature. The fact that in these groups, matched on dysphoric 
mood, there was no sign of valence effects may be telling. When the sample was split into 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric no significant effects were found. However the between group 
means for positive specific recall were in the anticipated direction, such that dysphoric 
children retrieved inappropriately overgeneral positive memories. Although overgenerality 
occurs independent of mood or in remission from depression in some studies (e. g. Spinhoven 
et al., 2005), there is some reason to suspect that depression still affects accessibility of 
positive information (e. g. Park et al., 2002; adolescents demonstrated OGM to positive cues, 
even in remission from depression). Hence, trauma may dictate the extent of overgenerality, 
as evidenced in this study, while depression might shape valence effects by its influence on 
the accessibility of mood or schema incongruent material. In this study mood and valence 
effects were not significant, most likely due to small sample sizes in the dysphoric group. 
Nevertheless, there is some indication that valenced recall is being affected in a predictable 
direction (dysphoric individuals overgeneral to positive cues). That is, dysphoric children 
were less able to access specific positive information. Again, this is consistent with other 
adolescent studies of OGM and depression (Park et al., 2002; Kuyken et al, in press), where 
the effect of depression on AM was most pronounced for retrieval of specific positive 
memories. 
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7.6.3. EF, OGM and Abuse 
We then move to the results of EF. This is a relatively new concept and one that appears to 
offer an interesting insight into individual encoding and/ or information storage preferences. 
EF was positively correlated with AMS and with FER as predicted. Furthermore, there was an 
interaction between EF and group such that LEF was associated with reduced specificity and 
HEF was associated with increased specificity in the residential group. This interaction only 
occurred in the presence of a life stressor otherwise EF had no group level effect on 
specificity. It appears that EF may be functioning as a measure of avoidant and sensitised 
coping in the residential group, such that individuals who have experienced severe life 
adversity fall into emotionally avoidant (LEF) or emotionally sensitised (HEF) groups, 
resulting in reduced and heightened specificity, respectively. Theoretically this makes sense 
based on the coping literature (e. g. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). For example it may be that 
LEF is associated with a repressive coping style whilst HEF is associated with vigilance, in 
the context of stress or abuse. The association between reduced AMS and avoidance is 
consistent with results from Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams and Eelen (2005) and Kuyken, 
Howell and Dalgleish (in press) who both found links between reduced AMS and avoidant 
coping in depressed groups. It is interesting to note that the effect of EF on AMS was again 
stronger for positive cues, further supporting the idea that differential cognitive bias may 
hinge on the processing or retrieval of positive information in youth. 
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7.6.4. EF, Abuse Severity and Recency 
Moreover, EF and AMS were correlated with severity of abuse in the residential group. This 
was an interesting and unexpected result. With increased objectively rated abuse severity 
there was increased likelihood of high EF classification, and increased AMS. This may reflect 
a survival-based mechanism akin to hypervigilance (Mathews & MacCleod, 1994) i. e. the 
more highly abused boys by necessity may have had to be more vigilant of socio-emotional 
signals hence high EF. Thus, heightened EF with increased abuse severity in the residential 
group, may account for the surprising result that ran counter to the hypotheses, that increased 
abuse severity in the residential group was associated with increased AMS. Furthermore, an 
examination of the nature of the specific memories recalled by these most highly abused boys, 
reveals that they were recalling predominantly recent memories to cue words. For example in 
response to the cue word happy: `today when I was splashing in the puddle' or `yesterday 
when I was talking to you'. This focus on the recent past may also explain why they were 
more specific than less-severely abused peers. This would perhaps suggest an adaptive 
memory search strategy, which concentrates on the recent `safe' past to avoid an extremely 
unpleasant and problematic more distant past. However the implications of such a short-term 
memory strategy are poor in terms of long-term goal formulation and developing a positive 
identity of self (see Conway, 2005 for a review). It may also be that these more severely- 
abused boys are instigating a boundary delimited strategy in keeping with the observations 
made by Conway & Pleydell Pearce (2000) who remind us that lifetime period themes may be 
linked to higher order themes such as `work', or `school' or self-evaluative knowledge of life 
time periods such as `when things weren't going well'. Present results may suggest that the 
more disturbed boys, with more disturbed abuse histories, once removed from the negative 
life circumstances, may have delimited that period. Kuyken et al., (in press) also found less 
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overgenerality to positive cues associated with trauma in their adolescent population. It is 
unclear whether any evidence of `recency' exists in these data. Cuing autobiographical 
memories from across the lifespan would help address this recency issue. 
7.6.5. Facial Emotion Recognition (FER) 
Boys in the residential group showed considerable deficits on the facial emotion recognition 
task. This deficit applied to sad, neutral and almost also to happy face valence. It is rare in the 
visual science literature to find deficits on recognition of happy face valence as this is 
considered a very basic perceptual skill. To contextualize the severity of the recognition errors 
found here, in Study 4, errors of this magnitude were only demonstrated by school children 
aged 6-7. There are clearly serious implications for socio-emotional functioning in these boys 
given such fundamental deficiencies in the processing of basic social communication signals. 
Cicchetti, Hornung & Reed (2000) also investigated the effects of atypical experience on 
recognition of emotion in faces in children. Results also suggested that maltreated children 
show biases in their interpretation and understanding of emotional signals. Neglected children 
evidenced a response bias with a lower standard for selecting sad faces than other children for 
instance. This is consistent with the present data, where the residential children more readily 
classified neutral faces as sad compared to controls. Therefore maltreatment may affect 
children's understanding or interpretation of particular emotion displays. This result (deficits 
in recognition of salient and ubiquitous social-interpersonal stimuli) is perhaps augmented by 
the results of the social problem-solving task, arguably a related but downstream, higher order 
social-emotional task. 
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7.6.6. Social Problem Solving (SPS) 
Residential children exhibited markedly impaired social problem-solving ability. "Hit", "Stab 
them", "Don't know", "Hurt myself', "Run away" were some of the worst-case examples of 
solutions offered to social problems by the residential boys. Despite heavy prompting, these 
children failed to offer steps to solve typical social problems. In some cases boys offered 
negative steps, which would be deemed likely to worsen the social problem by principally 
resorting to violence or aggression. It was almost impossible for these boys to elaborate on 
any suggested solution. For example `Don't know- talk to them' was a typical response, and 
all suggestions likewise tended to be single step solutions. Given the boys' high-level co- 
operation on all other tasks, it is considered highly unlikely that non-cooperation could 
account for results on this task. The deficit may however be task specific. 
MEPS vignettes have a beginning and a positive end. This may have been a problem for the 
boys who have not experienced a positive end to a social problem. It is possible that the 
provision of a positive end outcome was therefore disabling for these boys and better 
responses would perhaps have been evoked given open-ended questions. The boys may also 
simply think `What is the point? '. Cognitive appraisal is often survival based in severely 
abused children, so there may be less motivation to think of nice ways to resolve the relatively 
minor conflicts depicted in MEPS. Also, in severely abused children sequential, cognitive 
processing is often lost and such children are often time-integration deficient due to living in a 
very `here and now', moment-to-moment based existence. If so, it is not surprising there are 
deficits on a social-emotional task requiring these skills. Although these boys have been 
intensively coached regarding positive/ pro-social behaviours and conflict resolution, this has 
seemingly had little to no impact on their self-world models as indexed by the MEPS. Perhaps 
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negative schemas render it difficult for these boys to conceive of positive social strategies and 
outcomes. It would therefore appear that rather than psycho-educational strategies, "direct 
experience" may be needed to change dysfunctional thinking; something suggested by 
Phillipot et al. (2004) and which has clear implications for practically-based therapies and 
interventions. 
7.6.7. Inter-relationships 
This study sought to compare AMS with other emotion-related processing in children, in 
order to observe the patterns in relationships between these measures. As predicted, reduced 
AMS was associated with impaired FER, deficits in SPS and with lower EF in the residential 
group. There was also some relationship between AMS and abuse severity. Moreover, there 
were links between EF and abuse severity and between EF and performance on the other 
tasks. EF appeared to play a pervasive role, associating with several of the measures. This 
highlights the need to further explore and to broaden our explorations of the mechanistic 
relationships between OGM and other facets of cognitive-affective processing. Further 
research is required to underpin these relationships. 
7.6.8. Temporal Order 
One specific study aim was try to shed some light on the temporal dynamic between biases 
such as overgenerality and depression, by demonstrating the possible existence of such 
cognitive biases in a population at high risk of developing the disorder. Theories of 
depression have traditionally debated the direction of causality between disorder and 
cognitive bias. OGM is one such factor that has been discussed as a vulnerability factor for 
depression. Findings from this study support the proposition that cognitive biases such as 
OGM may precede depression. Indeed blind rating of the residential group by the consultant 
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clinician in terms of likelihood of developing future serious affective disorder, specifically 
depression, showed that out of the 13 boys named, 10 demonstrated the highest relative 
overgenerality in the sample. 
7.6.9. ARH 
Regarding AR and the developmental hypothesis (Williams, 1996), early adversity does seem 
to result in overgeneral recall. However, rather than children trying to regulate emotion by 
retrieving overgenerally, instead they may recall overgenerally because they see those 
memories as prototypical, operating at level of schema and not because this is less emotive. 
These abused children may operate at a schematic level because they are regularly trying to 
make sense of difficult situations. If life events were reasonably straightforward, a-b, and all 
is right with the world, then there would be no need for a young child to heavily engage an 
implicational/schematic level of thinking (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Power & Dalgleish, 
1997). But when an individual is confronted with ongoing and severe social-emotional 
conflict, s/he will have to habitually and heavily engage an abstract system to try to `make 
sense' of their world. If so, this would function to facilitate overgeneral thinking and resultant 
OGM. This induction of schematic level processing in trying to `make sense' of unpleasant 
experiences, ties in with ruminative tendencies in the OGM depressive literature (e. g. Watkins 
& Teasdale, 2001) and with problems of assimilation, associated with trauma (e. g. Williams, 
Stiles & Shapiro, 1999). Therefore although the existence of OGM in children who have 
experienced negative life events supports an ARH, only a study designed to specifically test 
affect generated in children recalling general versus specific memories would support or 
refute the specific affect regulating claim regarding OGM (see Philippot, Schaefer, & 
Herbette, 2003 for an examination of this in adults). Moreover, while the expected main 
OGM group effect was found for the residential boys, boys who were more severely abused 
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(as objectively rated) were in fact less overgeneral. Thus, abuse severity may be one factor, 
which moderates the nature of adopted AM styles. 
7.6.10. Caveats and Limitations 
Caveats of the present study include the fact that there was no participant rating of the valence 
of memories retrieved, which may have shed light on the absence of valence main effects. 
Participants could also rate the self-referential nature of cues, suggesting that cue words rated. 
as more self-referent may reflect relevant schema. If so, this may elucidate schematic based 
interpretations of overgenerality, i. e. highly self-relevant words may be more or less likely to 
elicit OGM responses. 
In addition, diagnostic assessment and a more formal assessment of trauma should be 
ascertained in future. More broadly, the relationship between trauma and impact of trauma is 
uncertain and is a difficult issue to assess. For example, the boys were almost without 
exception totally un-cooperative when asked to complete cognitive style questionnaires, such 
that these measures were entirely dropped from the study protocol. It is likely that this form of 
questioning was too obvious and felt to be intrusive. The AM, EF, FER and SPS measures in 
contrast, were well received and the information gleaned, though less direct, offers arguably 
more candid insight into the social-emotional functioning of these boys. Hence, information- 
processing tasks appear to offer a valuable inroad into investigating difficult aspects of 
emotion processing in sensitive groups (Drummond, Dritschel & Dalgleish, 2005). 
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7.7. In conclusion 
The theoretical motivation for studying this particular population was that they met the 
difficult criterion combination of having experienced severe, objectively measured, 
independently corroborated negative life events and thus being at high risk for depression, but 
also not currently being depressed. Within this group it was possible to select children who 
were placed in care solely because of child protection issues. Cases where child protection 
was not the primary cause of referral (e. g. initial conduct disorder or criminal behaviour) were 
excluded. The control group were also carefully matched, so conclusions regarding 
differences in AM functioning can be reasonably attributed to significant early childhood 
trauma, rather than socio-economic hardship, non-verbal IQ or mood. 
The mechanism through which negative life experience impacts AMS is still an open issue, 
but it does seem that early childhood adversity results in overgeneral recall, with the 
qualification that in the most severely abused cases, less overgenerality emerges, perhaps 
reflective of a survival based coping strategy as discussed. EF has proved useful as a marker 
of AMS, as it was in Study 1, and of performance on other emotion-related tasks, and 
warrants further investigation. Even the correlation between EF and the theoretically more 
remote SPS, was suggestive, noting of course that EF correlations and interactions were only 
significant in the residential group. Hence for example, low EF was only associated with 
poorer performance on tasks related to emotion, in the maltreated youth. It is hoped the 
examination of this high-risk population on several related tasks may help facilitate our 
understanding of the temporal ordering and possible interactions between OGM and 
emotional processing skill deficits, and depression. 
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Chapter 8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
'Within a developmentaCperspective, maladaption is viewedas evolving through the successive adaptations 
of persons in their environments. It is not something a person 'has" or an inefucta6fe expression of an 
endogenous pat flogen. It is the compk result of a myriad of risk and protective factors operating over 
time. . . Just as personality or the emergence of competence 
involves a progressive, dynamic unfolding in 
which prior adaptation interacts with current circumstances in a ongoing way, so too does mafadaptation 
or disorder. " (Sroufe, 1997, p. 251-252) 
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Abstract 8 The central theme of this thesis has been to examine cognitive biases associated 
with depression, in childhood, which may mirror or differ from those biases found in adult 
depression. This body of research has principally involved the extension of AM work to child 
samples. Part I of this general discussion focuses on the main results of the five empirical 
studies and the central theses advanced. Part II reviews the thesis results in light of theory and 
Part III presents methodological limitations and future directions, followed by a final thesis 
summary. 
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Introduction 
As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, the IP approach to depression has yielded important findings 
concerning depressive biases in adults. However the IP approach has not been as extensively 
utilized in child populations. The main aim of this thesis was to expand our existing 
knowledge base concerning depression-related IP biases in children. In particular, the aim was 
to investigate the phenomenon of OGM in childhood since this phenomenon had hitherto not 
been studied in this age range. 
PART II Main Empirical Findings and Central Theses Advanced 
In Part I of this General Discussion, the first five sections offer empirical chapter summaries 
covering the main findings of the thesis. In the subsequent five sections I would like to 
propose five central theses as derived from this cumulative body of research. The theses 
advanced are; `Child AM Matters', `Age Matters', `Focus Matters', `Style Matters' and 
finally, `Valence Matters'. 
8.1. Empirical Chapter Summaries 
8.1.1. Development of AM Specificity 
This study was the first to demonstrate an OGM bias in children. Moreover, results perhaps 
tell us something about susceptibility of positive information to bias. Dysphoric children 
irrespective of age failed to retrieve specific positive memories, while the negative bias, only 
emerged later in development between ages 10-11. This supports the idea that biases 
associated with depression may emerge initially with problems with positive information 
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processing but spread to include negative information over time, and presumably with 
continued negative mood, consistent with Nandrino et al 2004 and Dozois & Dobson, 2003. 
This study also introduced a new measure of Emotion-Focusing which significantly predicted 
AMS. EF results highlight the importance of studying biases in encoding as a factor 
contributing to OGM. 
8.1.2. A Clinical Study 
The second study was the first study to allow a direct comparison of depressed adult, 
adolescent and child AM functioning with respect to overgenerality. It is also the first study to 
examine OGM bias in clinically depressed children. Thus, extending a long literature of work 
in adult clinical populations. In addition this study allows us to compare the effects of 
dysphoria with the effects of clinical depression in childhood and to observe whether there are 
any differences in the severity of associated bias. Depressed children demonstrated reduced 
AMS. The OGM effect was stronger for memories to negative cues than to positive in the 
child-depressed group but OGM was significant to both positive and negative cues in the 
older depressed groups. Results can be interpreted as support for AR and schema accounts of 
OGM. The fact that there was no significant difference between the extent of OGM across the 
three depressed age groups strongly emphasizes the importance of studying OGM in youth. 
The differences between depressed and dysphoric children's AM styles were also of note. 
8.1.3. A Longitudinal Study 
The longitudinal study was the first to examine the relationship between biases in CS and 
OGM in children. This is also the first study to use a diathesis-stress design in the 
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investigation of OGM. Evidence of a link between an overgeneral thinking style and OGM 
was of particular interest. To date, no study has documented a relationship between an 
overgeneral thinking style and OGM. OGM was also associated with a negative attributional 
style for positive events. This finding suggests that further attention should be paid to the link 
between causal attribution and OGM. This study also allowed an examination of the 
predictive value of these variables. CS predicted depressed symptoms during a stressful life 
event. Overgeneral retrieval to positive cues also predicted depressed symptoms, but not 
above that of previous mood. The depression measure used may be crucial in studies of the 
predictive value of OGM. Results were more pronounced for recall to positive (as opposed to 
negative) cues consistent with previous research in adults (e. g. Brewin et at, 1999). Although 
various schema-based interpretations of OGM exist, to my knowledge, this is the first direct 
evidence of the link between negative self-world schema and OGM. Results support a 
depression cognitive vulnerability hypothesis in children. 
8.1.4. A Face Study 
The aim of face processing study was to highlight the usefulness of information processing 
approaches to study mood related biases in affective processing in children and to validate a 
child appropriate measure of IP for use in children to compliment the AMT. As predicted, 
dysphoria was positively associated with accurate labelling of sad faces. The study revealed 
mood related bias in the way children process ecologically valid stimuli- which may have 
implications for future maladaptive biases. This study was the first to demonstrate mood 
related biases in children's processing of facial affect. Results were discussed in terms of 
cognitive bias and depressive realism. 
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8.1.5. A Residential Study 
Emotion-related processing in children in a high-risk population for depression was 
examined. Children in residential care who had experienced severe life adversity showed 
various emotion-processing deficits. This included reduced AMS, poor face emotion- 
recognition, and severe deficits on an index of social problem solving ability. EF was 
significantly correlated with many of the measures. In addition, EF interacted with negative 
life events to affect AMS so that boys who had experienced negative life events and who were 
low emotion-focusers were particularly vulnerable to OGM. This finding is interpreted as 
suggestive of an avoidant coping style consistent with Hermans et al, 2005. Results provide 
evidence of depression related cognitive biases in children preceding the development of 
clinically recognized depression. 
8.2. Central Theses 
8.2.1. Depression, Trauma and Child Autobiographical Memory Matters 
It appears OGM operates in childhood (Studies 1,2,3 and 5). Children from the ages of 7-16 
were tested across four AMT studies. In each study, there was evidence of reduced AMS 
associated with dysphoria/depression or trauma, as predicted by adult research (see Chapter 
2). The presence of OGM in children supports the developmental aspects of the theory of AR, 
which states that the origins of OGM may lie in childhood. Moreover, as with previous adult 
literature (e. g. Brittlebank et al, 1993; Brewin et al, 1999) the longitudinal value of OGM in 
predicting 24% of the variance in depressive symptoms in children, was demonstrated (Study 
3). OGM predicted depression symptoms during a stressful life event 8 months later. 
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However, OGM did not predict depression above the predictive value of previous mood 
scores. This result may be measure specific i. e. the CDI may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
mood change. This interpretation is supported by the fact that positive OGM did predict 
responses to several feeling state questions at Time 2, independent of previous mood. A 
counter argument however is that unlike in adulthood (Mackinger et al, 2000; Spinoven et al, 
2005) OGM may be highly mood dependent in children. Further research is needed to address 
this issue. Nonetheless OGM appears to play some role in experience of depression in 
childhood. 
Further evidence of the potential significance of OGM as a depressive bias in youth comes 
from the fact that there was a significant relationship between OGM other depression- 
associated biases. For example, previous work in adults has demonstrated a relationship 
between reduced AMS and poor SPS (Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 1996). Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) would suggest poor memory of specific positive events would impair 
effective on-line social problem solving. Consistent with this view, residential children 
showed SPS deficits associated with reduced AMS (Study 5). Likewise, a face-processing 
paradigm was introduced (Study 4) to attempt to investigate depressotypical biases in 
children, using a child-friendly methodology, since depression in adults is associated with 
biased facial processing (e. g. George et al, 1998). 
Finally, OGM was found in children who were not displaying current levels of depression but 
who had experienced significant life stress (Study 5). Residential boys who had been placed 
in long-term care for reasons pertaining to child protection recalled only 35 % specific 
memories. To my knowledge this is the most severe record of OGM in any clinical population 
to date. This pronounced effect may be because of the severity of trauma experienced. It may 
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also be due to a combination of age and experience of trauma e. g. closer temporal proximity 
to traumatic events may be related to greater memory overgenerality. The fact that this OGM 
bias is in evidence in a traumatized group at high risk for depression, but without any present 
depressive diagnosis, or known history of depression, may be suggestive in terms of the 
temporal relationships between trauma, depression and OGM in the childhood. 
All the AMT results are consistent with the hypothesis that once activated negative schema 
(believed to be central component of depression) influence the filtering, encoding, processing, 
interpretation, storage or retrieval of information as proposed by Clark, Beck & Alford 
(1999). In terms of AM it appears depression in childhood is associated with errors of 
memory overgenerality to positive and/or negative cues. Indeed a modified version of Breuer 
and Freud's (1895) model of autobiographical memory, presented in Power and Dalgleish 
(1997) pp 69, states that: 
"One or more early traumatic events, thoughts or wishes can form a "pathogenic 
nucleus" around which later associated memories become attached according to a 
number of rules. First, there is a linear chronological order, with the oldest memories 
running in sequences to the newer memories. There may however be multiple 
pathways or themes that can be traced back to the original nuclear memory. Second, 
the themes are stratified around the nucleus such that older strata are resisted.... Third, 
logical chains run through the material to the nucleus; these logical linkages meet at 
memory nodes and may connect across themes as well as within them. Activation of 
one of the memory nodes leads to a spread of energy through the linkages to the 
nucleus.... " 
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Hence negative experiences early in development may be crucial in underpinning OGM, 
especially if the AMT cues map onto a pathogenic nuclear theme. It will also be harder to 
change earliest themes because these themes are well buffered amongst all the associated 
memories, acting as evidence. What this argument suggests is that the system can become 
engaged in a life long pattern of disregarding information inconsistent with these initial 
negative experiences. This suggests the spotlight of research efforts and therapeutic efforts 
should be placed squarely on early experiences and subsequent developing patterns of 
cognition. The fact that depressed children, adolescents and adults all demonstrated OGM 
(Study 2) and that early experience of abuse affected memory in the residential study (Study 
5) would support this argument. 
8.2.2. Age Matters 
Age effects were demonstrated across samples. Study 1 was the only AMT study to 
systematically examined two age groups of children. (Study 2 looked at children, adolescents 
and adults, Study 3 was a longitudinal design and Study 5 looked at sample of boys in late 
childhood). In Study 1, age was a significant predictor of AMS. Specificity improved with 
increasing chronological age, between 7-11 years. Improved specificity with age is consistent 
with predictions derived from developmental literature (e. g. Howe & Courage, 1997) 
indicating better AM strategies, storage capacity and detail with age. To my knowledge, this 
is the first study to demonstrate improved specificity with age in children using a standard 
cuing methodology. 
Interestingly, when AMS was investigated over a wider age range (Study 3), AMS was found 
to improve across age (adults were more specific relative to adolescents and children). 
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However, this was only in the non-depressed groups. Depressed AMS did not significantly 
improve across age group. This finding is consistent with results from Study 1, in that 
dysphoric children's negative AMS style did not improve with increased age unlike non- 
dysphoric counterparts'. There are clear implications here in terms of the impact of depression 
on a developing memory system. It is tempting to speculate that early experience of 
depression leaves a lasting impairment on the AM system. 
In a further comment about age, irrespective of the mechanism at work, the extent of OGM 
across depressed child, adolescent and adult groups was not significantly different. That is, 
depression appeared to operate similarly across age (Study 2). Depressed children were just as 
overgeneral as depressed adults. Given the association between OGM, hopelessness and 
suicidality in adults (e. g. Williams, et al, 2005), this has significant implications in terms of 
the seriousness with which researchers and clinicians approach OGM in youth. Moreover, 
core beliefs develop from early childhood. Self-concept formation begins around the age of 5 
(Howe & Courage, 1993) therefore if negative self-beliefs can begin to influence the 
developing system from this point, there is further reason to pay attention to this phenomena 
early in youth. OGM may offer a direct target for preventative therapeutic intervention. 
8.2.3. Focus Matters 
With respect to what aspects of IP are contributing to the OGM effect, a neglected area of 
research has been encoding. This thesis introduced a new measure of Emotion-Focusing (EF) 
to address this deficit. More specifically, would children who encode the `emotion' content of 
situations be better at retrieving specific AMs? EF was therefore coined as a term to represent 
the extent to which children focus on emotion in the environment. EF was investigated in 
270 
CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Studies I and 5 and in both studies EF significantly predicted unique variance in AMS. In 
Study 1 children who were more likely to encode emotion demonstrated increased AMS so 
that OGM was associated with low EF. It is conceivable that the association between low 
emotion focusing and OGM points to an avoidance tendency consistent with results from 
Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams & Eelen (2005). Hermans et al showed that a cognitive 
avoidant coping style was associated with reduced AMS. This cognitive avoidance ties in 
with reduced AMS and reduced AMS is associated with `avoidance' of emotional descriptors 
in the EF task. Thus, EF may be tapping a global index of avoidant vs. sensitised processing 
styles. There was a main effect of EF for negative cues and an age and EF interaction for 
positive cues in Study 1. Most children struggled to recall specific negative memories. High 
EF children on the other hand, were able to produce specific negative memories, irrespective 
of age. It appears that if events are encoded in emotional terms an emotional cue will be more 
likely to activate the memory representation. Contrary to predictions, there was no significant 
relationship between dysphoria and EF in this study. It is unclear what the implications 
therefore exist in terms of EF and depression. 
In Study 5, EF was again associated with AMS. EF interacted with group such that in the 
presence of significant life adversity low EF was associated with OGM and high EF was 
associated with specific recall. EF was also significantly related to abuse severity in this 
group such that the more (objectively rated) abused boys were more likely to fall into the high 
EF category. It is suggested that this may be part of a survival mechanism akin to 
hypervigilance (Mathews & MacCleod, 1994). Furthermore, the result was specific to positive 
AMS, so that highly abused children were able to produce more specific positive memories 
relative to less abused children in the lower EF groups. This counterintuitive finding was 
given some consideration. When the AMS data from the most highly abused boys was 
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examined, it appears that these boys were producing highly specific positive memories, de 
facto by producing very recent memories to positive cues. This recency effect has not been 
highlighted in the research to date and could again reflect an extreme avoidant memorial 
coping strategy, which could have a bearing on OGM results. 
Williams (1996) suggested that a predisposition to focus on emotion should result in OGM as 
a result of schematic level processing. Instead EF was associated with increased AMS, in 
accordance with various theories of cognition and emotion (Beck et al 1979; Power & 
Dalgleish, 1997; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Low EF is associated with OGM in the 
residential groups. However EF was not related to depression scores. EF can assess the 
relative extent to which individuals focus on emotion. However, the stimuli are not yet 
designed to tackle `over-sensitivity' to emotional cues. That is a stimulus set needs to be 
developed in which the emotional content of the cues varies systematically to assess whether 
certain individuals are hypersensitive to emotion'. It could be that assessment of 
hypersensitivity to emotion is required before this relationship will emerge, or that the self- 
referential nature of the EF stimuli is important in testing depression effects. Thus, EF is a 
novel measure and a novel construct. However, there is clearly much scope to develop this 
measure further to index what individuals are attending to in the environment and what 
implications this may have on further information-processing and memory. 
8.2.4. Style Matters 
A significant relationship was identified between CS and OGM (Study 3). To my knowledge 
this is the first evidence of a significant relationship between a negative CS and OGM in the 
literature. In particular OGM was associated with a tendency to overgeneralize. OGM was 
I would like to acknowledge Mark Williams for his personal communication of this important observation. 
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also associated with a negative attributional style. Hence, a child who made errors of 
overgeneralization for negative events and who believed positive events were unstable (i. e. 
likely to change over time) were more likely to demonstrate OGM to positive cues. Bearing in 
mind, that this was not a clinical population, this is a strong result. The theoretical links 
between overgeneralizing (Beck et al, 1979) and OGM (Williams, 1996) are clear however no 
account of OGM has explicitly considered this CS as a key contributing factor. Attributional 
style appears to be involved in the way events are encoded and retrieved in childhood. The 
salience attributed to events may be partly governed by the way in which they are causally 
viewed for instance. If an event is deemed unstable it is perhaps less useful as information on 
which to form higher order judgements or base goals, and so on. Therefore unstable events 
may be less likely to be recorded than stable events. Attributional style was related to OGM 
and was able to predict depressive symptoms independent of previous mood. As with EF, 
future studies could address these IP styles in greater detail to investigate their role in OGM. 
OGM was not associated with catastrophizing, selective abstraction, or internalising. It may 
be that these cognitive errors/styles are less prevalent in childhood or that they only come into 
play later in childhood or with greater severity of depression. 
8.2.5. Valence Matters 
One of the overarching aims of this thesis was to examine cue valence effects with respect to 
OGM. On the whole, irrespective of depression, children were less likely to recall specific 
negative memories relative to positive (in all AMT studies). This main effect suggests that on 
the whole, children are predisposed to better recall (or encode) specific positive events from 
their lives relative to negative, in keeping with a literature on positive bias in normals (e. g. 
Taylor & Brown, 1988; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004). The results of the facial 
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emotion recognition task in non-dysphoric children perhaps also support this positive bias 
hypothesis in that normal non-dysphoric children tended to make sad as neutral errors. 
Dysphoric children showed reduced positive AMS (Studies 1&3 in school samples). In 
clinical samples, the effects of OGM were more stable for recall to negative cues, although 
effects were also present for positive cues. This may suggest that the recall of positive 
information is particularly susceptible to the effects of mood in terms of OGM. That is, it was 
difficult for dysphoric/depressed children to access specific positive memories. Moreover, 
when dysphoric and non-dysphoric children are compared, non-dysphoric children show a 
bias in favour of specific positive recall (relative to negative), while dysphoric children show 
balanced specific recall (i. e. similar means for positive and negative AMS). The implications 
in terms of schema are that dysphoric children lack positive self-schema, relative to controls. 
Thus positive information is less well retained. Moreover, when less positive information is 
accessible this has implications for a person's sense of self and future goal planning (Conway, 
2005). This in turn may well affect mood (e. g. ICS, 1993; SPAARS, 1997). Dysphoric 
children demonstrated similar means for positive and negative AMS consistent with the 
number of memories typically recalled by individuals in a happy or sad mood (Power and 
Dalgleish, 1997). It is important to track this valence effect across development to see what 
future role it may play in depression. 
In the traumatized population (Study 5) valence effects were noticeably absent. The absence 
of valence effects in the residential study may be linked to the fact that groups were matched 
on mood. Since, splitting this data into dysphoric and non-dysphoric showed means in the 
anticipated direction i. e. dysphorics less specific to positive cues. In addition, in the 
discussion of Chapter 7 (section 6.2) it was posited that valence cues in the residential group 
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may have elicited `mixed' valence responses, as judged by the content of the memory 
responses e. g. memories of an abusive parent in response to the cue `happy'. Emotion related 
processing is complicated in these children, as evidenced by their performance on all 
emotion-related tasks, therefore the absence of valence effects in this population should be 
interpreted with this in mind. 
Moreover, clinically depressed children demonstrated reduced AMS to negative cues, 
consistent with the idea that if more negative schema are in operation not only positive, but in 
addition, negative event memory may be affected. Indeed, with increased depression negative 
schema are posited to exert greater influence on processing (Beck et al, 1979). In depressed 
children it is possible that negative themes of `sad', `lonely' etc, as presented by the AMT 
cues words, trigger central, active themes, which result in a propositional readout (Dalgleish 
et al, 2003) or that negative events have become prototyped. Alternatively, the activation of 
negative affect caused by negative cues may inhibit a successful memory search (Philippot et 
al, 2004) or OGM to negative cues may reflect cognitive avoidance (Williams, 1996). Direct 
investigation of the affect inducing effect of cue words, the self-referential nature of AMT cue 
words, generalizing tendencies, as well as in depth interviews about coping with painful 
memories would help decode which theory better accounts for the OGM responses. 
There was also a relationship between age and valence. Dysphoric children aged 7-8 were 
more specific to negative cues than same age counterparts but dysphoric children aged 10-11 
were less specific to negative cues, relative to controls. That is, negative AMS did not 
improve across age-group in the dysphoric sample (Study 1). This may be mechanistically 
important. Longitudinal studies are clearly required to better test the development of OGM 
across age. Nonetheless, the present results suggest that early experience of dysphoria effects 
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AM such that by age 10-11 an OGM style to negative cues as well as positive is established. 
It may be that dysphoria/depression effect positive and negative recall through different 
underlying mechanisms. Positive OGM could occur more through a mood congruent 
mechanism (relatively independent of age) whereas negative OGM may be more schema 
dependent (see Chapter 3, Study I section 6.3). 
Subtle valence differences may offer an important mechanistic insight into the operations 
underlying OGM. For example, there were no significant differences between AMS in the 
depressed and dysphoric child groups. However, the within group valence patterns and the 
valence differences between these groups and their controls, were intriguing. Depressed 
children differed from controls for negative AMS. Dysphoric children differed from controls 
for positive AMS. More precisely, dysphoric children demonstrated similar AMS for positive 
and negative cues, while controls produced greater positive AMS. In contrast, depressed 
children produced fewer specific negative AMs, than positive. Further studies are required to 
replicate these valence patterns and to specifically target an investigation of possible 
mechanisms involved. 
It is unclear why valence effects in the literature are mixed i. e. some studies find the 0GM 
with negative cues (Dalgleish et al, 2001; Mackinger et al, 2000; Burnside et al, 2004), other 
studies, including the ones in this thesis (Studies 1,3,4), find that the OGM effect typically 
lies with responses to positive cues (de Decker et al 2003; Moore, Watts & Williams, 1988; 
Park et at 2002; Puffet et al, 1991; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 
1988). It would appear from the results of this thesis that age, depression severity and 
experience of trauma may influence the valence effects observed. It may also be the case that 
overgeneral memories are elicited when cues reflect a particular autobiographical theme, 
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irrespective of the cue valence (Dalgleish et al, 2003). Valence effects would therefore vary 
across studies as a function of how closely cue word valence mapped onto the relevant 
schema in memory. In explaining valence effects, it is likely though that more than one 
mechanism, bias or effect is in operation at any given time i. e. proto-typicality, affect 
regulation, affect arousal or schema congruency (see Chapter 2). It may be that "No 
theoretical rationale can be given to account for these divergent results [or that] ... the effect of 
valence is merely a spurious effect" (de Decker et al, 2003). Otherwise, valence effects may 
be attributable to several stable factors in predictable ways. 
In summary, the consistent demonstration of OGM to positive cues and the significant effects 
relating to positive OGM through out this thesis is consistent with a meta-analysis of AM 
effects (Van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004), reporting that OGM is more often to positive not 
negative cues. Indeed, the origins of depressive biases, including OGM, may be with 
impairment in the processing of positive stimuli. This is important, in terms of therapy where 
focusing on interpretation of negative events may be far less relevant, if at all relevant, 
compared to therapy focusing on the interpretation, evaluation, appraisal, or memory for 
positive information. For example, in the context of depression, "The patient generally does 
not pay attention to or does not assimilate the meaning of events which disconfirm his 
depressing view. " (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). This may lead to refined clinical 
interventions, which specifically target disruptions to positive information processing. Indeed, 
evidence of a depression-associated bias away from specific positive information (consistent 
with positive OGM) rather than towards negative information processing, has been 
documented across various domains of processing. 
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Valence and Depression more generally 
For example, Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence, Cusack & Ogilvie (2004) found that MDD patients 
reported less arousal, less pleasantness and increased sadness in response to positive images. 
There was no increased sadness rating to negative stimuli. Likewise, from a behavioural 
perspective, Hopko, Armento, Chambers & Lejuez (2003) found mildly depressed individuals 
failed to perceive or acknowledge the positive benefits of pleasure yielding behaviours, with 
immediate or distal positive potential. Curry & Craighead (1990) found that depressed 
adolescents differed from psychiatric controls on positive event attribution. Similarly 
depressed women showed deficits for emotional responses only to pleasant facial expressions 
(Sloan, Strauss & Wisner, 2001) Also, in depressed youth inpatients, impaired processing of 
hedonic information (lower rates of positive adjective endorsement and lower rates of positive 
adjective recall) were observed, which were specific to depression and were not associated 
with anxiety. No effect of negative information processing was associated with depression. 
(Gencoz, Volez, Gencoz, Petit & Joiner, 2001). Mitterschifßhaler, et al (2003) also reported 
decreased activation in the medial frontal cortex when depressed females were shown positive 
stimuli. 
Moreover, Nandrino, Dodin, Martin & Henniaux (2004) conducted a fascinating study into 
processing of emotional information in first episode, recurrent and remitted depression. 
Increased or decreased P300 amplitudes, in response to positive and negative words, were 
measured'. First-episode depressed patients showed impairment for positive stimuli 
4-Amplitudes of event-related evoked potentials (ERPs) may reflect; resource allocation (Deldin et at 2001); 
strength of response to stimuli such that higher P300 amplitudes indicate confirmed participant expectations 
(Nandrino et al 2004); or the activation of stored memories required to process a stimulus (Johnson et al, 1993). 
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hypersthesia for negative stimuli (increased P300). This may be consistent with the present 
thesis AMT results found for dysphoric and depressed children. After clinical improvement, 
the positive deficit remained in the first-episode group while the negative bias disappeared in 
the recurrent group. Results strongly indicate that a depressive deficit with respect to positive 
information processing exists in the early stages of depression, which may form the basis for 
subsequent negative information processing biases in recurrent depression. 
Dozois & Dobson (2003) also tested the interconnectedness of depressive self-schema on a 
computerized task whereby individuals placed positive and negative interpersonal trait 
adjectives into a matrix depending on how self-descriptive and how positive or negative the 
words were believed to be. Inter-stimulus distance was calculated controlling for adjective 
endorsement. Individuals with more recurrent depression demonstrated significantly greater 
organization of negative content (i. e. less inter-stimulus distance) and less interconnectedness 
of positive content (i. e. greater inter-stimulus distance) than those with less recurrent 
depression. `Separated' organization of positive information is thought to reflect poor positive 
self-schema. This could underlie poor retention, retrieval, encoding or assimilation of positive 
information in depressed individuals. Thus, evidence from the wider depressive literature is 
consistent with the valenced AMT data results found here, indicating initial positive- 
information biases, spreading to negative-information biases. 
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Implications for Valence and OGM 
So far we have discussed the importance of age and depression status in accounting for 
valence specific results. There may also be different valence patterns associated with different 
clinical groups. In addition, it is clear that specific and overgeneral valenced memory retrieval 
can have different implications depending on the passive (or active) motivation behind of the 
preferred retrieval style. Future studies could specifically consider this issue. For example, a 
negative specific memory can reflect more than one thing such as an intrusive negative 
memory, an avoidant trivial or recent memory, or simply non-avoidant task compliance. (see 
Table 8.1) 
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Table 8.1. A Sample of Possible Underlying Explanations for Valenced AM Responses 
AM RESPONSES TO VALENCED CUES 
(proposed nature of effect) 
Specific negative 
1. Negative memories trivial, recent, harmless (functional) 
2. Negative memories commonplace so too many to choose from " 
3. Intrusive memory (dysfunctional - but not synonymous with depression) trauma related- 
4. Events encoded as negative when perhaps not (dysfunctional-synonymous with depression)** 
Overgeneral negative 
1. Negative events seen as schematic (dysfunctional) 
(a) Because frequent (dysfunctional but unbiased) " 
(b) Because significant (dysfunctional )** 
(c) Because viewed as prototypical (dysfunctional)** 
2. Participant is a child (N/A) 
Specific positive 
1. Access to lots of positive memories (functional) 
2. Specific positive retrieval recent or trivial (dysfunctional -link with trauma)- x 
Overgeneral positive 
1. Positive events seen as schematic (largely functional) 
(a) Because frequent (functional) 
(b) Because significant (less functional )x 
(c) Because viewed as prototypical (possibly functional but biased) x 
2. There are no specific positive memories to choose from (dysfunctional but not biased) " 
3. Positive specific events exist but are not retrieved or encoded as such (highly dysfunctional)** 
Note: Content analysis and participant report of typicality and AMsignificance required 
** Memory style synonymous with depressive bias 
" Perhaps indicative ofDepressive Realism 
Trauma related 
x Positive Bias 
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As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the styles of interest to a cognitive psychologist investigating 
depressive bias are evident and do not blanket encompass overgeneral (or specific) retrieval. 
Depressive bias: Overgeneral negative (because viewed as prototypical or significant) 
Overgeneral positive (because not retrieved or encoded as such) 
Specific negative (because encoded as such) 
Where specific or overgeneral memory is deemed justified (i. e. roots currently experiential) 
this is not classed as depressive bias. This would be classed as depressive realism and is 
marked ("). 
Depressive Realism: Specific negative (because so many to choose from) 
Overgeneral negative (prototypical because frequent) 
There are also several styles, which may prove typical of a trauma population. Since trauma 
and depression are often co-morbid, it is unsurprising that styles perhaps more critically 
associated with trauma have been classified as depression-associated in the AMT literature. 
(denoted by -, ) 
Trauma Related: Specific negative (because intrusive) 
Specific positive (when trivial or recent) 
Something which is rarely discussed in the literature, but which is surely as scientifically 
noteworthy as is depressions' polar sister; positive bias. 
Positive Bias: Specific positive (when trivial or recent but individual not traumatized) 
Overgeneral positive (because viewed as significant) 
Overgeneral positive (because viewed as prototypical) 
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So is OGM always Over-generalizing? 
It is not clear that positive and negative OGM echo the same cognitive process. OGM to 
negative cues in depression may reflect the operation of negative schema, prototypicality or 
overgeneralization judgements consistent with a typical depressive categoric style (Beck et al 
1979). OGM to positive cues in depression, on the other hand, may reflect the fact that 
specific positive information has being dismissed due to cognitive dissonance. Thus, OGM to 
negative cues may occur because there are multiple exemplars, which have been given a 
general classification. OGM responses to positive cues may indicate an absence (rather than 
abundance) of positive memories. If this is the case, positive and negative OGM in depression 
do not reflect the same underlying memorial search-retrieve processes. 
Positive OGM would reflect a task failure whereas negative OGM would reflect 
overgeneralising in the true sense. That is, a depressed person doesn't say `I'm happy all the 
time' because they have accessed lots of happy memories and have generalised them. They 
may however say `I'm happy sometimes' because they fail to locate a specific memory. Both 
responses are classified as OGM but the implications in terms of memory-search-retrieval are 
different. Perhaps a simple task to accompany the AMT would shed light on this issue. For 
example, asking individuals to list as many good and bad memories as possible in a fixed time 
period might give an indication of the availability of negative vs. positive memories, to 
compliment the overgenerality data. If valenced OGM is as proposed, one would expect many 
more `negative' memories to be listed than `positive'. In essence, depressed OGM to positive 
cues may not reflect overgeneralizing, that is, the cognitive principle of spreading semantic 
meaning across several elements (de Bonis, 1998) but rather poor positive information 
processing. 
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PART 11 1 Theory 
8.3. Problems, Alternatives and Additions to the Theory of Affect Regulation 
Though the theory of Affect Regulation (AR), (Williams, 1996) has generated substantial 
research interest in the field of AM and affective disorders (see Chapter 2) and has fuelled 
numerous creative and productive theoretical debates in the literature (e. g. Dalgleish et al., 
2003; Philippot et al, 2004) which have undoubtedly advanced our understanding of the 
underpinnings of depressive cognitive (memory) style. It grows increasingly likely that AR 
cannot adequately account for the wide-ranging findings in the literature. It remains highly 
likely that a cognitive avoidant style plays some role in the development and/or maintenance 
of overgeneral recall. However, the following sections highlight the main, emerging 
shortcomings of AR. The second part of this section deals with alternative theories to account 
for OGM in depression and traumatized groups. 
8.3.1. Multiple Interpretations e. g. Prototypicality 
Regarding AR and the developmental hypothesis (Williams, 1996), early adversity does seem 
to result in overgeneral recall. However, rather than children trying to regulate emotion by 
retrieving overgenerally, instead they may recall overgenerally because they see those 
memories as prototypical, operating at level of schema and not because this is less emotive. 
Under normal circumstances people use generic memory because of the efficiency it affords 
in summarizing large numbers of individual episodes and events. General memories can give 
quick access to information. However general memories are formed not merely as a frequency 
effect, i. e. the more frequent an event the more likely it is to become generic. Instead, one off 
events are often generalized if they are viewed as typical by the individual. Importantly then, 
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individual events can become generic in a person's memory if they are seen as paradigmatic 
or representative, as governed by an individual's `cognitive agenda'. Our retrieval systems 
deliver what is seen as typical and what is considered `typical' by an individual is effected by 
their current schema and scripts. Thus overgeneral recall may feasibly be considered a 
consequence of prototypical appraisals governed by underlying schema unmotivated by an 
affect regulation mechanism. 
Children may operate at this schematic level if they are regularly trying to make sense of 
difficult situations. If life events were reasonably straightforward, then there would be no 
need for a young child to heavily engage an implicational/schematic level of thinking 
(Barnard & Teasdale, 1993; Power & Dalgleish, 1997). However, when an individual is 
confronted with stress, for example in the case of trauma or depression, s/he will habitually 
and heavily engage an abstract system to try to `make sense' of their world. If so, this would 
function to facilitate overgeneral thinking and resultant OGM. This induction of schematic 
level processing in trying to `make sense' of unpleasant experiences, ties in with ruminative 
tendencies in the OGM depressive literature (e. g. Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) and with 
problems of assimilation, associated with trauma (e. g. Williams, Stiles & Shapiro, 1999). 
Therefore although the existence of OGM in children who have experienced negative life 
events or depression, supports an ARH, only a study designed to specifically test affect 
generated in children recalling general versus specific memories would support or refute the 
specific affect regulating claim (see Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003). Moreover, while 
the expected main OGM group effect was found in traumatized boys (Study 5), boys who 
were more severely abused were in fact less overgeneral. This effect has also been been 
demonstrated by Kuyken, Howell & Dalgleish (2005). The current ARH cannot singularly 
account for this type of complexity in the OGM data. 
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8.3.2. AR's problem with Valence 
Another problem with the theory of AR in explaining OGM is the existence of overgeneral 
positive memory in depression. The theory of AR, if correct, can account for why depression 
is associated with a propensity to produce overgeneral negative memories, i. e. the avoidance 
of specific (painful) negative memories. This theory comes unstuck, or at best must stretch to 
account for cases of overgeneral positive recall. Continuing with an AR hypothesis, one could 
only argue that overgeneral positive recall exists because (a) the AM system becomes 
indiscriminately overgeneral or (b) searches for specific positive memories triggers thoughts 
of "I don't have specific positive memories" which results in the experience of negative affect 
and thus overgeneral recall. Either way, the mix of overgeneral negative and positive 
memories found in clinically relevant populations, makes it difficult to conceive of how these 
qualifications would systematically work. For example, if OGM is viewed as an attempt to 
avoid specific negative memories, we must assume individuals demonstrating overgeneral 
recall to positive cues are trying to avoid remembering specific positive memories. This is 
only coherent if one assumes that positive personal memories are adverse to some individuals. 
This may well be in the case in depression (e. g. Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence, Cusack & 
Olgivie, 2004). It is slightly more difficult to explain in remission from depression, as 
individuals in a good mood should not find positive memories adverse. 
8.3.3. Are Specific Memories Actually More Emotionally Evocative? 
Indeed, are specific memories actually more emotionally evocative than general? The theory 
of AR rests on the assumption that they are. However, recent work by Phillipot and 
colleagues (Philippot et al, 2002; Philippot et al, 2003; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005) has 
suggested that under some circumstances specific recall may be less emotionally evocative 
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than general. Furthermore, distinctions must be made between different types of emotion 
generation. Specific memories can certainly trigger physiological emotion reactivity as details 
of a traumatic or unpleasant or unwanted memory come to mind (e. g. Brewin, 2001). 
However, at the same time, generic memories can generate emotion, but emotion perhaps of a 
different quality. The emotion generated by overgeneral negative remembrance- causes the 
individual to `feel' depressed, hopeless, powerless, and vulnerable i. e. triggers emotion 
perhaps via a more schematic route (e. g. Power & Dalgleish, 1997). This type of distress may 
be harder for individuals to quantify and introspect about so participants' rating of emotional 
intensity may be confounded by this complexity. This type of abstract thinking is not 
necessarily associated with high physiological arousal but it is, in essence, associated with 
long-term dysfunctional affect. 
8.3.4. The Extent of Overgenerality in a given Population or Patient 
Another problematic aspect of the Williams' (1996) model is its dependence on a disruption 
to the normal development of the memory system in childhood. As Dalgleish et al. (2003) 
pointed out, a developmentally disrupted memory system would result in a high incidence of 
overgeneral memories but this is not the case. Overgeneral memories are the exception rather 
than the rule; typically 75% of memories retrieved on the AMT are specific. In support of the 
AR theory in terms of importance of childhood experience on the developing AM system, 
current results show that severe negative life events in early childhood results in extreme 
overgenerality (35% specificity in Study 5). It is simply that, this may not be only (or largely) 
due to AR processes. Instead it may just as easily be associated with the impact of early 
adversity on developing schema. 
287 
CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.3.5. Alternatives to Affect Regulation: Temporary Memory System Disruption 
An alternative theoretical analysis of the overgenerality bias might be that the memory system 
is developmentally normal but that individuals fail on the task on a relatively small number of 
trials because the memory system is temporarily disrupted for some reason. This Temporary 
Memory System Disruption hypothesis (TMSD) is proposed by Dalgleish et al, (2003). The 
source of this disruption could be the presence of personal schemas, "conflating across 
positive or negative aspects of past experience". Certain cue words might map closely onto 
the content of such schemas thereby causing them both to become further activated and to 
attract processing resources. This would mean that either a propositional read-out of activated 
schema would be given, or that processing would be truncated as resources are directed 
elsewhere. This might also explain why anxiety is not typically associated with overgeneral 
AM; anxiety-related negative schemas are about the world not about the self. Asking anxiety 
patients to generate specific memories about the threatening content of the world may result 
in overgeneral errors. 
Similarly if viewing OGM as an inhibitory control problem, Hasher & Zacks (1979) proposed 
that depressed individuals have difficulty inhibiting interfering cognitive material when 
seeking to perform cognitive tasks. Within a hierarchical AM framework this would lead to 
vulnerability to OGM because specific retrieval requires appropriate inhibition of mnemonic 
material from other stages of the memory hierarchy. Deficits in this ability to inhibit 
interfering information may contribute significantly to OGM errors. Moreover it has very 
recently been demonstrated that AM retrieval appears particularly vulnerable to executive 
failures of inhibitory control. Dalgleish et al. (2005) argued that, if a central problem in 
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specific memory retrieval is a failure to inhibit interfering information, then numbers of over- 
general memories on the AMT should be associated with errors of performance on executive 
tasks that require inhibition of irrelevant information. In a series of studies in dysphoric 
individuals Dalgleish et al. demonstrated that this was the case. Levels of 0GM were 
correlated highly with levels of inhibitory task errors on a range of executive paradigms with 
little or no relationship to autobiography, memory or emotion. 
Overgeneral positive recall may also be explained with reference to negative schema. In effect 
depressed individuals may underplay positive specific memories because of strong negative 
schema making the recollection of specific positive memories incongruent with the self. 
Alternatively, the absence of positive schema (rather than the presence of negative schema) in 
some individuals (for examples dysphorics) could explain poor specific positive recall. In 
addition, a negative self-schema (e. g. `I am a failure') could be activated by both negative- 
schema congruent (e. g. `Sad') and positive-schema incongruent (e. g. `Success') cues. In the 
first instance the schema will be activated and the depressed individual will quickly be able to 
give a response be it specific (because they can think of multiple examples) or generic 
(because they view sad events as prototypical). In the second instance, being made to think 
about success may make a depressed person think of all the ways in which they are not 
successful thus triggering negative self-schema. It will be difficult to suppress the influx of 
these `non-successful' memories to provide a counterexample. The individual may now give a 
general response. Hence, active self-schemas are likely to be a source of cognitive intrusion 
when cues reflect the thematic content of these schema (Dalgleish et al, 2003). 
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8.3.6. Developmental Schema Memory Impact Theory (D-SMIT) 
I would trouble to go one step further, and combine elements of AR with TMSD and suggest 
that the developmental memory system is not normal, but is impaired, but that the impairment 
is not affiliated with AR mechanisms. I would argue that due to the effects of early childhood 
trauma or adversity (an AR element), the memory system is biased to: 
(a) Encode events as negative (because sensitised to negative information) 
(b) See negative events as prototypical (because the event(s) happened early in life 
they will have heavily influenced schema development) 
(c) Filter out positive events as schema incongruent (consistent with schema 
theory) 
Thus, there is heightened sensitivity to negative information (due to the AR early adversity 
element) followed by subsequent overgenerality caused by a combination of schema 
congruent vs. incongruent mechanisms and prototypicality bias. This means schema are 
causally involved in the retrieval of overgeneral memories (the TMSD element). However, 
the developmental impact of adversity on schema, is such that it accounts for why it is in 
depressed individuals that this overgeneral effect is predominantly observed 
We all have schema. Yet the schema of normal mood individuals, are not activated by AMT 
cue words, or if activated, the schema do not appear to have strong effector links with the 
memory system (no resulting overgeneral memory). This may be because difficult childhood 
memories are key to OGM in the sense that early childhood adversity establishes close links 
between developing schema and developing memory and emotion, and thereby the systems 
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can exert greater (than normal) influence on each other. This argument, in short, is the 
developmental-schema memory impact theory (D-SMIT). 
Schema-memory and emotion links in childhood-traumatized individuals will be strong. Less 
traumatic or less significant negative events early in childhood will only moderately if at all 
evidently, impact developing schema and will not be accompanied by strong affect links. 
Schema are less malleable in adulthood, which is why concentrated therapeutic effort is often 
required to modify or qualify schema after a negative event. Childhood adversity on the other 
hand, will far more easily impact developing schema. In fact early experience functions as the 
very blueprint for such schema. Early experience guides the newly developing schema, hence 
early negative experience has significant implications on self, world and future schema as 
there is little backlog of experiential information in children to offer contradictory or 
competing evidence. Children's schema are new and like carte-Blanc; impressionable. Early in 
life children who have experienced trauma and/or adversity believe that `bad things happen to 
me and I can't prevent it'. This has subsequent effects on mood, information processing, and a 
developing memory system. The schema of non-depressed/non-traumatized children on the 
other hand may develop in a more piecemeal, integrative, functional way, encompassing 
multiple (and less emotive) event memories and appraisals. It is early adverse experience, 
which results in `pathogenic nuclear themes' (Breuer & Freud, 1895). 
This is arguably why the theory of TMSD holds true for depressed individuals but not for 
controls. This is also why the theory of AR holds true, in the sense that early childhood 
trauma is of causal significance in the development of the OGM bias. Whereas, TMSD 
neglects to explain why disruption only occurs in depression and AR, I propose, gets the 
implications of childhood adversity wrong (i. e. avoiding specific negative memories as 
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opposed to forming negative schema). Combined however, and with the addition of the stress 
on development of strong schema-memory-emotion links (thus the ensuing vulnerability of 
the schema and memory systems to each other), it becomes easier to account for many of the 
results in the valenced AM depressive literature. Also as with anything pertaining to plasticity 
in the brain, there is likely to be a critical period during development whereby the impact of 
negative information is more severe than otherwise. One could argue that this period is during 
early childhood when cognitive schemas are being developed and formed. 
8.3.7. Congruence and Inhibition 
Recently, Dalgleish and colleagues (2005) have shown that self-rated depression was 
associated with specific errors when the task instructions were reversed. It is felt that 
inhibition is therefore also key to understanding the nature of 0GM responses. Clinical 
groups fail to inhibit task inappropriate responses and therefore so far have looked to be 
overgeneral but are overspecific if they are required not to be. This makes sense in terms of 
the clinical groups that are effected i. e. depression and trauma and OCD and eating disorders 
all have problems with intrusive negative information and `control'. Hence, we can infer, that 
a problem with inhibiting unwanted information may be relevant to OGM. 
8.3.8. Importance of self-concept to OGM 
The importance of self-concept is also an under-researched area of OGM. In adolescence, 
memories best recalled as contributing to life stories were organized around clear themes and 
personality traits, with high levels of congruency and consistency (Habermas & Bluck, 2000). 
Therefore it seems likely that organization of self-concept effects AM. Howe & Courage 
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(1993) state that with the emergence of the self we witness the emergence of AM. They argue 
that AM does not depend on language for its existence but does require a cognitive sense of 
self. So is it possible that self-concept is less sophisticated in depression and that this can 
account for OGM? Beck et al, (1979) would certainly assert that the self-concept in 
depression is over-simplistic, one-dimensional and fixed e. g. `I am fearful' - as opposed to the 
multidimensional `I am sometimes fearful, but I am also strong and kind'. This could 
contribute to OGM errors in depression. 
8.4. Thesis Results in terms of Information-Processing 
Results of this thesis suggest that one IP style mediating the relationship between life 
experience and experience of depression in childhood may be OGM (Figure 8.1). 
Figure 8.1. IP and OGM 
LIFE EVENTS X, II DEPRESSION 
Y, Z III OGM III 
Reduced AMS was associated with EF, FER, SPS and a range of negative CS measures. 
OGM also predicted depressive symptoms in childhood during a stressful life event and was 
present in children who had experienced trauma. EF as a measure of encoding preferences, 
FER as a measure of emotion interpretation, and OGM as a memorial bias were all associated 
with depression in childhood. The interrelationships between these variables was also 
investigated and indicated that children's processing can be biased in ways equivalent to those 
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found in adult depression. (Figure 8.2. ) Future work should further consider the pattern of 
avoidant (or selective) processing of valenced emotional information as a feature of child 
depression (across attentional/interpretative, memorial and schematic domains). Further 
studies are also needed to underpin the interrelationships between these IP preferences. 
Figure 8.2. Summary of IP Thesis Findings in Childhood 
IP 
Altendoll 
Memory 
EF OGM 
FER 
Associative 
9ppraisal ý": Impaired 
DAS 
.. "0 SPS CTI-C 
CNCEQ 
CASQ 
Depression 
.................. 
Schema and Propositional beliefs E motion 
`Bold connectors denote empirical relationships as evidenced by the present thesis results. 
8.5. Thesis Results in terms of Cognition and Emotion 
Williams et al (1997) highlight the importance of memorial biases in characterizing 
depression in adults. The AMT results from this study supports this characterization in 
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depressed children. Poor specific positive recall relative to negative is consistent with 
previous work showing depressed children's poor recall of positive self-descriptors (e. g. 
Gencoz et al, 2001; Hammen & Zupan, 1984; Neshat-Doost, et al, 1998) and improved recall 
of negative descriptors (e. g. Timbremont & Braet, 2004). High dysphoric children also 
showed better recall of sad stories relative to positive (Bishop, Dalgleish & Yule, 2004). This 
thesis extends the evidence of depression-related memorial bias in children towards negative 
information and away from positive, by demonstrating this bias in the recall of specific 
personally relevant autobiographical memories 
Results would perhaps support the proposition made by Williams et al (1997) that depression 
is characterized by resource allocation/sustained strategic attention towards negative 
information, in that dysphoric children demonstrated accurate recognition of sad faces relative 
to controls (Study 4) and greater negative AMS compared to controls (Study 1). However, 
one refinement in keeping with this theory may be that the bias for negative information is 
preceded by impairment in positive information processing, as reviewed in section 8.2.5. 
In terms of Beck's cognitive theory of depression, the thesis results support the contention 
that schema-based processing with its capacity for bias and selective recall exists in childhood 
and may play a role in vulnerability to depression. Predicted links between negative schema 
and depression in children were demonstrated. Moreover, these factors were associated with 
OGM recall in children. Poor recall of positive events could contribute to the perpetuation of 
negative beliefs and mood state such that depressed children are known to demonstrate 
negative schematic self-beliefs (e. g. Zupan, Hammen & Jaenicke, 1987; Schniering & Rapee, 
2004) and reduced positive specific recall was associated with such negative self-schema in 
this thesis. 
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According to Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) remembering is a goal directed activity and 
there is a strong relationship between self, goals and memory. Moreover, memory is distorted 
under two guiding principals of correspondence and coherence. Coherence can be utilized to 
explain why the memory system may become biased against the assimilation of positive 
information in depression i. e. in an effort to maintain a coherent negative self-view. It appears 
this mechanism may already be in effect in childhood, as evidenced by the paucity of specific 
positive self-related memorial information retrieved by depressed/dysphoric children. 
In addition, consistent with a depressive realism interpretation, mildly depressed individuals 
(dysphorics) were more balanced in their specific valenced recall, whereas non-depressed 
individuals actually retrieved greater numbers of positive specific memories relative to 
negative. Results in clinically depressed and dysphoric children also suggest different 
underlying schema or mechanisms. For instance, there is evidence that dysphorics are less 
self-devaluative compared to depressed persons although they are similar in terms of affective 
components (Teasdale & Cox, 2001). Therefore dysphoric children may demonstrate poor 
positive AMS due to mood incongruence, whereas OGM effects in clinically depressed 
children may be more governed by negative self-beliefs. Noting of course that the activation 
of emotion-related schema should not facilitate the recall of information specific to a unique 
episode (Schaefer & Philippot, 2005). 
It is proposed that emotion provides a guiding principle around which development is 
organized, including the development of the self (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). This rings true 
in terms of the AMT findings here. AM is central in defining the self and depressed/dysphoric 
children show poor recall of specific positive AMs. If these children have poor organisation 
of positive information in memory it will be hard for them to access and retrieve positive 
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memories from their past. Furthermore, results suggest that dysphoria affects AMS in children 
not by increasing availability of negative memories but by decreasing availability of positive 
memories. This is consistent with the SPAARS model, which asserts that in a negative mood, 
depression prone individuals may find it difficult to access positive information due to un- 
integrated positive and negative aspects of the self. 
Results from the residential children also demonstrated the impact of early adversity on 
emotion-related processing. If goals are hierarchically arranged and are important to processes 
of cognition and emotion, what kind of goals do abused children have and how are they 
hierarchically arranged e. g. `don't get killed by mum then do my homework. ' What 
implications does this have for cognitive and emotion processing? According to SPAARS 
(1997) cognition-emotion cycles occur in levels or cycles with each cycle leading to the event 
being appraised in a more sophisticated way. Abused children may stop short in appraisal 
cycles and not go further than basic survival orientated processing, and hence this may in part, 
result in deficits on tasks such as the MEPS. 
In summary, this body of work was approached from central theories of cognition and 
emotion and from established cognitive models of depression. Existing affect-cognition 
theories are largely based on adult data (Williams et al 1997; ICS, 1993; SPAARS, 1997). 
However, work with children clearly has theoretical as well as applied implications and may 
give insight into the development of the biases or systems espoused by these theories. 
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PART III I Methods, Future Studies and Conclusions 
8.6. Methodological Issues in Pushing Forward this Research 
One of the main limitations of the AMT is that it is unclear what is motivating responses to 
these cues. Overgeneral errors on this task are historically viewed as reflecting dysfunction. 
I lowever there is more than one possible motivation for retrieving an overgeneral memory. 
For example, positive events happen all the time and are viewed as prototypical, or there are 
large periods of time where the individual just felt happy and it is difficult to single out one; 
in contrast to an OGM because the individual can't think of a specific memory because they 
don't have any to access. As researchers we need to start examining the motivation behind 
valence-specitic OGM recall. 
Another issue is that a common definition of AM involves memories that are "relevant for the 
self-concept because they form the individual's history of life" (de Decker et al, 2003). 
Swales et at (2001) also give a similar definition. However, the AMs produced in the AMT 
are not necessarily informing individuals' self-concept. Indeed it is worth considering the 
criticism that 'current work on autobiographical memory does not take the term 
autobiographical seriously enough' (Bluck & Habernas, 2000). In this view, only memories 
that are linked to the self through their motivational or emotional significance over one's life 
are truly autobiographical. Therefore many of the memories retrieved on the AMT may not be 
autobiographical in the strictest sense, i. e., meaningful, highly self-reverent, contributing to a 
sense of self or life story. It is difficult to find a way around this methodologically, apart from 
requesting memories from more distant time frames or perhaps asking individuals to give 
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`important' memories. Therefore, I think it is important to acknowledge that the AMT 
samples the retrieval style of an individual but that we must caution about talking about the 
memories as being autobiographical in the strictest sense. Indeed, Williams (1996) highlights 
two studies by Singer and Moffitt (1992) whereby students were given instructions to provide 
`self-defining' memories. This instruction resulted in more than double the number of 
categoric memories retrieved to cue words. This shows that the `significance' of the memory 
retrieved by the participant will have a bearing on the specificity of the memory retrieved. No 
study has examined the significance of the content of memories retrieved in this sense, i. e. 
whether they represent memories of higher personal meaning or relate to a life lesson. The 
extent to which an individual offers significant as opposed to more trivial memories will 
influence the overgenerality of their memories. This is not taken into account in the AMT. 
Another criticism of the AMT methodology is simply a general criticism of cuing paradigms 
in general. This has drawbacks including its stimulus limitability. Words have to be matched 
for word frequency and emotionality, which is a difficult task. Word stimuli also have limited 
applicability to subjects of low reading ability. However, the point here is that very little work 
has been conducted into the nature of this cuing e. g. work in the cognitive literature in general 
has looked carefully at the effect of self-referencing and personal relevance of memory cue 
words but no such studies have examined the possible effect of these factors on cuing AM. 
Perhaps most importantly, the imageability of the words needs to be properly tested, as words 
high in imageability are more likely to produce specific memories than words low in 
imageability. This could affect the specificity of responses (Williams, Healy & Ellis, 1999) 
Coding instructions could also be revised e. g. responses such as `my mum' `home' can be 
viewed extreme forms of overgeneral memory rather than be excluded as semantic associates. 
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Participants could also be asked to rate the valence of the memories recalled to try to clarity 
valence effects in the literature. Furthermore, many possible moderators of OGM (such as 
personality, age and culture) could be examined systematically to gain a more thorough 
understanding of stable contributing factors. 
Finally, many different cue words have been used throughout the AMT literature. Also 
different instructions are used. The neutral words used can he problematic for instance one 
study used `bread' and 'grass' as a neutral cues. These words are very different to cuing with 
emotional words. For instance, one can wonder how many people have self-defining 
memories involving bread? Also, in the AMT, some cue words are dispositional e. g., 'happy' 
whereas other words are occurent, e. g., 'excited'. Occurrent emotion tends to reflect 
something `here and now' whilst dispositional cues would perhaps be more likely to trigger 
more general responses. Again this has not been systematically considered in the literature. 
With respect to other possible improvements to the methodologies used throughout this thesis, 
the FER could be improved by using faces rated more carefully e. g. on a liken-scale and 
adding other negative emotions such as anger, or disgust (Sprengelmeyer, et at, 1997). 
Measurements of cognitive vulnerability also appear to lack precision, for example there was 
overlap between the CS measures. The MEPS has also been criticised on the grounds that it 
measures hypothetical social problem solving ideas but not solution implementation 
(D'Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). Future studies could address MFPS measures 
alongside observer report of implemented social skill. EF could also be studied with neutral 
AMT cues, could be developed with a greater range of depicted emotions, and also with 
varying extremes of emotion. The state vs. trait nature of EF could also he explored. 
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The availability of measures of depressed mood in children are also a clear area for 
improvement. Better discriminating measures of mood in children are needed. For example, a 
pure depressed clinical sample was difficult to obtain and low base rates of dysphoria in 
normal populations meant small numbers. It is also unclear what the precise relationship is 
between dysphoria and depression. In addition, studies that rely on depression measures with 
high negative affect content (such as the CDI) may not detect important effects relating to low 
positive affect. By way of example, the CDI in Study 3 correlated highly with `how sad are 
you right now' but did not negatively correlate with `how happy are you right now'. It would 
be interesting to incorporate a measure of low positive affect in addition to measures of high 
negative affect to perhaps better capture depressive populations. With increased numbers 
interactions between factors and possible mediational relationships between variables could 
be examined. Alternatively, negative mood measures with better spread might help deal with 
this problem. 
8.7. Future Directions 
AM recency could be examined. Is recency a typical memorial coping style of highly abused 
individuals or is this a normal memorial strategy employed on the AMT? This would be 
assessed through content analysis and participant report. Further studies specifically 
investigating negative self-schema in association with OGM are required. Depressed 
individuals may retrieve overgenerally because negative affect generated by the cue words 
may impairs memory search processes, resulting in automatic `schematic' responses. Studies 
investigating the association between affect arousal and OGM are therefore required. Children 
could also be asked to rate the valence and significance of memories retrieved to assess the 
extent to which these factors are associated with overgenerality. 
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Future work could investigate the absence of mood effects with respect to neutral face stimuli 
in childhood. For example, is the problem stimulus dependent? Also, Yik and Russell (1999) 
concluded from their work that facial expressions signal the same social message across 
culture. It would be of interest to examine whether mood has any bearing on the interpretation 
of social messages of facial expression. It may be that depression is less associated with 
inaccurate labelling of emotions but more associated with higher order appraisals of the 
social-interpersonal meanings of such facial expressions. Timing the latencies to respond to 
valenced faces may also yield interesting results regarding whether depressed children spend 
longer attending to negative information (in keeping with Williams et al, 1997). 
Research to date has also paid remarkably little heed to gender differences in AM functioning. 
Davis (1999) examined memory for childhood events in adult men and women remembering 
back to childhood. The overall pattern of findings obtained was consistent with the 
proposition that gender-differential socialization processes influence the content and 
complexity of representations of autobiographical emotional events in memory. OGM was not 
investigated, but it is likely an effect would be found, given females recall more emotionally 
valenced material than males. Gender effects could therefore be investigated. In addition, 
previous studies of OGM have sporadically examined the relationship between OGM and IQ 
measures with mixed outcomes (e. g. Dalgleish et al, 2005; Park et al, 2002; Wessel et al, 
2001; Williams & Dritschel, 1992). In this thesis no relationship was found between IQ and 
AMT results. However these results may be measure dependent and so future work could 
concentrate more specifically on the relationship between executive functioning and OGM in 
children and adults. 
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Attempts could also be made to modify OGM with a diary study. Children could be assigned 
to AMS and control conditions and asked to fill in a diary of events over several weeks. Will 
active attempts to encode/rehearse specific positive events improve subsequent memory 
retrieval at follow up and even more interestingly, would this have any impact on mood or 
self-esteem? More broadly, teaching children functional cognitive skills prior to 
puberty/adolescence has already proven useful (e. g. Gilham, et al, 1995; de Cuyper et al, 
2004). Gilham, Reivich, Jaycox & Seligman (1995) embarked on a depression prevention 
study with school children, followed over 2 years. Treatment children were taught cognitive 
and social problem solving skills. At 2 year follow up moderate to severe depressive 
symptoms were halved. This would support the possibility that psychological immunization 
against depression in children can occur if children are educated regarding cognitive emotio- 
social information processing. Would tackling a range of information processing skills such 
as accurate facial affect recognition, specific AM recall, and increasing awareness of 
overgeneralizing tendencies or attributional errors, improve long-term mood in children? 
8.8. Practical Implications 
If OGM is agreed to be dysfunctional, researching developmental time lines will inform how 
and when to intervene. For example results of this thesis indicate that OGM retrieval is a 
typical retrieval style of children aged 7-8, but thereafter deviations in specificity may be 
more mood related. Throughout this thesis I attempted to select information processing tasks 
that would translate easily into implications for everyday functioning e. g. face processing, 
personal memory recall. The residential study highlights basic skill deficits in processing of 
emotion and notable OGM in children who have experienced extreme negative life events but 
are not demonstrating affective disorder. The deficits in the residential group were severe and 
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fundamental. Suggestions were made regarding improvement to current intervention 
strategies for children in care. For example, this might include, basic skills training on 
identifying basic emotion and tasks aimed at extending the recall frame for positive event 
memories. Direct experience may be needed to reduce the influence of negative schema on 
information processing. Performance on the tasks may reflect a product of `moment to 
moment' survival based thinking. However, if a long-term memorial style is impaired these 
children are failing to develop a positive bank of long-term memories to draw from in terms 
of self-identity, social problem solving, and goal formation. Conway (2005) points out such 
`recent' memories are on a forgetting trajectory because they are unlikely to be rehearsed and 
unlikely to be significant to long-term goals. For example - `splashing in a puddle yesterday'. 
Patterns in the memory responses e. g. `in my room at night' was a common response to the 
cue word `Lonely' this could also offer information regarding a vulnerable period to target for 
boys in care. Findings from this study support the proposition that cognitive biases such as 
OGM may precede depression. Indeed blind rating of the residential group in terms of 
likelihood of developing future affective disorder, specifically depression, showed that out of 
the 13 boys named, 10 demonstrated the highest relative sample overgenerality. Finally, the 
OGM bias in childhood was not more pronounced in a clinical group compared to a sub- 
clinical group and overall the extent of OGM was the same in depressed children as in adults. 
Therefore efforts should be made to address this bias in youth. 
8.9. Thesis Summary and Conclusions 
There exists a limited literature on emotion-related cognitive processing in children. Dalgleish 
et al (1998) stated that there is "almost no research examining ways in which depressed 
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children perceive, attend to, remember, think or make judgements about emotional material". 
This thesis was looking to address this deficit. In depressed adults cognitive bias tends to 
occur at an elaborative stage of processing i. e. during the interpretation, recognition and recall 
of information, a type of memorial bias was therefore principally investigated. 
8.9.1. Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis has contributed to: an understanding of child AM specificity, an understanding of 
development of valenced emotion processing, an appreciation of the affects of mood and age 
on information-processing in children, an understanding of possible causal relationships and 
the interrelationship between multiple cognitive measures in children including memory and 
mood. The thesis has also enabled comparisons between child and adult depression related 
processing and has contributed a new measure of Emotion-Focusing. This thesis has 
demonstrated for the first time: OGM in depressed and dysphoric children; a link between 
OGM and CS; the relationship between depressed mood and processing of facial affect in 
children; the importance of emotion encoding to OGM and OGM in abused children. In terms 
of originality in approach - the concept of EF had not been empirically tested. This offers a 
new approach to the study of OGM and explained statistically significant unique variance 
even above dysphoria. EF may have clinical, as well as theoretical relevance. The work on 
SPS then replicates adult findings and highlights one of the possible downstream 
consequences of OGM in children. The demonstration of associations between OGM and the 
other emotion-related measures sets OGM in the context of other prototypical depressive 
biases. The AM findings in this thesis are consistent with, but expand upon the accepted 
knowledge in the field as indicated by adult studies. 
305 
CHAPTER 8. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
8.9.2. Relevance to a Professional Audience 
This doctoral work was presented at a special interest meeting on AM in Oxford in 2004 and 
at a British Psychological Society conference on child psychology in Edinburgh, 2005. The 
work on EF has been presented at a university department specifically interested in emotion 
processing. The residential work was presented at a Clinical Professional Development 
Training Day at the Institute of Psychiatry, London. A written summary of some of this work 
was also requested for the British Psychological Society publication of Service and Practice 
Update- a journal distributed to child and adolescent practitioners within the UK (Appendix 
8.1). A publication of Study I is also in press, for a Special Edition of Cognition and Emotion 
on Autobiographical Memory and Psychopathology (Appendix 8.2). Colleagues in Wales and 
Australia are now using the measure of EF to inform their studies on child AM. Thus, the 
work is of some interest to a clinical-cognitive audience. 
8.9.3. Importance of the Work 
Depression is considered one of the most costly and devastating of psychological problems. 
Concentrating research on adults who are already suffering from depression can tell us a lot 
about what depressed persons do and feel. It helps less, in discovering the cognitive causes of 
depression. It helps even less if any attempt is to be made at preventative research. Testing 
children whether vulnerable or not, to examine the existence of known depression-related 
cognitions seems central to uncovering the development of depression from a cognitive 
perspective. This research has confirmed for me the extent of similarities between children 
and adults in terms of cognition. My first administration of the child depression inventory, in 
which several 7-8 year old children endorsed statements such as `I am ugly', `I do everything 
wrong', `no-one really loves me' made me stop and think. For all the children (or adults) who 
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fall below any clinical criteria for depression, there is still an immense amount of suffering 
going on. Moreover, when you sit in front of a7 year old child, and say the word `happy' and 
they look back at you confused, pause, frown in concentration, grapple with themselves, yet 
still can't produce a ready happy memory - this is fundamentally sad. Anything we can do as 
researchers to improve our understanding of depressive thinking, or more precisely, how to 
improve functional thinking- is important. 
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Appendix 1.1. Main features of DSV-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Major 
Depressive Episode 
Five (or more) of the following symptoms are present during the same 2-week period and represent a 
change from previous functioning; at least one symptom is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of 
interest or pleasure. Do not include symptoms that are clearly due to a general medical condition, or 
mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations. 
(1) Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by subjective account (e. g., 
feels sad or empty) or observations by others (e. g. appears tearful). 
Note: in children and adolescents, can be irritable mood. 
(2) Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly 
every day (as indicated by subjective account or observations by others). 
(3) Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e. g., a change of more than 5% of 
body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day. 
Note: in children, consider failure to make expected weight gains. 
(4) Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
(5) Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others, not merely 
subjective feelings or restlessness or being slowed down). 
(6) Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
(7) Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly 
every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick). 
(8) Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by 
subjective account or as observed by others). 
(9) Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a 
specific plan, or a suicide attempt or specific plan for committing suicide. 
source: 11L J)Lri Irmo f ýi i ý. ruý; tft and Stati', ti» ! Maim 'd o %ic idD,, \) Il ý 11%. 
Text Rwision, Fourth Lditiön. Copyright 2000 by the American Psvchiatric Association. 
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Appendix 1.2 
Characteristics of Automatic vs. Controlled Processing (based on Power & Brewin, 
1991) Table adapted from Power & Dalgleish (1997) 
SCHEMA-BASED PROPOSITIONAL 
Automatic Processes Controlled Processes 
Parallel Sequential 
Modular 
Fast 
Effortless 
Low awareness 
Inflexible 
Difficult to modify 
Emotion generating 
Dependent/interactive 
Slow 
Effortful 
High awareness 
Flexible 
Easy to modify 
Emotion inhibiting 
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Appendix 3.1. Sample Coded Child AMT Responses 
Specific Positive: 
Happy: 
Today playing a game... 
Surprised: 
Coming here. 
When my tooth fell out.... 
When my parents got a new car- it was a 
people carrier. 
Last Christmas when I got a bike... 
Successful: 
Today when I finished a Christmas card... 
When I completed a game... 
When I completed a science lesson.... 
When I learnt my 10 and 20 times tables 
Safe: 
When my brother looked after me when I 
got lost in Boots in Croydon... 
Interested: 
When I saw my first tarantula at the zoo. 
There was a fire in my house... I was 
interested in that. 
In dinosaurs... (child goes on to give an 
excited and elaborate account of a recent 
visit to a dinosaur museum) 
Overgeneral Negative: 
Sad: 
I feel sad a lot. 
When my mum shouts. 
When my brother hits me. 
When friends won't play with me. 
When I get beaten up. 
When my mum is sad. 
When I'm not allowed things. 
Angry: 
At my sister... 
At my mum... 
Hurt: 
All the time. 
When x makes fun of me. 
Careless: 
I drop things all the time. 
Sometimes at school. 
Lonely: 
When I have no one to play with. 
All the time. 
When I hide behind the shed and cry. 
In the playground - all the time. 
I have no one to talk to at school. 
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Overgeneral Positive: 
Happy: 
When I am with my family 
When friends play with me 
When I am at home 
When I save penalties 
Surprised: 
When I get a present 
At Christmas when I get presents 
Successful: 
When I do a good piece of work 
Safe: 
When my sister used to give me a bath 
When I am at home 
When I'm in the school 
When I am in bed 
Interested: 
When I am watching television, I like 
watching James Bond 
When I read books about science 
When I draw pictures, I am interested in art 
Specific Negative: 
Sad: 
When I saw mum and dad hitting each other 
When I found my fish and it was dead 
Mum's accident.... 
Two days ago I didn't get to see my aunty 
Angry: 
When my brother annoyed me so I kicked him 
When my bike got stolen 
When x lied on me and was saying bad things 
about me.... 
Last week when x threw a roller blade at me 
Hurt: 
When my friend said she didn't like me 
Careless: 
When I dropped a glass 
When I accidentally wasn't watching my sister 
and she fell off the bed 
Lonely: 
Like yesterday when there is nothing to do. 
When I got sent to the punishment room... 
When my mum went away to my aunties for 
the night and I felt lonely. 
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Appendix 3.2. Sample EF Face Stimuli 
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Appendix 3.3. Sample EF Images 
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Appendix 3.4. The Child Depression Inventory (CDI-S; Kovacs, 1992) 
While a plethora of instruments are available for measuring depression in adults, there are few 
corresponding measures available for use with children. The CDI is the most widely used in 
child depression research. For this reason, the CDI was chosen as the depression measure 
used in this body of research. 
The CDI-short form was used throughout this thesis for two reasons. The short form cuts out 
many problematic questions such as `I want to kill myself, which are inappropriate for 
community-based child testing. Secondly the short form was used due to time constraints. 
Working with young or vulnerable populations, with limited attentional capacity and often 
with several cognitive measures or tasks to be completed, meant reducing the acceptable 
number of items (or trials), where appropriate, was always a methodological consideration. 
The short and long versions have high correlation and comparable diagnostic power (r = 0.89, 
alpha reliability = 0.80). The CDI-S requires the lowest reading ability of any depression 
measure. The CDI has shown good test-retest, internal consistency, and construct validity, 
especially in non-clinical populations (see Twenge & Nolen-hoeksema, 2002), it has good 
predictive validity (Haavisto et al, 2004; Mattison, Handford, Kales, Goodman & 
McLaughlin, 1990) and in previous studies scores on the CDI were moderately correlated 
with psychiatrists ratings of level of depression (e. g. Kadzin, 1989). The CDI-S was felt to be 
the best measure to meet the study aims. 
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Appendix 3.5. CDI-S 
Item / 
QI am sad once in a while. 
QI am sad many times. 
Q1 
am sad all the time. 
Item 2 
EI Nothing will ever work out for me. 
I am not sure if things will work 
out for me. 
Things will work out for me O. K. 
Item 3 
QI do most things O. K. 
QI do many things wrong. 
0I do everything wrong. 
Hemd 
QI hate myself. 
QI do not like myself. 
QI like myself. 
Item 5 
F -I I feel like crying everyday. 
QI feel like crying many days. 
QI feel like crying once in a while. 
Convrieht ©1 
Item 6 
Q Things bother me all the time. 
Q Things bother me many times. 
Q Things bother me once in a while. 
Item 7 
QI look 0. K. 
Q There are some bad things about 
my looks. 
QI look ugly. 
Item 8 
QI do not feel alone. 
QI 
feel alone many times. 
QI feel alone all the time. 
Item 9 
I have plenty of friends. 
F-I I have some friends but I wish I 
had more. 
EJ 
I do not have any friends. 
Item 10 
Q Nobody really loves me. 
QI 
am not sure if anybody loves me. 
Q1 
am sure that somebody loves me. 
1991.1992, Multi-Health Sustems, Inc. All 
CDI-S answer sheet 
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The items offer three possible statements, which reflect; a depressive symptom, mild 
depressive symptom or no depressive symptom. A higher score on the CDI reflects higher 
depressive symptoms. Scoring is in the range 0-20. A raw score of 7 or above denotes 
significantly above average depressive symptoms on the basis of past research and as 
recommended by the authors of the measure (Kovacs, 1992). T-scores above 65 are generally 
considered clinically significant 
T-score An Interpretative Guide 
>70 very much above average 
66-70 much above average 
61-65 above average 
56-60 slightly above average 
45-55 Average 
40-44 slightly below average 
30-34 much below average 
<30 very much below average 
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Appendix 3.6. Mean Positive and Negative AMS (and standard deviations) within EF, 
Age and Dysphoric subgroups 
LOW EF(n=19) 
Age/yrs 7-8 (n=12) 10-11 (n=7) Total (n=19) 
Dysphoria ND D ND D ND D 
n= (n=11) (n=1) (n=5) (n=2) (n=16) (n=3) 
Negative . 55 . 00 2.40 2.50 1.13 1.67 
SD (1.03) (. 00) (1.14) (2.12) (1.36) (2.08) 
Positive 2.45 . 00 4.60 3.00 3.13 2.00 
SD (1.29) (. 00) (. 89) (. 00) (1.54) (1.73) 
MEDIUM EF(n=30) 
Age/yrs 7-8 (n=16) 10-11(n=14) Total (n=30) 
Dysphoria ND D ND D ND D 
n= (n=14) (n=2) (n=11) (n=3) (n=25) (n=5) 
Negative . 79 . 50 4.45 2.33 2.40 1.60 
SD (. 89) (. 71) (. 82) (. 58) (2.04) (1.14) 
Positive 3.00 2.00 4.63 3.33 3.72 2.80 
SD (1.11) (1.41) (. 50) (. 58) (1.20) (1.10) 
HIGH 
Age/yrs 7-8 (n=7) 
EF (n=21) 
10-11(n=14) Total (n=21) 
Dysphoric ND D ND D ND D 
n= n=4 n=3 n=11 n=3 n=15 n=6 
Negative 2.50 3.67 4.81 4.00 4.20 3.83 
SD (1.91) (2.31) (. 40) (1.73) (1.42) (1.83) 
Positive 4.25 2.00 4.27 2.33 4.26 2.17 
SD (. 96) (1.00) (1.10) (. 58) (1.03) (. 75) 
TOTAL EF (n=70) 
Age/yrs 7-8 (n=35) 10-11 (n=35) Total (n=70) 
Dysphoric ND D ND D ND D 
n= (n=29) (n=6) (n=27) (n=8) (n=56) (n=14) 
Negative . 93 2.00 
4.22 3.00 2.51 2.57 
SD (1.25) (2.37) (1.15) (1.51) (2.04) (1.91) 
Positive 2.97 1.67 4.48 2.88 3.70 2.36 
SD (1.27) (1.21) (. 85) (. 65) (1.32) (1.08) 
`ND = non-dysphoric D= dysphoric 
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Appendix 4.1. 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire 
The scores are grouped into four bands so that in the general population roughly 80% of children score close to 
average, 10% score slightly raised, 5% score very high. The exception is the pro-social scale, with roughly 80% 
close to average, 10% slightly low 5% low and 5% very low. 
NAME OF CHILD GENDER D. O. B. UNIQUE ID 
Parent Questionnaire date 
*** Total difficulties score: 26 (20-40 is VERY HIGH) 
*** Emotional Symptoms score: 9 (7-10 is VERY HIGH) 
*** Conduct problems score: 7 (6-10 is VERY HIGH) 
* Inattention-hyperactivity score: 7 (6-7 is slightly raised) 
* Peer problems score: 3 (3 is slightly raised) 
*** Pro-social score: 3 (0-5 is VERY LOW) 
Impact score: -1 
THESE ANSWERS ARE BASED ON X'S BEHAVIOUR AT HOME, PRIMARILY WITH HER SISTER 
Teacher Questionnaire date 
Total difficulties score: 
Emotional Symptoms score: 
Conduct problems score: 
Inattention-hyperactivity score: 
Peer problems score: 
Pro-social score: 
Impact score: 
Self-Report Questionnaire date 
Total difficulties score: 
Emotional Symptoms score: 
Conduct problems score: 
Inattention-hyperactivity score: 
Peer problems score: 
Pro-social score: 
Impact score: 
Diagnostic Prediction: 
Any psychiatric disorder: 
Emotional disorder: 
Oppositional Conduct disorder: 
ADHD/Hyperkinesis: 
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Appendix 4.2 
The Autobiographical Memory Test for Children (AMT-C) Test Instructions 
(Drummond, 2005): 
I am interested in your memories for things that have happened to you in your life. You have 
lots of memories of things that have happened to you don't you? (Pause for child to think and 
acknowledge). I am going to read and show you some words on some cards. For each word I 
want you to think of a memory that happened to you, which the word reminds you of. So I 
show you a card and you think of one of your memories. Does that make sense? So, I want 
you to tell me the memory you think of when you see or hear the word. Is that ok? 
But there is one another thing.. . the memory has to be specific. Do you know what that 
means? (acknowledge child's response). It means the memory had to happen on one day, one 
time. So if I say "good" it would be ok to say `when I went to Nicola's party' because 
Nicola's party happened on one day. But it would not be ok to say `when I go to parties' 
because that is memory for lots of times, lots of parties. Does that make sense? Ok. So you 
give me a word (any word) and I'll tell you my specific memory (engage child with this 
example). 
One more thing, do you think you could give me a different memory for each word? Don't 
give me the same memory more than once. Now lets practice some words before we start: 
Bored Cold 
Hungry Funny 
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9 If a child gives an overgeneral response prompt with `Can you think of one time? ' 
9 Prompt once for clarification if given a general memory or a semantic associate. 
"A semantic associate is coded as a non-memory if child can't retrieve an 
autobiographical (event) memory. 
" If a child fails to give any memory response code as omission. 
" If a child repeats a memory to more than one cue ask him/her to think of another 
memory but note this on the record sheet. 
9 Give the child 60 seconds to retrieve a memory. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Feeling State Questions 
Adapted Birelson: 
1. I feel like crying* 
2. I feel sad* 
3. I feel worried* 
4. I feel lonely* 
5. I feel bored 
6. I like to go out 
7. I can stick up for myself 
8. I enjoy a lot of things 
9. I look forward to a lot of things 
10. I sleep ok 
11. I am easily cheered up 
12.1 have lots of energy 
Mood control: 
13. It is easy to improve a bad mood 
14. When I am in a good mood it stays for a long time 
15. I find it difficult to control a bad mood** 
16. When I am in a bad mood it lasts for a long time** 
17. When I feel good I allow myself to feel that way totally** 
Rating of Life Stress 
18. I think changing schools is a big deal* 
19. I am concerned about changing schools* 
20. I am nervous about the new school* 
21. I am happy right now** 
22. I am pleased with my SAT exam results 
23.1 am looking forward to secondary school** 
Feeling state questions correlated with CDI scores* or positive OGM** at Time 2. 
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Appendix 5.2. Gender Analyses 
Depression prevalence rates for girls and boys in pre-adolescence are different (i. e. they are 
higher for boys; Angold & Rutter, 1992). This shifts in adolescence such that significantly 
more females report depression (e. g. Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). There is specific evidence that 
cognitive style variables, such as negative inferences about the self, may mediate gender 
differences in depressive symptoms in adolescents (Calvete & Cardenoso, 2005). For this 
reason, possible gender differences in cognitive style (or AM recall) were examined in this 
study, though it is stressed that there are insufficient numbers to address these kind of gender 
issues properly. 
There were no significant gender differences in responses across the various cognitive 
measures, including AM, according to ANOVA. Boys reported slightly more dysfunctional 
attitudes on the DAS (average 120 vs. 140) and produced slightly more overgeneral memories 
(average 1.86 vs. 2.56 to positive cue words and 1.57 vs. 1.69 to negative cue words) 
compared to girls but these differences were not significant (DAS, F(1) = 2.19, p= . 15; 
positive OGM, F(1) = 2.76, p= . 11; and negative OGM F(1) = . 045, p= . 83). Consistent with 
psychiatric statistics boys were more likely to report a dysphoric mood at baseline than girls 
of the same age, (1(30) = 2.55, p= .0 17) however this difference was not significant at Time 2 
during a stressful life event, 1(30) = 1.68, p=1.04. Therefore there were no significant gender 
differences in CS or AM, which could easily account for reported depressed mood. Any 
gender results however must be treated with great caution as larger sample sizes are required 
to adequately assess gender effects. 
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Appendix 5.3 Inter-relationship between CS measures 
DAS CTI-C CASQ CNCEQ 
DAS 1 -. 356 -. 206 -. 387* 
. 053 . 275 . 035 
CTI-C 1 . 657** . 564 
. 000 . 001 
CASQ 1 
. 249 
. 185 
CNCEQ 1 
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Appendix 5.4. Zero (r) and Partial (pr) Correlations between CS and AM at Time 1. 
AM 
Overgeneral Specific 
CS Positive Negative Positive Negative 
r rp r rp r rp r rp 
DAS . 56 . 37 . 35 . 31 -. 42 -. 
23 -. 16 -. 09 
p . 
00 v . 04 . 06 . 
10 
. 02 . 
22 
. 40 . 
64 
CTI-C -. 59 -. 45 -. 30 -. 25 . 63 . 53 . 24 . 19 
p . 00 
' . 02 . 
10 
. 
19 
. 00 v . 
00 
. 21 . 
33 
CASQ -. 44 -. 31 -. 41 -. 38 . 52 . 43 . 43 . 41 
p . 02 . 
11 . 02 ' . 
04 001/ . 02 . 02 ' . 
03 
CNCEQ -. 39 -. 09 -. 19 -. 10 . 37 . 15 . 20 . 14 
p . 03 . 
62 . 32 . 60 . 04 . 43 . 26 . 46 
0= significant correlations after controlling for mood. 
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Appendix 5.5 Graphical depiction of Significant CS and AM relationships 
Negative Schema (CTI-C) 
.c 
Fewer -ve Fewer -ve 
views of views of 
self, world, self, world, 
future + Ve future + ve 
OGM AMS 
0 
CD 
Negative 
views of 
self, etc., 
J 
Low OGM High OGM 
functional dysfunctional 
Stable Attributional Style (CASQ) 
s L Stable +ve 
event 
attributions 
Co aý I 0 U 
CD 
event 
ö attributions 
J 
Low OGM 
functional 
-ve & +ve 
OGM 
Unstable +ve 
event 
attributions 
Low OGM 
functional 
Overgeneralizina (CNCEQ 
Fewer errors 
of over- 
generalization 
0 U 
CO 
Greater errors 
of over- 
generalization 
J 
Low OGM 
functional 
High OGM 
dysfunctional 
High OGM 
dysfunctional 
Negative 
views of 
self, etc., 
Stable +ve 
event 
attributions 
Unstable +ve 
event 
attributions 
-ve & +ve 
AMS 
Low AMS High AMS 
dysfunctional functional 
Fewer error; 
of over- 
generalizatic 
Greater errors / 
of over- 
generalization 
Low AMS High AMS 
dysfunctional functional 
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Appendix 5.6. 
Zero (r) and Partial (pr) Correlations between CS, AM and Mood Measures at Time 2 
CDI 
Time 2 CDI +ve Sp -ve SP +ve OG -ve OG DAS CTI-C CASQ CNCEQ 
r . 79 -. 
42 -. 04 . 51 . 
16 
. 51 -. 61 -. 26 -. 65 
p . 00 . 
02 . 83 . 00 . 
39 
. 00 . 00 . 16 . 00 
pr - -. 16 . 13 . 
21 . 04 . 09 -. 38 . 06 -. 31 
p - . 41 . 
51 . 28 . 84 . 64 . 05 . 74 . 10 
Partial correlations controlling for mood at Time 1. 
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Appendix 5.7. Correlation between Feeling State Questions and Mood at Time 1 
Correlation with CDI (Time 1) 
Questions at time 2. 
Rp 
I am happy right now (on a scale of 1-10) -. 262 . 162 
1 am concerned about changing schools (on a 
scale of 1-10) 
. 336 . 069 
I think changing schools is a big deal (on a scale 
of 1-10) 
. 410 . 024* 
When I'm in a bad mood it lasts for a long time 
(never, sometimes, often) 
. 408 . 035* 
I find it difficult to control a bad mood (n, s, o) . 594 . 001 ** 
When I'm in a good mood it stays for a long time 
(n, s, o) 
-. 298 . 110 
When I feel good I allow myself to feel that way 
totally (n, s, o) 
-. 539 . 002** 
feel like crying (n, s, o) . 452 . 012* 
1 like to go out (n, s, o) -. 321 . 084 
1 can stick up for myself (n, s, o) -. 145 . 446 
1 feel sad (n, s, o) . 719 . 000** 
feel worried (n, s, o) . 719 . 000** 
feel lonely (n, s, o) . 719 . 000** 
am looking forward to going to secondary 
school (1-10) 
-. 287 . 132 
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Appendix 6.1. Sample FER Faces 
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362 
ý/ - /J I-1 
TT1 
"" (flflflfl 
flflKv 
"""""" 
"""""""""" 
363 
r 
Yi^; 
ýi: r 
i. 1. 
"""""""""" 
"""""""""" 
iw+`'1',,,, 
"""""""""" 
--, 
"""""""""" 
`-ý `--' - -^ ý1 
ýi ý ,' 
364 
ý:; _ý.. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 6.2. Schematic Face labelling tool 
.... .... .. 
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Appendix 6.3. Face-Emotion Labelling Task Instructions 
I am going to show you some photographs of people's faces (indicate front page of the 
booklet). There are lots of people's faces in here. 
First I want to show you some cartoon faces (participant presented with copy of the 
schematic labelling tool). What do you think this face is showing? (point to far right hand 
schematic face) And what is this face? (far left hand face) And this face? (centre face). If 
the participant fails to give any response prompt with `Are all these cartoon faces the 
same? What is different about them? ' Participant responses recorded. If participant fails to 
give adequate response describe logic of the schematic tool. 
I want you to try to match the photograph of the person to one of these cartoon drawings 
(points to schematic tool). I want you to tick or circle whichever face you think best 
matches the person in the photograph. There is no right or wrong answer. I am just 
interested in what you think. 
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Appendix 7.1. Means-Ends (Social) Problem Solving (MEPS) 
Practice Example 
Two friends have asked you to meet up at the weekend. One wants you to go and play 
football the other wants you to go to the cinema (or let participant make a second suggestion). 
You have said yes to both of them but can't do both. Now you have to choose. End: Both 
friends are happy with you. 
The Five Social Problems and Desired Outcomes 
1 You're not getting along with someone you care about. End: you're getting along with each 
other again fine. 
2. You're having difficulties with a particular teacher. End: you and the teacher are getting 
along. There is no problem. 
3. Your friends seem to be ignoring you. End: your friends like you again. 
4. You have moved to a new school so you don't have any friends there. End: you have new 
friends at the school 
5. You have accidentally broken a window but the unit manager (youth group leader) thinks 
you did it on purpose. End: they believe you that is was an accident. 
Scoring 
Responses are scored along two dimensions: 1) Mean-Ends; the mean number of relevant 
individual steps suggested to solve the problem. 2) Mean-Effectiveness; the overall 
effectiveness rating of the responses per problem. This rating is conducted on a7 point Likert 
scale where 1= not at all effective and 7= extremely effective. MEPS rates indications of 
awareness of obstacles and time references in an effectiveness rating. An effective solution is 
one that achieves the problem solving goals while maximising positive outcomes and 
minimizing negative outcomes. The relevant outcomes involve long term as well as short- 
term goals. 
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Appendix 7.2. The Schonell Reading List 
tree little milk egg 
book school sit frog 
playing bun flower road 
clock train light picture 
think summer people something 
dream downstairs biscuit shepherd 
thirsty crowd sandwich beginning 
postage island saucer angel 
ceiling appeared gnome canary 
attractive imagine nephew gradually 
smoulder applaud disposal nourished 
diseased university orchestra knowledge 
audience situated physics campaign 
choir intercede fascinate forfeit 
siege recent plausible prophecy 
colonel soloist systematic slovenly 
classificatio n genuine institution pivot 
conscience heroic pneumoni a preliminary 
antique susceptible enigma oblivion 
scintillate satirical sabre beguile 
terrestrial belligerent adamant sepulchre 
statistics miscellaneous procrastinate tyrannical 
evangelical grotesque ineradicable judicature 
preferential homonym fictitious rescind 
metamorphosis somnambulist bibliography idiosyncrasy 
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Overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) is strongly associated with 
depression in adults and appears to reflect a stable cognitive bias. However, it is 
not known whether this bias exists in children or what factors contribute to its 
development. We examined the roles of age, dysphoria, and a new variable, 
emotion focusing (EF), on the production of specific autobiographical memory 
(AM) in children, using the standard Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Results show that older children are more specific 
than younger children, irrespective of cue valence. Dysphoria was linked to less 
specific retrieval of positive memories in children. A three-way interaction 
between age, valence, and dysphoria was also found, such that older dysphoric 
children demonstrated a difficulty in retrieving specific negative memories. In 
addition, emotion focusing was associated with specific AM recall, especially to 
negative cues. Results are discussed with reference to the development of 
depressogenic biases. 
Depression in adults is reliably associated with an overgeneral autobiographical 
memory (OGM) retrieval style (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). Evidence 
suggests that overgeneral retrieval exists as part of a stable, dysfunctional 
cognitive style and is somewhat independent of current mood (e. g., Brittlebank, 
Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Mackinger, Pachinger, & Leibertseder, 2000). 
This has led a number of theorists to assert that the roots of this bias may lie in 
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childhood. Williams (1996) proposed that an OGM style may develop from 
early childhood as a means of coping with negative affect. Individuals, for 
example, who have experienced trauma during childhood, have greater difficulty 
in retrieving specific memories in adulthood, even for events unrelated to the 
trauma (e. g., Kuyken & Brewin, 1995). Adolescents exposed to family violence 
during childhood, and reporting comorbid depression, also exhibit an OGM bias 
as evidenced in interview data concerning family conflict (Orbach, Lamb, 
Sternberg, Williams, & Dawud-Noursi, 2001). Although links between devel- 
opment of an OGM style and depression have been made in theory, to date there 
are no studies examining OGM bias in children. Importantly, if overgeneral 
recall does reflect a stable bias, it could be a useful marker of cognitive vul- 
nerability to depression in children. 
We have some insight into the development of the OGM bias from investi- 
gations involving adolescents (de Decker, Hermans, Raes, & Eelen, 2003; Park, 
Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002; Swales, Williams, & Wood, 2001). In these studies, 
as expected from the adult literature, clinically depressed adolescents are more 
overgeneral in their responses to cue words than nondepressed controls. How- 
ever, in the Swales et al. study there was also a positive correlation within the 
clinical population, with the more depressed and hopeless adolescents demon- 
strating greater specificity to negative cues. This is in the opposite direction to 
that which would be expected from previous findings with depressed adults (van 
Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). Post hoc analyses attributed this finding to a 
repeated memory phenomenon, whereby a subset of parasuicidal adolescents 
recalled the same negative traumatic event to more than one cue word. The 
researcher was the therapist in this study, which may also be pertinent to the 
result. Repeated specific recall can be addressed with clear participant instruc- 
tion to prevent or judge repetition. 
Existing studies examining AM retrieval in children have tended to con- 
centrate on the onset of AM recall in preschool to early school age children and 
have used different methodologies from those used in the adult literature. This 
developmental literature reveals that specific questions can yield specific AM 
responses even in very young children. However, overall, young children's 
preferred mode of memory reporting is general (Nelson, 1993). Greater detail, 
structure and reference to temporal markers are then observed in AMs as a 
function of increasing age (Howe & Courage, 1997). These findings are dis- 
cussed in terms of language acquisition (Nelson, 1993) and self-concept for- 
mation (Howe & Courage, 1997) rather than in terms of specificity or generality 
per se. However, improvement in knowledge base, strategy use, language skill, 
self-concept, and storage capacity, with age (for a full review see Howe & 
Courage, 1997), are likely to facilitate AM response specificity. By age 7 the 
quality of children's AM recall is considered comparable with adult functioning 
(Gathercole, 1998). The present study therefore sought to test an early to middle- 
school age child population on the standard AMT cueing task in order to bridge 
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the gap in the AM and depression literature, and to look for evidence of the 
development of or onset of an overgeneral retrieval style prior to its establish- 
ment in adolescence. The use of the AMT cuing methodology then makes direct 
comparison between child and adult retrieval styles possible, providing a clear 
baseline from which to examine any effects of mood. 
We considered that age and dysphoria might also interact to affect AM 
production. In a5 year longitudinal study of 8 to 13-year-olds, Nolen-Hoek- 
sema, Girgus, and Seligman (1992) found that as children age, cognitive style as 
measured by the Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire (Kaslow, Tan- 
nenbaum, & Seligman, 1978), became a significant predictor of depression. In 
contrast, only negative life events predicted depression in the younger group. 
Authors suggest the reason for this apparent increasing role of cognitive style in 
depression with age may be due to cognitive capacities increasing with age, or 
because cognitive styles become more stable across later childhood. Similar data 
exist, showing an increasing relationship between depression and mood con- 
gruent memory bias with age (Neshat-Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule, & Dal- 
gleish, 1998). If age, mood, and cognition do interact in this way, the association 
between dysphoria and overgeneral retrieval may manifest itself differently in 
younger as opposed to older children. 
A further factor that might interact with age and dysphoria to influence AM 
retrieval is cue valence. In the adult literature, overgeneral recall can occur more 
in response to positive (as opposed to negative) cue words (e. g., Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986) or it can show the reverse effect (e. g., Mackinger, 2000). 
Inconsistent valence effects in depressed groups may be attributable to variance 
in the relative casual contribution of affect regulation (Williams, 1996), tem- 
porary memory system disruption caused by schema activation (Dalgleish et al., 
2003) or mood congruency (see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997). 
All are likely to play a role. It is also possible that age further influences this 
valence effect. Drummond, Dritschel, Astell, and O'Carroll (2005) tested chil- 
dren aged 6-11 years and a young adult comparison group on perception of 
facial affect. Ability to recognise facial emotion increased with increasing 
chronological age in this study. The results showed that there was no significant 
difference between adults and children on recognition of happy or neutral faces. 
However, there was a significant difference between children and adults on 
rating of sad faces. Children were significantly poorer than adults on identifi- 
cation of negative facial affect. Children made many "sad as neutral" type 
errors, suggesting there might be an important developmental effect of proces- 
sing of negatively valenced material in children. An aim of the present study was 
to further investigate this issue. 
Finally, this study is the first to introduce the idea of emotion focusing (EF) as 
a possible additional variable influencing the overgeneral effect. Motivation for 
studying this variable comes from Williams (1996) who argued that OGM may 
in part, be attributable to preferential encoding of situations according to their 
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emotional content. Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby (2000) restated that 
trauma in early childhood may result in a cognitive style in which individuals 
habitually focus on, or are hypersensitive to, the affective features of events. The 
extent to which individuals focus on (encode) the emotional features of their 
environment is an important factor that has hitherto been neglected in both child 
and adult investigations of AM retrieval. EF was therefore used in this study to 
denote individuals' predisposition to focus on the emotional features of their 
environment. For example, given a typical scenario of a university library during 
an exam period, one individual may encode the fact that several students at their 
desks look terrified and tearful, while another individual, viewing the same 
scene, may notice instead that there is a pile of precariously stacked books 
against a chair leg. The first individual will be effectively cued to remember the 
library event by the word "fear" while the second individual would be better 
cued by the phrase "safety hazard" and would probably not remember the event 
based on an emotional descriptor. 
Regarding AM predictions concerning EF, Williams (1996) suggested that 
people who have a greater tendency to encode the emotional content of situa- 
tions would be more likely to demonstrate overgeneral recall than those who do 
not. This argument is based on the assumption that focusing on emotion pro- 
motes schematic level encoding. OGM would then result in individuals who 
were sensitised to emotion during childhood and therefore may encode emotion 
preferentially, for example, in the case of early childhood trauma. This hypo- 
thesised link between EF, overgeneral recall, and vulnerability to depression has 
not as yet been investigated. 
Other theoretical accounts of cognition-emotion relations may however, 
make different predictions. For example, cognitive theories of depressed mood 
and/or AM (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Bower, 1981; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Teasdale 
& Barnard, 1993) would suggest that, to the extent that a specific auto- 
biographical event is encoded in emotional terms, the presence of a congruent 
emotional cue word (such as in the AMT) would be more likely to elicit retrieval 
of that event from memory. The rationale here is that retrieval of AMs is 
facilitated by the presence of any information that maps on to the underlying 
representational content of that memory. Consequently, because high EF indi- 
viduals would habitually lay down AM representations with a greater proportion 
of emotional content, the presentation of emotional cues should be more likely 
to activate those representations leading to facilitated generation of specific 
memories. An alternative hypothesis for the effect of EF on AM retrieval is 
therefore, that individuals' predisposition to focus on the emotional features of 
their environment may result in more specific AM recall to emotional cue 
words. People who are depressed may preferentially encode negative affective 
aspects of events, such that depressed high emotion-focusers would be highly 
specific to negative cues. It is currently not known whether EF is associated with 
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overgeneral or specific valenced recall. The final aim of the present study was 
therefore to investigate the influence of EF, and the putative interactions of EF, 
age, valence, and dysphoria, on AM retrieval in children. 
Although OGM is characteristically discussed as a retrieval phenomenon, it is 
also useful to consider it as a possible encoding phenomenon. It is not clear that 
children or adults encode all information in a given context and then later 
suppress specific aspects at retrieval. Instead, some individuals may avoid or 
preferentially encode specific features (or emotional features) of events such that 
it effects specific representations in memory. This would mean that both 
encoding and storage (not just retrieval) are important in understanding the 
overgeneral bias. Whether considered in isolation or interacting with other 
factors, such as age, dysphoria, or valence, EF may significantly influence the 
nature of AM recall and thereby, the development of depressive associated 
biases. 
In sum, the overall aim of this study was to extend the adult AM literature to 
a child population. To our knowledge, no one study has looked at the interaction 
of age, dysphoria, and valence as factors known to influence AM. Nor has any 
study looked at child AM using the standard cueing task, or considered EF as a 
contributing factor. The specific hypotheses were therefore as follows. 
Hypothesis 1 
Age, valence, and dysphoria will interact to influence AM specificity in chil- 
dren. Younger children will be less specific than older children. Age and valence 
will interact such that young children will demonstrate reduced specificity 
especially to negative cue words. Dysphoria in children will be associated with 
reduced specificity and the effects of dysphoria will be valence specific. The 
effects of dysphoria may increase with age. These effects will remain after 
controlling for any effects of general scholastic ability. 
Hypothesis 2 
Emotion focusing will explain a significant proportion of the variance in AM 
specificity. EF will be associated with either increased or reduced AM speci- 
ficity. EF will also interact with age, valence or dysphoria, factors already 
known to influence AM retrieval. The effects of EF will occur independent of 
scholastic ability or age. 
METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 70 children (35 girls) took part in this study. Of the participants, 35 
were aged 7-8 years (M= 7.86, SD = 0.40). The remaining 35 participants were 
aged 10-11 years (M= 10.6, SD = 0.72). The gender ratio across age groups was 
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similar with 17 females in the younger group and 18 females in the older group. 
As previously discussed, children aged 7-8 years were chosen as the youngest 
age group for which AM retrieval is believed to be commensurate with adult 
functioning. Children aged 10-11 were then chosen to provide a discrete age 
comparison group and to form a good bridge with previous adolescence lit- 
erature (e. g., Park et al., 2002). These two age groups ensured the best chance of 
detecting any deviance in normal child AM development, if any exists. There 
were 14 dysphoric participants (8 from the younger group and 6 from the older 
group). The remaining participants (27 and 29 respectively) were categorised as 
nondysphoric. "Dysphoric" in this study means reporting a depressive mood (as 
indicated by a score of 7 or above on the Child Depression Inventory; Kovacs, 
1992, see the next section). 
All participants were volunteers recruited from a London, UK junior school. 
The school was initially contacted to sanction the research proposal. Research 
approval was then obtained from the relevant ethical bodies. Permission to 
conduct research was sought from individual classroom teachers, followed by a 
letter of consent to parents and finally written consent from the children 
themselves. The sample was ethnically mixed. No individual with special 
educational needs was included in this study. No child with any known history 
of trauma or emotional disturbance, as established from school records and 
teacher reports, was included. We elected to use this criterion since a history of 
trauma is known to influence AM recall (e. g., de Decker et al., 2003) and there 
would have been insufficient children with a history of trauma to examine any 
such influences systematically. 
Materials and measures 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The 
task comprised 10 emotional words, 5 positively valenced (happy, surprised, 
safe, successful, interested) and 5 negatively valenced (sad, lonely, hurt, 
careless, angry). Words were presented to participants on 120 mm x 100 mm 
laminated cards and participants were asked to retrieve a specific memory for 
each cue word. All participants completed three practice trials involving neutral 
words, with feedback, to ensure that all participants understood and were able to 
complete the requirements of the task. Every child retrieved at least one specific 
memory during the practice trial. Participants were informed that that they 
would be prompted to provide a specific memory if an overgeneral response was 
given (i. e., a memory that was not of a particular event on a given day). In 
addition, clear instruction was given requesting the child not to give the same 
memory to more than one cue word, to avoid the phenomenon of "repeated 
memories" discussed earlier. The presentation of cue words was mixed across 
valence. Participants were given 60 s to retrieve a memory. Failure to respond 
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was coded as an omission; failure to retrieve a memory was coded as a "no 
memory". Failure to retrieve a specific memory resulted in the allocation of an 
overgeneral response categorisation for that cue word. All participant responses 
were recorded on audiotape and later coded for specificity. 
Two independent raters coded the AM responses as either specific, over- 
general (OGM; extended or categoric; where an extended memory is of a single 
event lasting more than one day and a categoric memory is a generic collection 
or class of events) or as "no memory". The mean numbers of specific first 
response memories for each child, as a proportion of all responses, were used as 
the data for analysis. An example of scoring of an OGM response to the cue 
word "Lonely" was, "When I was in Year Two I used to sit on the lonely bench 
every playtime". This was coded as overgeneral because it is a categoric 
memory. A specific memory response to the same cue was, "On Friday - When 
I was at home. I had no-one to play with 'cause my brothers were out at a friends 
and I wasn't allowed to go". This memory was coded as a specific response 
because the memory is of a particular place and time (of less than I day). Over 
85% interrater reliability was achieved on coding of these responses. This 
reliability estimate is comparable to reliability rates found in the adult literature 
(e. g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
Validity of the AMT for use in children was established in several ways. No 
child failed to retrieve a specific AM to at least one practice cue word and some 
of the experimental cue words. Some children in the youngest age group were 
unsure of the meaning of the words "successful" or "careless" (N= 4). In these 
instances, the experimenter explained the meaning of the word by invariably 
saying "good at something" or "clumsy". This was sufficient for all children to 
acknowledge their understanding of the word and quickly retrieve a valid 
memory (specific/overgeneral). There were only seven "no memory" responses 
in total, which were distributed across age (three from older children) and cues. 
There were no omissions or memory repetitions. Content validity was also 
examined by having two raters judge whether the content of the reported 
memory was appropriate to the cue word used to elicit the memory. All children 
recalled appropriate content memories. High content validity was confirmed by 
over 95% interrater agreement on memory content appropriateness on a random 
50% of the sample. 
Emotion focusing (EF). A measure of EF was constructed using combined 
results from two tasks: Card Sorting and Image Description. The Card Sorting 
Task consisted of a set of 12 cards (90 mm x 60 mm) each portraying an adult 
face displaying one of three different emotional facial expressions (happy, 
neutral, or sad). The faces were arranged in a6x2 formation and consisted of 
an equal gender mix, mixed age, and appearance (e. g., hair length, colour). The 
faces were not of mixed race due to limited availability. All photographs were 
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drawn from a sample set of faces, which had previously been used and received 
over 75% interrater agreement concerning the emotion being portrayed (Le Gal 
& Bruce, 1999). First, the experimenter verified that each child understood the 
nature of grouping and physically demonstrated that the cards could be sorted 
into two groups, using gender as the most obvious sorting category. Once 
established, the cards were then replaced and the children were required to sort 
the cards according to their own sorting category, verbalising the decision as 
soon as one was made. A score of 1 was given when the child sorted the faces 
according to affect (emotion). A score of 0 was given for any other 
(nonemotional) sorting category. The sorting categories suggested by children 
were emotion (happy and sad faces), hair colour, hair length, age, face shape, 
and subjective attractiveness. 
The second EF task was the Image Description Task. This involved a picture- 
cueing methodology. A series of 11 photographic images of socioemotional 
behavioural settings (e. g., family laughing around a dinner table; child being 
admonished by parent figure), were drawn from a developmental psychology 
stimulus pool. The 11 images were presented to the participants as 200 mm x 
150 mm laminates, and depicted for example, "Parents standing over a baby, 
smiling". All but one of the cards involved a child protagonist. Protagonists 
were of mixed age and race. Participants were simply asked to "Tell me what 
you see" in response to being shown each pictorial card. The participant 
responses were recorded and later coded for emotional description. Subjects 
were given a score of 1 if an emotional adjective or adverb was used in the 
description of the card, for example "happy, excited, loving". A score of zero 
was given for each card where no emotional description was given, for example 
"a baby, a mum and a dad". Two raters examined participant responses in terms 
of these categories. When emotion was implied but an emotional adjective was 
not directly used (e. g., "running hard" or "dad is making up with son for 
missing him play football"), it was decided that a strict criterion would be used 
and only an emotional descriptive would result in an emotional classification. 
That is, inference of emotion was not sufficient to classify as an emotional 
description. Using this criterion, 100% interrater category agreement was 
achieved. 
From these two tasks a combined measure of EF was constructed whereby the 
sample was divided into high, medium, or low emotion-focusers according to 
the following criteria. The criteria for low EF was that the participant neither 
sorted the cards by emotion nor used emotion descriptions in over 75% of the 
images in the image description task. The criteria for medium EF was that the 
participant either sorted the cards by emotion or described over 75% of the 
images in terms of emotion. The criteria for high EF required the participant to 
both sort the cards by emotion and describe over 75% of the images in terms of 
emotion. This classification was considered statistically reasonable in the 
absence of any other theoretical or empirical constraints. 
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Child Depression Inventory (CDI-S). The shortened version of the Child 
Depression Inventory (CDI-S; Kovacs, 1992) was completed. This measure 
consists of 10 mood-related items with three possible responses per item. 
Participants are directed to indicate which of each of the three statements best 
applies to them over the last 2 weeks. The statements are read out loud to the 
participants and participants are required to tick the most appropriate statement 
to them. According to CDI guidelines (Kovacs, 1992) participants with a CDI 
score of 7 or above are classed as dysphoric and those with scores below 7 are 
classed as nondysphoric. The word "dysphoric" is used in this study rather than 
"depressed" simply to stress that the current authors felt the measure best 
reflects a depressive mood or emotional state characterised by depression, which 
can be transient, rather than a depression disorder, which should be formally 
diagnosed. 
General Ability A measure of scholastic ability was constructed for each 
child using a combination of teacher report and age appropriate National 
Curriculum Attainment levels. This is a method of ability grouping commonly 
used in British primary school education. From these two sources, children were 
divided into high, medium, and low ability groups. Where discrepancy existed 
between groupings based on optional SAT levels (e. g., high attainment in maths 
but medium attainment in English), the teacher's summative assessment on 
overall ability was used as the final criterion. Although Standard IQ measures 
are more commonplace and therefore easier to interpret across studies, the 
measure of scholastic ability was favoured to respect testing time constraints, to 
avoid unnecessary stress caused to individuals by IQ testing in a young and 
partly dysphoric sample, and to utilise teacher reports of child potential for an 
arguably stronger index of actual ability. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually and face-to-face, in a quiet testing envir- 
onment within the school. Participants were first asked to complete the AMT, 
followed by the two EF tasks and the CDI. Task order was fixed to avoid 
possible contamination effects of the CDI or EF on the AMT. Once the parti- 
cipants had completed all four experimental tasks they were thanked for their 
participation and fully debriefed. After the testing session an indicator of general 
scholastic ability was obtained from school records and in consultation with the 
appropriate class teacher. 
RESULTS 
The numbers of specific autobiographical memories (AMs) by age, dysphoria, 
and cue valence are shown in Table 1. In keeping with predictions, the data in 
Table 1 indicate that young nondysphoric children are less specific to negative 
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TABLE 1 
Means and (standard deviations) of positive and negative specific autobiographical memories 
(AMs) recalled by dysphoric and nondysphoric children, grouped by age 
AMs recalled 
Cue 7-8 years 10-11 years Total 
valence (it = 35) (n = 35) (n = 70) 
Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total Positive Negative Total 
Nondysphoric 2.97 0.93 3.90 4.48 4.22 8.70 3.70 2.51 6.21 
(n = 56) (1.27) (1.25) (2.08) (0.85) (1.15) (1.30) (1.32) (2.04) (2.98) 
Dysphoric 1.67 2.00 3.67 2.88 3.00 5.88 2.36 2.57 4.93 
(n = 14) (1.21) (2.37) (3.14) (0.64) (1.51) (1.55) (1.10) (1.91) (2.53) 
Total 2.74 1.11 3.86 4.11 3.94 8.06 3.43 2.53 5.96 
(n = 70) (1.34) (1.51) (2.24) (1.05) (1.33) (1.80) (1.38) (2.00) (2.92) 
cues than to positive cues. Furthermore, young dysphoric children appear to 
recall more specific negative memories and fewer specific positive memories 
compared to their nondysphoric age equivalents. The data also indicate that 
dysphoric children in the older group are less specific than older nondysphoric 
children to both positive and negative cues, suggesting evidence of the OGM 
bias. 
A three-way ANOVA with Age (7-8 yrs and 10-11 yrs), Dysphoria (high and 
low), and Valence (positive and negative) was conducted to examine this 
assumption. General Ability (high, medium, and low) was initially included as a 
covariate but was not significant, F(1,65) = 1.56, p= . 22. Reported analyses are 
therefore without this covariate. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of Age, F(1,66) = 38.80, p< . 001, such that older children were more specific 
than younger children. Results also revealed a main effect of Dysphoria, F(1,66) 
= 7.38, p= . 01, such that overall 
dysphoric children were less specific than 
nondysphoric children. There was also a Valence trend, F(1,66) = 3.77, p= 
0.056, in that children tended to recall fewer specific negative memories than 
positive. However, these main effects were qualified by a three-way interaction 
between Age x Valence x Dysphoria on AM recall, F(l, 66) = 4.4, p= . 04. 
In order to deconstruct this three-way interaction, 3 two-way ANOVAs were 
conducted. The first examined the relationship between Age and Dysphoria on 
recall to positive cues, the second looked at the relationship between Age and 
Dysphoria on recall to negative cues. A third ANOVA was conducted to directly 
examine the relationship between Age and Valence on AM recall. In the first 2 
x2 ANOVA (Age x Dysphoria) on specific positive recall there remained a 
main effect of Age, F(1,65) = 8.25, p <. 001, such that younger children recalled 
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fewer specific positive memories than older children and a main effect of 
Dysphoria, F(1,65) = 20.75, p< . 001, such that dysphoric children recalled 
fewer specific memories to positive cues than nondysphoric. There was no 
significant interaction between Age and Dysphoria on positive recall, F(1,65) _ 
. 26, p=. 
63. 
In the second 2x2 ANOVA (Age x Dysphoria) on specific negative recall 
there remained a main effect of Age, F(1,65) = 27.31, p< . 001, such that 
younger children recalled fewer specific negative memories than older children. 
There was no main effect of Dysphoria, F(1,65) = 0.04, p= . 85. However, there 
was a significant interaction between Age and Dysphoria, F(1,65) = 7.79, p= 
. 007, such that nondysphoric children's recall of negative memories sig- 
nificantly improved across age, t(54) = 10.21, p< . 001, while dysphoric chil- 
dren's negative specific recall, though higher than non-dysphorics in the 
younger group, stayed static across age, t(12) = 0.97, p= . 35. Moreover, by age 
10-11 years, dysphoric children recalled significantly fewer specific memories 
to negative cues than their nondysphoric age equivalents, t(33) = 2.4, p= . 02, in 
keeping with an OGM bias. 
In order to directly examine the relationship between Age and Valence a2x 
2 ANOVA (Age x Valence) was conducted. Results show a main effect of Age, 
F(1,68) = 74.92, p< . 001, a main effect of Valence, F(1,68) = 20.17, p< . 001, 
and a significant interaction between Age and Valence, F(1,68) = 13.22, p< 
. 001, such that older children were more specific than younger children to 
both 
positive, 1(68) = 4.77, p< . 001, and negative cues, t(68) = 8.32, p< . 001. 
However, children in the younger group recalled significantly fewer memories 
to negative cues compared to positive, 1(34) = 5.45, p< . 001. This valence 
difference was not significant in the older group, t(34) = 0.64, p=0.53. 
In summary, and as can be seen in Table 1, age affected positive and 
negative recall such that older children were more specific to both. Dys- 
phoria exerted a main effect on positive recall such that dysphoric children 
retrieved fewer specific positive memories than nondysphoric children. The 
three-way interaction above was attributable to age and dysphoria interact- 
ing to influence the recall of. negative memories. Young nondysphoric chil- 
dren showed low specificity to negative cues. Older nondysphoric children 
showed relatively high negative specificity. In contrast, young dysphoric chil- 
dren showed higher specificity to negative cues than their same age counter- 
parts and yet specificity to negative cues in the older dysphoric group was 
comparatively low. 
The following analyses addressed the second study hypothesis, which was 
that EF would contribute to AM specificity and may interact with other factors 
to influence specificity. This is the first study to examine EF. It was therefore 
important to first establish that EF was not simply a correlate of another vari- 
able, such as age or scholastic ability, which would reduce the usefulness of EF 
as a measure. There was, however, no correlation between EF and Age (rs = . 13, 
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it = 70, p= . 27); General Scholastic Ability (rs = . 08, n= 70, p= . 51); or Dysphoria (rs = . 12, it = 70, p= . 3) in this sample. 
Subsequently, an enter-stepwise regression model was conducted on total 
specific AMs such that Age and Dysphoria were entered in a first step and EF 
was added in a second step, to investigate whether EF accounted for unique 
variance in AM specificity, over and above any effects of age and dysphoria. 
Age and Dysphoria accounted for significant variance in AM specificity, 
F(2,69) = 45.69, p <. 001, Adjusted R2 = . 56. The inclusion of EF resulted in a 
significant additional 12% of variance being explained (R2 change = . 12, F= 25.05, p> . 001). The final model included Age as the best independent predictor 
of specificity (r=. 72, n= 70, P. 66, p <. 001), followed by EF (r =. 47, n= 70, ß 
. 35, p< . 001), and then Dysphoria (r =. 07, n= 70, ß -. 27, p <. 001). All three 
variables contributed to a significant final model accounting for 68% of the 
variance in specificity, F(3,69) = 49.75, p <. 001, Adjusted R2 = . 68. There was 
no collinearity between variables (VIF < 2). 
Given that EF was shown to be an important predictor of AM specificity, we 
repeated the analyses used to test Hypothesis 1, this time including EF as an 
additional factor. Two 3x2x2 ANOVAs with EF (high, medium, and low), 
Age (7-8 yrs and 10-11 yrs), and Dysphoria (dysphoric and nondysphoric) were 
therefore conducted, first for positive and then for negative valence. This was 
done to test the hypothesis that EF would interact with other factors known to 
influence AM performance. 
Once again results of the analysis of positive recall showed the main effects 
of Age, F(1,58) = 18.68, p <. 001, and Dysphoria, F(1,58) = 28.95, p <. 001. As 
can be seen in Table 2, there was no main effect of EF on positive recall, 
F(2,58) = 1.79, p= . 18. However, a significant interaction was found between 
EF and Age on positive recall, F(2,58) =4.29, p=. 018, such that older children 
were more specific than younger children in the low and medium EF categories, 
t(17) = 3.04, p= . 007, and 1(28) = 4.13, p< . 001, respectively. However, in the 
high EF group there was no significant difference between younger and older 
children's specific positive recall, 1(19) = -0.91, p= . 38. Young children are 
just as likely to produce a specific positive memory as older children in this 
group. There was no significant three-way interaction between EF, Age and 
Dysphoria, F(2,58) = 0.25, p= . 78, and no interaction between EF and Dys- 
phoria, F(2,58) = 1.02, p= . 37. 
When EF was included in an analysis of specific negative recall, there 
remained a main effect of Age, F(1,58) = 35.18, p <. 001, with no main effect of 
Dysphoria, F(1,58) = 1.41, p= . 24. However, EF exerted a main effect on 
negative recall, F(2,58) = 17.02, p< . 001, such that high emotion-focusers were 
more specific to negative cues compared to low, t(38) = 6.12, p< . 001, or 
medium, t(48) = 3.70, p< . 001, emotion-focusers. EF did not interact with Age 
to affect negative recall, F(2,58) = 1.74, p= . 18, nor was there any three-way 
interaction between EF, Dysphoria, and Age, F(2,58) = 1.22, p =30. Of interest 
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TABLE 2 
Means and (standard deviations) of positive and negative specific AMs recalled by children 
within emotion focusing (EF) and age categories 
Emotion focusing (EF) 
Low Medium 
(n = 19) (n = 30) 
Nigh 
(n=21) 
Age (yrs) 7-8 
(ii - 12) 
10-11 
(n - 7) 
Total 
(ºr - 19) 
7-8 
(n = 16) 
10-11 
(n = 14) 
Total 
(n = 30) 
7-8 
(n = 7) 
10-11 Total 
(n = 14) (n = 21) 
Negative 0.5 2.42 1.21 0.75 4.00 2.27 3.00 4.64 4.10 
(1.00) (1.27) (1.44) (0.86) (1.18) (1.93) (2.00) (0.84) (1.51) 
Positive 2.25 4.14 2.95 2.87 4.36 3.57 3.29 3.86 3.67 
(1.42) (1.06) (1.58) (1.15) (0.74) (1.22) (1.50) (1.29) (1.35) 
to us was whether EF and Dysphoria would interact significantly to influence 
negative specificity, however, no such interaction was found, F(2,58) = 1.68, p 
= . 20. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study show that age, dysphoria, and cue valence interact to 
influence AM specificity in children. Older children are more specific than 
younger children especially to negative cues. Dysphoric children are overgeneral 
to positive cues and there is an interaction between age, dysphoria, and cue 
valence such that older dysphoric children are also overgeneral to negative cues. 
Regarding EF, high emotion-focusers produce specific AMs and EF sig- 
nificantly predicts unique variance in AM specificity. Each of the main findings 
is discussed in turn and possible mechanistic implications are considered. 
First, as predicted, older children were able to produce a specific memory 
more readily than younger children. This suggests that between 7 and 11 years 
of age, a child's autobiographical recall develops from a general to a more 
specific memory style. This is consistent with the finding in the developmental 
literature that memorial ability develops with age (Howe & Courage, 1997; 
Nelson, 1993). As predicted, this effect of age on specificity was further 
influenced by cue valence. Younger children produced fewer specific memories 
in response to negative cues than to positive. This difference was not apparent 
with the older children, who presented approximately equal numbers of positive 
and negative specific memories. This age by valence effect has not been pre- 
viously demonstrated and it suggests that it is particularly children's specific 
negative recall, which improves with age. It is clear that the development of 
cognitive processing of valenced stimuli in children is an interesting and 
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previously neglected area of research, which could hold clues to the origins of 
information processing biases associated with depression. In addition, if AM in a 
normal population develops from a general to a specific retrieval style with age, 
the question remains whether in a depressed population memory fails to develop 
into a specific style or whether depressed individuals regress back to an over- 
general style. 
Our results are the first to provide direct evidence that dysphoria is linked to 
OGM in children. Dysphoric children retrieved significantly fewer specific 
positive AMs than non-dysphoric children, irrespective of age. This is consistent 
with the well-documented adult AM literature, and with adolescent findings in 
general. Moreover, age and dysphoria interacted to affect specific negative 
retrieval, such that there was an effect of dysphoria on negative recall in the 
older group. Dysphoric children in the older group retrieved significantly fewer 
specific negative memories compared to their non-dysphoric age equivalents. 
What is more, when we examined the pattern of negative AM retrieval across 
groups more closely, we found that the younger dysphoric children retrieved 
more specific negative memories than their nondysphoric age-group counter- 
parts. However, while nondysphoric negative recall significantly improved 
across age group, the same was not true for dysphoric children. By age 10-11 
years, therefore, dysphoric children were retrieving significantly fewer specific 
negative memories than nondysphoric older children. Thus, though dysphoric 
children demonstrate reduced specificity for both negative and positive cues, the 
effects of dysphoria on negative recall are only really apparent in the older 
group. 
It may be that dysphoria affects positive and negative recall through different 
underlying mechanisms or processes. For instance, dysphoria may be affecting 
positive recall via mood congruency, which is a relatively autonomous 
mechanism based on spreading activation and therefore less dependent on age or 
cognitive ability than other possible mechanisms. In contrast, the impact of 
dysphoria on negative recall may be more schema dependent, and therefore its 
effect on recall is not observed until later in childhood when schemas are more 
firmly in place. In keeping with this schema explanation, repeated experience of 
dysphoric mood may allow negative biases to become more engrained and better 
established in older dysphoric children. In younger dysphoric children, however, 
negative schemas may be less well defined and therefore exert less influence on 
information processing. This interpretation though speculative, is supported by 
results from Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1992), which showed that effects of cog- 
nition on depression increased with increasing age. This interpretation is also 
consistent with results from Neshat-Doost et al. (1998) who found evidence 
suggestive of an age-related increase in the elaboration of negative self-referent 
schematic representations in depressed youth. Predictions from kindling and 
sensitisation theory would also lend credence to this type of interpretation (see 
for example, Segal, Williams, Teasdale, & Gemar, 1996). 
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Alternatively, it may be that a young child's negative AM response style is 
already so highly overgeneral that dysphoria can exert little additional effect. It 
would therefore not be until later in childhood, when children have typically 
developed a more specific retrieval style, that the overgeneral effect of dys- 
phoria on negative recall would become apparent. Interestingly, this relative 
difficulty in retrieving specific negative memories in older dysphoric children is 
not in keeping with the finding that depressed adolescents demonstrate highly 
specific recall to negative cues (e. g., Park et al., 2002). Further research is 
needed to track the evolution of the OGM bias and to clarify the differences in 
valence specific AM styles in children, adults, and adolescents. 
Our study has also introduced the idea of emotion focusing as a potential 
vulnerability marker for depression. EF significantly contributed to predicting 
variance in AM specificity, even above the predictive value of age and dys- 
phoria. Our results indicate that high emotion-focusers demonstrate specific 
memory recall to emotional cue words. Thus, an emotion-focuser who pre- 
ferentially focuses on emotion in the environment may form memory repre- 
sentations with relatively high emotional content. When these individuals are 
then asked to recall events in response to emotional cue words, specific retrieval 
is then relatively easy for these individuals. EF could be important, especially if 
attempts are made to assist people in recalling specific AM information, 
something that is a core component of some cognitive-based clinical treatments. 
Emotion encoding does not appear to correspond with overgeneral retrieval 
as expected by Williams (1996). However, it is proposed that with the addition 
of an environmental stressor, EF may emerge as a vulnerability factor for 
depression, more in keeping with the trauma-induced EF hypothesis proposed by 
Williams. EF is clearly a meaningful new measure for use with children and 
adults and warrants further investigation. 
It is important to note that EF was not correlated with any measured inde- 
pendent variable in this study. Although there was an interaction between age 
and EF on positive recall, there was no colinearity with this variable. EF was not 
a product of age nor was there any correlation between scholastic ability or 
dysphoria, and EF. Therefore the variability accounted for by EF in this study is 
clearly not attributable in any straightforward way to the effects of dysphoria, 
age, or ability. Further longitudinal studies are required to look more closely at 
the relationship between negative life events, EF, and AM retrieval over time. It 
may be, for example, that EF interacts with ruminative style to affect AM and 
depressive mood. 
Furthermore, in order to develop the measure of EF a greater range of stimuli 
could be added to the image description element, or a more sophisticated coding 
system could be introduced, whereby different levels of description are recog- 
nised. It might also be helpful under some circumstances to accept inference of 
emotion if it is found, for example, to be a typical descriptive style of some 
groups. In addition, high emotion focusing was associated with AM specificity. 
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It would be interesting to test individuals on nonemotional cue words (in 
addition to emotional cue words), to test whether high EF individuals still 
demonstrate specific recall outwith their area of focal interest. EF is a new 
measure so no data are available to validate its use and the division used here to 
differentiate high, medium, and low EF was selected only as a prudent statistical 
division. In future, more sophisticated coding and classification categories could 
be explored. 
Regarding other caveats or limitations of the present study, it was important 
in investigating the possible mechanisms through which overgeneral recall may 
develop and act as a vulnerability marker for the etiology or maintenance of 
depression, that we test a sample vulnerable to clinical depression but not suf- 
fering from it. However, it is not clear in the literature what the precise rela- 
tionship is between dysphoria and depression. We would also anticipate that 
with the addition of clinical data and larger sample sizes, interactions, such as 
that between age and dysphoria, may become significant and a relationship 
between EF and depression would perhaps emerge. Although the present results 
are nonetheless interesting, replication with greater sample sizes would add to 
the strength of the findings; for example, some subgroups in the 3x2x2 
ANOVA design were small, thus leading to reduced power in our investigation 
of the higher order EF interactions. Finally, as noted, this is the first study to use 
the standard AMT in this age range. Although all children retrieved appropriate 
content memories to all cue words and were able to produce specific memories 
to at least some cue words, the lack of established validity and reliability data for 
this measure in children should be acknowledged as a limitation of the study. 
In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of testing AM in children. 
Present results also demonstrate the usefulness of testing children with valenced 
emotional stimuli. As already highlighted, a key finding was that younger 
children tended to retrieve relatively fewer specific memories, particularly in 
response to negative cue words, whereas dysphoric children demonstrated 
reduced specific positive recall. It may be of interest in future studies to track 
this valence effect through development to see what role it may play in the later 
onset of depression. An understanding of the nature and development of normal 
valenced biases in childhood clearly has important implications for under- 
standing the development of depressogenic biases. This study has attempted to 
examine the development of valenced AM specificity as one such bias. Looking 
at AM specificity from this developmental perspective should help us better 
understand the existence of OGM in adults and in psychopathology. The results 
of the current study also suggest that dysphoria affects AM in children, not by 
increasing availability of negative memories but by decreasing the availability 
of specific positive memories. It is unclear what underlying processes are 
responsible for such effects in the AM literature. It is likely though that more 
than one mechanism, bias, or effect is in operation at any given time. Further 
work is needed to unravel the contributions and roles of associated variables. 
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Moreover, examining differential bias across age is essential. It may be, for 
example, that such depressive biases originate with deficits in processing of 
positive information but spread to include negative information processing 
biases with age, or failing intervention. 
Manuscript received September 2005 
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